The Problem of Lay-Analyses1926-002/1927.en
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    45

    III

    To make myself perfectly plain to you, it
    will be necessary for me to acquaint you
    with certain psychological teachings which
    are not known beyond the circle of analysts
    and accordingly, not appreciated beyond this
    group. On the basis of this theory, it will be
    easy for you to deduce what we expect of the
    patient and how we go about obtaining it.

    In explaining matters to you, I will allude
    to our theory dogmatically, as if it already
    were an accepted doctrine. Nevertheless, I
    do not want you to assume that our theory,
    as I shall presently put it before you, came into
    being as a fully developed, well-rounded out
    philosophical system. The development of
    our theory came about only very gradually,
    little by little, and was built up through con-
    tinuous contact with observations. Moreover,
    our theory, in accordance with these obser-
    vations, was continually modified until it

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    The Problem of Lay-Analyses

    finally evolved in a manner apparently satis-
    factory for our purposes.

    Only so short a time as a few years back, it
    would have been necessary for me to express
    this theory in somewhat different terms. And
    even today, I cannot guarantee that the terms
    I am using are definitely fixed and will not be
    modified again. You know very well that
    scientific truths do not burst upon us with the
    unexpectedness of a sudden phenomenon. As
    a rule, any science, long after its early stages,
    lacks the character of definiteness, unchange-
    ability, and infallibility for which our human
    way of thinking longs so intensely. However,
    any science, as it presents itself to contem-
    poraries, is science as its best, so far as con-
    temporaries are able to judge.

    My introductory remarks, I hope, will as-
    sist you in gaining a correct perspective in
    reference to psychoanalysis, especially when
    I ask you to bear in mind that our specific
    science is still very young–hardly as old as
    our century, as a matter of fact–and deals
    with about the most difficult matter presenting
    itself to human research. Let me therefore

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    [47]

    encourage you to interrupt me unabashedly
    in my explanations, when you do not grasp
    the full meaning of my words and require
    further elucidation.

    “I am already interrupting you, even before
    you really start. You say that you are going
    to acquaint me with a new psychology. But I
    was always under the impression that psy-
    chology as such is no new science. As a matter
    of fact, it seems to me there always has been
    enough psychology and enough psychologists.
    In college, I learned of the great things
    achieved in this realm of human endeavor.”

    Far be it from me to deny these achieve-
    ments. However, scrutinizing them closely,
    you will find that they rather belong in the
    category of sensory psychology. A doctrine of
    soul life never had a chance for development,
    because its conception was obstructed by one
    very essential misunderstanding. After all,
    what does psychology embrace today, as it is
    taught in colleges? Aside from a few im-
    portant sensorimotoric perceptions, there are
    just a number of classifications and definitions
    referring to certain processes of the soul

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    The Problem of Lay-Analyses

    which, thanks to the fact that these terms have
    become a part of our living language, are now
    the common property of all educated people.
    To all appearances, such limited information
    does not enable us to clearly grasp our soul
    life.

    Did you ever notice that every philosopher,
    poet, historian and biographer evolves his
    own psychology, based on individual pre-
    sumptions, in regard to the connection and
    the ultimate purpose of psychological phe-
    nomena, all of which are more or less accept-
    able but altogether and equally unreli-
    able? Seemingly, a common foundation is
    missing. Thus it happens that in the realm
    of psychology, there is an utter lack of respect
    and authority. There, obviously, anybody is
    permitted to “poach” or “freelance” to his
    heart’s content.

    ТЕ you touch upon a question of physiology
    or chemistry, nobody will dare speak up, un-
    less he is in possession of authentic informa-
    tion. However, when discussing psychological
    questions, you may expect everybody to ven-
    ture an opinion, or raise his voice in protest.

    [48]

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    49

    The Problem of Lay-Analyses

    Evidently, there is no “professional knowl-
    edge” in his realm! Inasmuch as everybody
    has a soul life, everybody considers himself a
    born psychologist.

    There is a story of an old woman who of-
    fered her services to take care of babies. When
    asked whether she knew anything about
    babies, her answer was: Why, sure, haven’t I
    been a baby myself once?

    “And this common foundation of soul life,
    overlooked by all psychologists, you claim to
    have discovered through the observation of
    ailing people?”

    I do not believe that the origin of our find-
    ings minimizes their value. Embryology, for
    example, would not enjoy any confidence as a
    science if it were unable to explain clearly
    the origin of pre-natal deformities.

    You will remember that I have mentioned
    before persons whose thoughts insist upon
    travelling their own way. To such an extent
    as a matter of fact, that such persons are
    forced to ponder about problems which do not
    interest them at all.

    Do you believe that psychology, as gener-
     

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    The Problem of Lay-Analyses

    ally taught, will be in a position to render
    even so much as the slightest assistance for the
    explanation of such anomalies? And after all,
    there is not one of us whose thoughts, during
    the night, do not travel their very own way,
    creating visions which we are unable to inter-
    pret, which we are at a loss to understand, and
    which frequently appear to be, to an almost
    disquieting extent, products of morbidity.

    I am now referring to our dream life!
    Among the majority of people, the opinion
    always prevailed, and still prevails, that there
    is an inherent meaning to dreams, that some
    attention ought to be paid to our nocturnal
    visions, that a certain interpretative value is at-
    tached to them. Orthodox psychologists have
    never been able to interpret the meaning of
    dreams. To them, dreams were something
    with which they did not know what to do. And
    as soon as orthodox psychology tried to inter-
    pret our dream life, their explanations ven-
    tured far afield from psychology proper.
    Dreams, according to them, were nothing
    other than the result of physiological sensa-
    tions, originating from an unequal soundness

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    51

    of sleep in different parts of the brain. I ven-
    ture to state right here, that any psychology
    unable to explain the essence of our dreams
    is also inapplicable to the understanding of
    normal soul life and cannot be expected to be
    recognized as science.

    “You are becoming so aggressive that I sur-
    mise one of your sensitive spots has been
    touched upon. I have heard before that in
    psychoanalysis great value is attached to
    dreams, that dreams are interpreted and be-
    hind them old memories of actual events are
    sought. On the other hand, I also know that
    the interpretation of dreams is left to the ar-
    bitrary conception of the analyst and that the
    analysts between themselves have frequent
    squabbles, in regard to the question of how to
    interpret a certain dream and the justification
    of arriving at certain conclusions. If this is
    really the case, I do not think you should stress
    the advantage of psychoanalysis, in regard to
    orthodox psychology.”

    There you have said something very appro-
    priate. It is only too true that the interpreta-
    tion of dreams in theory, as well as practice of

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    52

    psychoanalysis, has achieved incomparable
    importance.

    If at this point, I appear to be aggressive to
    you, this must be looked upon as a defense
    mechanism. When I reflect upon all the nui-
    sance brought about by some of our analysts
    in connection with the interpretation of
    dreams, I could despair. I feel like quoting
    the pessimistic truism of our great satirist
    Nestroy, who once said: “Any progress is only
    half as great as it seems to be in the begin-
    ning!” But haven’t you noticed that we mortals
    are always bent upon confounding everything
    and distorting it? Nevertheless, with a little
    caution and self-training, most of the dangers
    lurking behind the interpretation of dreams
    can be avoided.

    But it will never be possible for me to get
    down to the explanation of our new science
    which I promised you, if we continually di-
    gress.

    “If I understood you correctly, you were
    going to speak about the fundamental pre-
    sumptions underlying the new psychology.”

    It was not my intention to start with that.

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    53

    The Problem of Lay-Analyses

    Rather, I intend to tell you what we have
    learned of the soul apparatus, in the course
    of our analytical studies.

    “What do you mean by ‘soul apparatus’ and
    what is it made of, may I ask?”

    You will soon enough see what the soul ap-
    paratus is. It is irrelevant to ask of what ma-
    terial it is made, as this question has no psy-
    chological interest. As far as psychology is
    concerned, the question of material is just as
    unimportant as the question would be in the
    realm of optic, of whether a telescope is made
    of metal or cardboard. The question of mat-
    ter does not enter here at all, but there is great
    importance attached to the aspect of space.

    This obscure soul apparatus, which serves
    as the agent for all processes of our soul, is
    conceived by us as an instrument consisting of
    several parts. Each of these parts we shall call
    a stage. There is an individual function at-
    tached to each of these stages, and all of them
    are correlated to each other in reference to
    space. Aspects of space like “near” and “far,”
    and “above” and “below,” for the time being,
    only serve to illustrate the regular sequence of

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    54

    The Problem of Lay-Analyses

    the functions allotted to the different stages of
    the soul apparatus.–Do you still follow me?

    “Hardly! However, I hope I will under-
    stand you eventually. At any rate, your ex-
    planation appeals to me as a somewhat pecu-
    liar description of the anatomy of the soul,
    which, according to biologists, is non-
    existent.”

    I will grant that what you call my “some-
    what peculiar description of the anatomy of
    the soul,” is merely a parallel drawn upon for
    the purpose of elucidation, as is so often done
    in sciences. In the early stages of a new science
    such parallels have always been quite primi-
    tive,–open to revision, as it were. I consider
    it superfluous to strengthen my argument by
    referring to the frequently applied “if,” as is
    quite popular in such cases. The actual value
    of such “if” argumentations–“fiction” the
    philosopher Vaihinger would call it–greatly
    depends on how advantageously this argu-
    mentation may be applied to the case in ques-
    tion.

    However, for argument’s sake, let us accept
    the popular conception and assume that within

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    55

    us there is a psychical organization, recording
    sensations and perceptions of physical wants
    on one hand, and releasing motoric actions on
    the other. This medium for establishing this
    definite coöperation we call the “I.”

    Of course, this is nothing new. Each one of
    us takes this for granted, if he is not a phi-
    losopher, and some despite being philosophers.
    However, our description of the psychical ap-
    paratus is not by far complete.

    Aside from the “I,” we perceive another re-
    gion of the soul, much more extensive, much
    more impressive, and much more obscure than
    the “I,” which we designate the “It.”

    It is the relation between the “I” and the
    “It” upon which we shall dwell first.

    Doubtless, you will raise an objection
    against our intention to refer to these two re-
    gions or stages of the soul with simple pro-
    nouns, instead of giving them beautiful eu-
    phonious Greek names. However, in psycho-
    analysis, we prefer to remain in contact with
    the popular way of thinking, and attach com-
    monplace terms to our scientific conceptions,
    rather than look upon such nomenclature in

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    [56]

    contempt. We do not expect to receive credit
    for this popularization of psychoanalytical
    terms, inasmuch as we are forced to do this in
    order to make ourselves plain to our patients
    who are frequently very intelligent, but not
    always exactly learned people.

    The impersonal pronoun “It” is most appro-
    priate for our purposes, as is plainly proved
    by the fact that we frequently speak of some-
    thing, averring that “‘It’ came to me quite
    suddenly”; “‘It’ gave me a shock”; “‘It’ was
    stronger than I.” “C’était plus fort que moi.”

    In the realm of psychology, we can only
    make ourselves understood by taking recourse
    to comparisons. This, after all, is no special
    peculiarity of psychology, inasmuch as other
    sciences also find it necessary to avail them-
    selves of analogous expedients. These compar-
    isons, however, must be modified time and
    again, as their application generally proves
    too limited. If you are seeking an explanation
    of the relation of the “I” to the “It,” it would
    be well to remember that the “I” serves as a
    foreground to the “It.” The “I” is, as it were,
    the outer, front layer of the “It.” We may so

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    The Problem of Lay-Analyses

    much more readily accept this comparison, in-
    asmuch as layers—say, of a tree—owe their
    peculiar characteristics to the modifying in-
    fluence of that exterior medium with which
    they are in contact. Thus, we visualize that
    the “I,” being the outer layer of the psychical
    apparatus, is the “It,” modified in accordance
    with the influence which the outer world ex-
    erts upon it.

    Here you will perceive how conceptions of
    space apply to psychoanalysis. To all intents
    and purposes, the “I” is actually the front
    layer, the obvious, whereas the “It” is the in-
    ner layer, the hidden. To make it even more
    plain: The “I” is inserted between the reality
    of the outer world and the “It,” the latter con-
    stituting the soul proper, the essence of the
    soul, as it were.

    “I am not going to inquire how you came
    to know all this. I should first like to know
    how this differentiation between the ‘I’ and
    the ‘It’ assists you in your psychoanalytical
    work, and why you need it.”

    Your question clearly shows me how to
    proceed.

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    The Problem of Lay-Analyses

    It is most important and extremely valuable
    to know that the “I” and the “It,” in many
    instances, greatly differ from each other. As
    far as the “I” is concerned, psychical activa-
    tions are subject to a different rule than the
    one applying to the “It.” The “I” has different
    intentions from the “It,” availing itself of
    means other than those resorted to by the “It.”

    Of course, much could be said in this re-
    spect, but perhaps it will be best if I give you
    a new comparison and a new example. Just
    remember the differences which developed,
    during the late war, between the actual front
    and the hinterland. We were apparently never
    surprised to observe that there were certain
    things going on at the front, utterly different
    from analogous developments in the hinter-
    land, and that in the hinterland many a thing
    was permissible which had to be strictly pro-
    hibited at the front. In the war, the deciding
    factor, of course, was the proximity of the en-
    emy. In our psychical life, the deciding factor
    is the proximity of the outer world. Remem-
    ber that in ancient times “outside,” “strange,”
    “hostile,” used to be identical conceptions.

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    59

    And now, the example I promised you: The
    “It” is never assailed by any conflicts. Within
    the “It,” contradiction and opposition dwell
    undisturbed in close proximity to each other,
    frequently equalizing one another by means of
    compromise. However, while the “It” thus re-
    mains undisturbed, the “I” cannot avoid fac-
    ing conflicts, and the only way for the “I”
    to escape the dilemma is by renouncing some
    particular intention, or urge, for the benefit
    of the other.

    The “I” is controlled by a very remarkable
    trend for unification, for synthesis—a charac-
    teristic utterly lacking in the “It.” The latter
    never manifests such unity of intention, but
    rather displays a tendency towards dissipation
    and a diversity of aims, utterly independent
    of one another, and without regard to each
    other.

    “If there really is such an important hinter-
    land of the soul, how do you explain the fact
    that it was never discovered before the advent
    of psychoanalysis?”

    By this question, you are leading us back to
    one of your former inquiries. Let me advise

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    60

    you, then, that orthodox psychology blocked
    its own way to the “It,” by holding on tena-
    ciously to a presumption which, in itself,
    seemed obviously enough but which, neverthe-
    less, cannot be successfully sustained any more.
    It was presumed that all psychical activa-
    tions are conscious, that consciousness is the
    characteristic of any psychological process,
    and that if there really were unconscious
    processes of our brain, these processes did not
    deserve to be termed psychological processes,
    having nothing at all to do with psychology
    proper.

    “I should say that this is self-evident!”

    Of course. That is exactly what all the or-
    thodox psychologists claim. However, it is
    easy enough to prove that such a view is in-
    correct, or rather amounts to an impractical
    separation. Observing ourselves, we easily per-
    ceive that many of our thoughts could not have
    arisen unless they were induced by certain
    premises. However, of the preparatory stages
    of these thoughts, which must have been psy-
    chical, too, we are unaware, inasmuch as only

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    [61]

    the complete result enters into our conscious-
    ness. Once in a while, it may be possible for
    us to reconstruct the development of a thought
    by retrospective contemplation.

    “Most probably, our attention had been di-
    verted so that we missed observing the devel-
    opment of the thought in the making, so to
    speak.”

    That’s just an obvious excuse!–insufficient
    to obscure the fact that quite frequently psy-
    chical activations–and often highly com-
    plicated ones, too–may occur in our soul life
    without our becoming actually aware of them.
    Alas, you may be ready to accept the hy-
    pothesis that just a little more or less of your
    “attention” may prove sufficient to transmute
    a non-psychical action into a psychical one.
    But why squabble? The existence of uncon-
    scious thoughts has been proven in hypnotic
    experiments, time and again, to the satisfac-
    tion of everybody.

    “I don’t wish to deny that, and I actually
    believe I am now beginning to understand you
    at last. What you are terming the ‘I’ is the

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    [62]

    Conscious while the ‘It’ describes the so-called
    Subconscious, which is so much discussed just
    now. But why, pray, this masquerade of new
    terms, if I may ask?”

    This is no masquerade, inasmuch as other
    terms cannot be employed here properly. Be-
    sides, let me ask you not to substitute litera-
    ture for science. If somebody refers to the
    Subconscious, I don’t know whether he is
    alluding to it as a stratum, that is, something
    dwelling in the soul beneath the Conscious, or
    whether he refers to it as to quality, that is,
    another consciousness, a subterranean one, so
    to say. To be sure, the greatest probability
    seems to be that anybody juggling such terms
    is himself not at all sure of what he really
    means. The only permissible differentiation is
    one between Conscious and Unconscious.

    Nevertheless, it would be a severe error to
    believe that a differentiation between Con-
    scious and Unconscious would be analogous
    to a differentiation between the “I” and the
    “It.” It would be too wonderful, if it were
    as simple as all that, and it would be easy
    going for our theory then. But, it is not so.

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    63

    simple! Correct only is that everything that
    occurs within the “It” is and remains uncon-
    scious, and that only activities of the “I” may
    become conscious. However, not all these ac-
    tivities are conscious, nor are they always
    conscious, nor do they necessarily have to be-
    come conscious. Parts of the “I” may remain
    permanently unconscious.

    The penetration into Consciousness of a
    psychical process is quite complicated. I can-
    not avoid demonstrating to you–dogmatically
    once more–what our hypothesis is in this
    respect. You will remember that the “I” is
    the outer, peripheral layer of the “It.” We
    now assume that on this outermost surface of
    the “I,” there is a peculiar device, a system, an
    organ if you wish, by whose exclusive actua-
    tion that phenomenon is created which we
    call Consciousness. This organ may be actu-
    ated from the outside–that is, our sensory
    nerves may convey to it sensations of an outer
    world–as well as from the inside, where first
    it may perceive the sensations from the “It”
    and, later on, the processes of the “I.”

    “This is getting worse and worse, and more

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    The Problem of Lay-Analyses

    and more beyond my understanding. Did you
    not invite me to discuss with you the question
    of whether or no, medically trained laymen
    should be permitted to apply psychoanalysis?
    Why, then, all these ramblings of vague and
    dark theories, whose correctness you will be
    unable to prove to me?”

    Only too well do I realize that I cannot
    convince you. As that would be beyond all
    possibilities, I have, therefore, surrendered
    such intentions. Even when instructing our
    own disciples in the theory of psychoanalysis,
    we always observe how little impression we
    make on them in the beginning. They accept
    the analytical teachings with just as much
    equanimity as any other abstractions which
    have been fed to them. Some of them may
    have the earnest desire to be convinced, but
    there is no trace that they ever really are con-
    vinced.

    We demand that anyone who intends to
    analyse somebody else, should first submit to
    an analysis. Only if in the course of this “self-
    analysis”–as it is usually incorrectly called

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    65

    –a disciple experiences the truth of psycho-
    analytical teachings on his own body–or
    rather on his own soul–then, and only then,
    he gains those convictions which later on will
    guide him in his work as an analyst.

    How, then, may I expect to convince you,
    Mr. Referee, of the correctness of our theo-
    ries, especially as I can only give you an in-
    complete, abbreviated, and, therefore, none
    too lucid outline of psychoanalytical teach-
    ings, without your being able to corroborate
    it through your own experiences?

    But such is not my intention at all! We are
    not discussing here the question of whether
    psychoanalysis is sense or nonsense, nor
    whether the premises of psychoanalysis are
    correct or full of grave fallacies. I am simply
    presenting our theories to you, because in this
    way it seems easiest to me to explain to you
    what is the real essence of psychoanalysis,
    what are its premises in reference to indi-
    vidual patients, and just what the treatment is
    that is administered to them. In this way, the
    problem of lay-analyses is projected in a strik-
     

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    [66]

    ing light. If you have followed me up to
    now, you may rest assured that the worst is
    over and that from now on, everything will
    be much more comprehensible to you.

    And now let me pause for a moment.