I N T R O D U C T I O N

B Y P R O F E S S O R D R . S I G M . F R E U D

T h i s present volume of Dr. Varendonck's contains a signifi-
cant novelty, and will justly arouse the interest of all
philosophers, psychologists and psycho-analysts. After an
effort lasting for some years the author has succeeded in
getting hold of the mode of thought-activity to which one
abandons oneself during the state of distraction into which
we readily pass before sleep or upon incomplete awakening.
He has brought to the consciousness the chains of thought
originating in these conditions without the interference of the
will; he has written them down, studied their peculiarities
and differences with directed conscious thinking, and has
made thereby a series of important discoveries which lead
to still vaster problems and give rise to the formulation of
still more far-reaching questions. Many a point in the
psychology of the dream and the defective act finds, thanks
to the observations of Dr. Varendonck, a trustworthy
settlement.

It is not my intention to give a review of the author's
results. I will content myself with pointing to the signifi-
cance of his work and will permit myself only a remark con-
cerning the terminology which he has adopted. He includes
the sort of thought-activity which he has observed in
Bleuler's autistic thinking, but calls it, as a rule, f o r e -
c o n s c i o u s t h i n k i n g, according to the custom prevailing in
psycho-analysis. However, the autistic thinking of Bleuler
 

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10 T H E P S Y C H O L O G Y O F D A Y - D R E A M S

does not by any means correspond with the extension and
the contents of the f o r e - c o n s c i o u s, neither can I admit that
the name used by Bleuler has been happily chosen. The
designation “fore-conscious” thinking itself as a characteristic
appears to me misleading and unsatisfactory. The point in
question is that the sort of thought-activity of which the
well-known day-dream is an example—complete by itself,
developing a situation or an act that is being brought to
a close—constitutes the best and until now the only studied
example. This day-dreaming does not owe its peculiarities
to the circumstance that it proceeds mostly fore-consciously,
nor are the forms changed when it is accomplished consciously.
From another point of view we know also that even strictly
directed reflection may be achieved without the co-operation
of consciousness, that is to say, fore-consciously. For that
reason I think it is advisable, when establishing a distinction
between the different modes of thought-activity, not to utilize
the relation to consciousness in the first instance, and to
designate the day-dream, as well as the chains of thought
studied by Varendonck, as freely wandering or phantastic
thinking, in opposition to intentionally directed reflection.
At the same time it should be taken into consideration
that even phantastic thinking is not invariably in want of
an aim and end-representations.