WIT AND ITS RELATION TO THE
UNCONSCIOUS

I
INTRODUCTION

WuoEver has had occasion to examine that
part of the literature of æsthetics and psychol-
ogy dealing with the nature and affinities of
wit, will, no doubt, concede that our philo-
sophical inquiries have not awarded to wit the
important rôle that it plays in our mental life.
One can recount only a small number of think-
ers who have penetrated at all deeply into the -
problems of wit. To be sure, among the au-
thors on wit one finds the illustrious names of
the poet Jean Paul (Fr. Richter), and of the
philosophers Th. Vischer, Kuno Fischer, and Th.
Lipps. But even these writers put the sub-
ject of wit in the background while their chief
interest centers around the more comprehen-
sive and more alluring problems of the comic.

In the main this literature gives the impres-
sion that it is altogether impractical to study
wit except when treated as a part of the comic.

3

4 ANALYSIS
Presentation of the Subject by Other Authors

According to Th. Lipps (Komik und Humor,
1898*) wit is “essentially the subjective side
of the comic; 1.6., it is that part of the comic
which we ourselves create, which colors our con-
duct as such, and to which our relation is that
of Superior Subject, never of Object, certainly
not Voluntary Object” (p. 80). The follow-
ing comment might also be added: —In general
we designate as wit “ every conscious and clever
evocation of the comic, whether the comic ele-
ment lies in the viewpoint or in the situation
itself ” (p. 78).

K. Fischer explains the relation between wit
and the comic by the aid of caricature, which,
according to his exposition, comes midway be-

. tween the two (Uber den Witz, 1889). The
subject of the comic is the hideous element in
any of its manifestations. " Where it is con-
cealed it must be disclosed in the light of the
comic view; where it is not at all or but slightly
noticeable it must be rendered conspicuous and
elucidated in such a manner that it becomes
clear and intelligible. "Thus arises caricature “
(p. 45). “Our entire psychic world, the in-
tellectual realm of our thoughts and concep-

? Beiträge zur Aesthetik, edited by Theodor Lipps and Richard

Maria Werner, VI,—a book to which I am indebted for the
courage and capacity to undertake this attempt.

INTRODUCTION 5

tions, does not reveal itself to us on superficial
consideration. It cannot be visualized directly
either figuratively. or intuitively, moreover it
contains inhibitions, weak points, disfigurements,
and an abundance of ludicrous and comical con-
trasts. In order to bring it out and to make
it accessible to æsthetic examination, a force is
necessary which is capable not only of depict-
ing objects directly, but also of reflecting upon
these conceptions and elucidating them—
namely, a force capable of clarifying thought.
This force is nothing but judgment. The judg-
ment which produces the comic contrast is
wit. In caricature wit has played its part un-
noticed, but only in judgment does it attain
its own individual form and the free domain of
its evolution."

As can be seen Lipps assigns the determin-
ing factor which classifies wit as part of the
comic, to the activity or to the active behavior
of the subject, whereas K. Fischer characterizes
wit by its relation to its object, in which char-
acterization he accentuates the hidden hideous
element in the realm of thought. One cannot
put to test the cogency of these definitions of
wit; one can, in fact, hardly understand them
unless one studies the text from which they were
taken. One is thus forced to work his way
through the author's descriptions of the comic

6 ANALYSI

in order to learn anything about wit. From
other passages, however, one discovers that the
same authors attribute to wit essential char-
acteristics of general validity in which they dis-
regard its relation to the comic.
K. Fischer's characterization of wit which
seems to be most satisfactory to this author runs
У as follows: “ Wit is a playful judgment" (p.
51). For an elucidation of this expression we
are referred to the analogy: “How esthetic
freedom consists in the playful contemplation
of objects” (p. 50). In another place (p. 20)
the æsthetic attitude towards an object is char-
acterized by the condition that we expect noth-
-ing from this object—especially no gratification
-of our serious needs—but that we content our-
selves with the pleasure of contemplating the
same. In contrast to labor the æsthetic attitude
is playful. “ It may be that from æsthetic free-
dom there also results a kind of judgment, freed
from the conventional restrictions and rule of
conduct, which, in view of its genesis, I will
call the playful judgment. This conception con-
tains the first condition and possibly the entire
formula for the solution of our problem. “ Free-
dom begets wit and wit begets freedom,” says
Jean Paul. Wit is nothing but a free play of
ideas” (p. 24).
Since time immemorial a favorite definition

INTRODUCTION 7

of wit has been the ability to discover similarities |
in dissimilarities, i.e., to find hidden similarities. |
Jean Paul has jocosely expressed this idea by
saying that “wit is the disguised priest who
unites every couple.” Th. Vischer adds the
postscript: “ He likes best to unite those cou-
ples whose marriage the relatives refuse to
sanction.” Vischer refutes this, however, by
remarking that in some witticisms there is no
question | of comparison or the discovery of x o

ities. Hence with very little deviation
from Jean Paul's definition he defines wit as
the skill to combine with surprising quickness
many ideas, which through inner content and
connections are foreign to one another. K.
Fischer then calls attention to the fact that
in a large number of these witty judgments one
does not find similarities, but contrasts; and
Lipps further remarks that these definitions
refer to the wit that the humorist and
not to the wit that he produces.

Other viewpoints, in some measure connected
with one another, which have been mentioned in
defining and describing wit are: “ the contrast
of ideas,” “ sense in nonsense,” and “ confusion
and clearness.”

Definitions like those of Kraepelin lay stress
upon the contrast of ideas. Wit is “ the volun-
tary combination or linking of two ideas which

8 1 ANALYSIS

in some way are contrasted with each other,
usually through the medium of speech associa-
tion.” For a critic like Lipps it would not be
difficult to reveal the utter inadequacy of this
formula, but he himself does not exclude the
element of contrast—he merely assigns it else-
where. “The contrast remains, but is not
formed in a manner to show the ideas connected
with the words, rather it shows the contrast or
contradiction in the meaning and lack of mean-
ing of the words ” (p. 87). Examples show the
better understanding of the latter. “ A contrast
arises first through the fact that we adjudge a
meaning to its words. which after all we cannot
ascribe to them.”

In the further development of this last con-
dition the antithesis of “ sense in nonsense ” be-
comes obvious. “ What we accept one moment
as senseful we later perceive as perfect nonsense.
Thereby arises, in this case, the operation of the
comic element” (p. 85). “A saying appears
witty when we ascribe to it a meaning through
psychological necessity and, while so doing, re-
tract it. It may thus have many meanings. We
lend a meaning to an expression knowing that
logically it does not belong to it. We find in
it a truth, however, which later we fail to find
because it is foreign to our laws of experience or
usual modes of thinking. We endow it with a

INTRODUCTION : 9

logical or practical inference which transcends
its true content, only to contradict this inference
as soon as we finally grasp the nature of the ex-
pression itself. The psychological process
evoked in us by the witty expression which gives
rise to the sense of the comic depends in every
case on the immediate transition from the bor-
rowed feeling of truth and conviction to the im-
pression or consciousness of relative nullity.”

As impressive as this exposition sounds one
cannot refrain from questioning whether the con-
trast between the ser “senseful and senseless upon
which the comic depends doés not also contribute
to the definition of wit in so far as it is dis-
tinguished from the comic. Also the factor of

— confusion and clearness “ leads one deeply into
the problem of the relation of wit to the comic.
Kant, speaking of the comic element in general, |
states that one of its remarkable attributes is!
the fact that it can delude us for a moment only. |
Heymans (Zeitschr. f. Psychologie, XI, 1896)
explains how the mechanism of wit is produced
through the succession of confusion and clear-
ness. He illustrates his meaning by an excellent

- witticism from Heine, who causes one of his fig-
ures, the poor lottery agent, Hirsch-Hyacinth,
to boast that the great Baron Rothschild treated
him as an equal or quite FAMILLIONAIRE.
Here the word which acts as the carrier of the

10 ANALYSIS

witticism appears in tne first place simply as a
faulty word-formation, as something incompre-
hensible, inconceivable, and enigmatic. It is for
these reasons that it is confusing. The comic
element results from the solution of the enigma
and from the understanding of the word. Lipps
adds that the first stage of enlightenment, show-
ing that the confusing word means this or that, is
followed by a second stage in which one perceives
that this nonsensical word has first deluded us
and then given us the true meaning. Only this
second enlightenment, the realization that it is
all due to a word that is meaningless in ordinary
usage—this reduction to nothingness produces
the comic effect (p. 95).

Whether or not either the one or the other
of these two conceptions may seem more clear
we are brought nearer to a definite insight
through the discussion of the processes of con-
fusion and enlightenment. If the comic effect of
Heine’s famillionaire depends upon the solution
of the seemingly senseless word, then the wit

- would have to be attributed to the formation of
this word and to the character of the word so
formed.

In addition to the associations of the view-
‚points just discussed there is another character-
(istic of wit which is recognized as peculiar to it
by all authors. “ Breyity alone is the body and

INTRODUCTION 11

soul of wit,” declares Jean Paul (Vorschule der
Aesthetik, I, 45), and modifies it with a speech of
the old tongue-wagger, Polonius, from Shake-
speare’s Hamlet (Act II, Scene 2):

“ Therefore, since brevity is the soul of wit,
And tediousness the limbs and outward flourishes,
I will be brief.”

Lipps’s description (p. 90) of the brevity of
wit is also significant. He states that wit says
what it does say, not always in few, but always
in too few words; that is: “ It expresses itself in
words that will not stand the test of strict logic
or of the ordinary mode of thought and expres-
sion. In fine it can express itself by leaving the
thing unsaid.”

That “ wit must unearth something hidden and
concealed ”—to quote K. Fischer (p. 51)—we
have already been taught from the grouping of
wit with caricature. I re-emphasize this deter-
minant because it also has more to do with the
nature of wit than with its relation to the comic.

I am well aware that the foregoing scanty
quotations from the works of the authors on wit
cannot do justice to the excellence of these works.
In view of the difficulties that confront one in
reproducing clearly such complicated and such
delicately shaded streams of thought I cannot

12 ANALYSIS

spare mquiring minds the trouble of searching
for the desired information in the original
sources. However, I do not know whether they
will return fully satisfied. For the criteria and
attributes of wit mentioned by these authors,
such as—activity, the relation of the content of
wit to our thoughts, the character of the playful
judgment, the union of dissimilarities, contrast-
ing ideas, “ sense in nonsense,” the succession of
confusion and clearness, the sudden emergence
of the hidden, and the peculiar brevity of wit,
seem to us, at first glance, so very pertinent and
so easily demonstrable by examples that we can-
not succumb to the danger of underestimating
the value of such ideas. But they are only dis-
jointed fragments which we should like to see
welded into an organic whole. In the end they
contribute no more to the knowledge of wit than
a number of anecdotes teach us of the true char-
acteristics of a personality whose biography in-
terests us. We do not at all understand the con-
nection that is supposed to exist between the in-
dividual conditions; for instance, what the brev:
ity of wit may have to do with that side of wit
exhibited in the playful judgment; besides we do
not know whether wit must satisfy all or only
some of these conditions in order to form real
wit; which of them may be replaced and whicb
ones are indispensable. We should also like a

INTRODUCTION 18

grouping and classification of wit in respect to
its essential attributes. The classification as
given by the authors is based, on the one hand, on
the technical means, and on the other hand, on
the utilization of wit in speech (sound-wit, play
on words, the wit of caricature, characterization
wit, and witty repartee).

Accordingly we should not find ourselves in a
dilemma when it comes to pointing out goals for
a further effort to explain wit. In order to look
forward to success we must either introduce new
viewpoints into the work, or try to penetrate
further by concentrating our attention or by
broadening the scope of our interest. We can
prescribe for ourselves the task of at least not
permitting any lack along the latter lines. To
be sure, it is rather remarkable how few examples
of recognized witticisms suffice the authors for
their investigations and how each one accepts
the ones used by his predecessors. We need not
shirk the responsibility of analyzing the same ex-
amples which have already served the classical
authors, but we contemplate new material besides
to lay a broader foundation for our deductions.
It is quite natural that we should select such ex-
amples of wit as objects for our investigation as
have produced the deepest impression upon our
own lives and which have caused us the greatest
amount of laughter,

14 ANALYSIS

Some may inquire whether the subject of wit
is worthy of such effort. In my opinion there is
no doubt about it, for even if I disregard the
personal motives to be revealed during the de-
velopment of this theme (the motives which drove
me to gain an insight into the problem of wit),
I can refer to the fact that there is an intimate

” connection between all psychic occurrences; a

connection which promises to furnish a psycho-
logical insight into a sphere which, although re-
mote, will nevertheless be of considerable value
to the other spheres. One may also be reminded
what a peculiar, overwhelmingly fascinating
charm wit offers in our society. A new joke
operates almost as an event of universal interest.
It is passed on from one person to another just
like the news of the latest conquest. Even prom-
inent men who consider it worth while relating
how they attained fame, what cities and countries
they have seen, and with what celebrated per-
sons they have consorted, do not disdain to dwell
in their autobiographies upon this and that ex-
cellent joke which they have heard."

24, V. Falke: Lebenserinnerungen, 1897.