177

IV

THE PLEASURE MECHANISM AND THE PSYCHO-
GENESIS OF WIT

We can now definitely assert that we know
from what sources the peculiar pleasure arises
furnished us by wit. We know that we can be
easily misled to mistake our sense of satisfac-
tion experienced through the thought-content
of the sentence for the actual pleasure derived
from the wit, on the other hand, the latter it-
self has two intrinsic sources, namely, the wit-
technique and the wit-tendency. What we now
desire to ascertain is the manner in which
pleasure originates from these sources and the
mechanism of this resultant pleasure.

It seems to us that the desired explanation
can be more easily ascertained in tendency-wit
than in harmless wit. We shall therefore com-
mence with the former.

The pleasure in tendency-wit results from
the fact that a tendency, whose gratification
would otherwise remain unfulfilled, is actually
gratified. That such gratification is a source
of pleasure is self-evident without further dis-
cussion. But the manner in which wit brings

178

about gratification is connected with special
conditions from which we may perhaps gain
further information. Here two cases must be
differentiated. The simpler case is the one in
which the gratification of the tendency is op-
posed by an external hindrance which is eluded
by the wit. This process we found, for exam-
ple, in the reply which Serenissimus received
to his query whether the mother of the stranger
he addressed had ever sojourned in his home,
and likewise in the question of the art critic
who asked: “And where is the Savior?” when
the two rich rogues showed him their portraits.
In one case the tendency serves to answer one
insult with another; in the other case it offers
an affront instead of the demanded expert
opinion; in both cases the tendency was op-
posed by purely external factors, namely, the
powerful position of the persons who are the
targets of the insult. Nevertheless it may seem
strange to us that these and analogous tend-
ency-witticisms have not the power to produce
a strong laughing effect, no matter how much
they may gratify us.

It is different, however, if no external fac-
tors but internal hindrances stand in the way
of the direct realization of the tendency, that
is, if an inner feeling opposes the tendency.
This condition, according to our assumption,

179

was present in the aggressive joke of Mr. N.
(p. 28) and in the one of Wendell Phillips, in
whom a strong inclination to use invectives was
stifled by a highly developed æsthetic sense.
With the aid of wit the inner resistances in
these special cases were overcome and the in-
hibition removed. As in the case of external
hindrances, the gratification of the tendency is
made possible, and a suppression with its con-
comitant “psychic damming” is thus obviated.
So far the mechanism of the development of
pleasure would seem to be identical in both
cases.

At this place, however, we are inclined to
feel that we should enter more deeply into the
differentiation of the psychological situation be-
tween the cases of external and internal hin-
drance, as we have a faint notion that the re-
moval of the inner hindrance might possibly
result in a disproportionately higher contribu-
tion to pleasure. But I propose that we rest
content here, that we be satisfied for the pres-
ent with this one collection of evidence which
adheres to what is essential to us. The only
difference between the cases of outer and inner
hindrances consists in the fact that here an al-
ready existing inhibition is removed, while
there the formation of a new inhibition is
avoided. We hardly resort to speculation when

180

we assert that a “psychic expenditure” is re-
quired for the formation as well as for the re-
tention of a psychic inhibition. Now if we find
that in both cases the use of the tendency-wit
produces pleasure, then it may be assumed
that such resultant pleasure corresponds to the
economy of psychic expenditure.

Thus we are once more confronted with the
principle of economy which we noticed first in
the study of the technique of word-wit. But
whereas the economy we believed to have found
at first was in the use of few or possibly the
same words, we can here foresee an economy
of psychic expenditure in general in a far more
comprehensive sense, and we think it possible
to come nearer to the nature of wit through
a better determination of the as yet very ob-
scure idea of “psychic expenditure.”

A certain amount of haziness which we could
not dissipate during the study of the pleasure
mechanism in tendency-wit we accept as a
slight punishment for attempting to elucidate
the more complicated problem before the sim-
pler one, or the tendency-wit before the harm-
less wit. We observe that “economy in the ex-
penditure of inhibitions or suppressions” seems
to be the secret of the pleasurable effect of
tendency-wit, and we now turn to the mechan-
ism of the pleasure in harmless wit.

181

While examining appropriate examples of
harmless witticisms, in which we had no fear
of false judgment through content or tend-
ency, we were forced to the conclusion that the
techniques of with themselves are pleasure-
sources; now we wish to ascertain whether the
pleasure may be traced to the economy in
psychic expenditure. In a group of these wit- ticisms (plays on words) the technique con- sisted in directing the psychic focus upon the
sound instead of upon the sense of the word,
and in allowing the (acoustic) word-disguise
to take the place of the meaning accorded to it
by its relations to reality. We are really justi- fied in assuming that great relief is thereby af- forded to the psychic work, and that in the
serious use of words we refrain from this con- venient procedure only at the expense of a
certain amount of exertion. We can observe
that abnormal mental states, in which the pos- sibility of concentrating psychic expenditure on
one place is probably restricted, actually allow
to come to the foreground word-sound associa- tions of this kind rather than the significance of
the words, and that such patients react in their
speech with “outer” instead of “inner” as- sociations. Also in children who are still ac- customed to treat the word as an object we
notice the inclination to look for the same

182

meaning in words of the same or of similar
sounds, which is a source of great amusement
to adults. If we experience in wit an unmis-
takable pleasure because through the use of the
same or similar words we reach from one set
of ideas to a distant other one, (as in “Home-
Roulard” from the kitchen to politics), we can
justly refer this pleasure to the economy of
psychic expenditure. The pleasure of the wit
resulting from such a “short-circuit” appears
greater the more remote and foreign the two
series of ideas which become related through
the same word are to each other, or the greater
the economy in thought brought about by the
technical means of wit. We may add that in
this case wit makes use of a means of connec-
tion which is rejected by and carefully avoided
in serious thinking.¹

¹ If I may be permitted to anticipate what later is discussed
in the text I can here throw some light upon the condition which
seems to be authoritative in the usage of language when it is a
question of calling a joke “good” or “poor.” If by means of
a double meaning or slightly modified word I have gotten from
one idea to another by a short route, and if this does not also
simul-
taneously result in senseful associ-
ation between the two
ideas, then I have made a “poor” joke. In this poor joke one
word or the “point” forms the only existing associ-
ation be-
tween the two widely separated ideas. The joke “Home-
Roulard” used above is such an example. But a “good” joke
results if the infantile expect-
ation is right in the end and if with
the similarity of the word another essential similarity in mean-
ing is really simultaneously produced-
as in the examples Tradutore-
Traditore (translator–traitor), and Amantes–Amentes

183

A second group of technical means of wit-
unification, similar sounding words, manifold
application, modification of familiar idioms, al-
lusions to quotations—all evince one common
character, namely, that one always discovers
something familiar where one expects to find
something new instead. To discover the fa-
miliar is pleasurable and it is not difficult to
recognize such pleasure as economy-pleasure
and to refer it to the economy of psychic ex-
penditure.

That the discovery of the familiar—‘recog-
nition’—causes pleasure seems to be uni-
versally admitted. Groos says:¹ “Recognition
is everywhere bound up with feelings of pleas-
ure.”

¹(lovers—lunatics). The two disparate ideas which are here
linked by an outer association are held together besides by a
senseful connection which expresses an important relationship
between them. The outer association only replaces the inner con-
nection; it serves to indicate the latter or to clarify it. Not only
does “translator” sound somewhat similar to “traitor,” but he
is a sort of a traitor whose claims to that name are good. The
same may be said of Amantes—Amentes. Not only do the words
bear a resemblance, but the similarity between “love” and
“lunacy” has been noted from time immemorial.
The distinction made here agrees with the differentiation, to be
made later, between a “witticism” and a “jest.” However, it
would not be correct to exclude examples like Home-Roulard
from the discussion of the nature of wit. As soon as we take
into consideration the peculiar pleasure of wit, we discover that
the “poor” witticisms are by no means poor as witticisms, i.e.,
they are by no means unsuited for the production of pleasure.

¹ Die Spiele der Menschen, 1899, p. 153.

184

ure where it has not been made too mechanical,
(as perhaps in dressing …). Even the mere
quality of acquaintanceship is easily accom-
panied by that gentle delight which Faust ex-
periences when, after an uncanny experience, he
steps into his study.” If the act of recognition
is so pleasureful, we may expect that man
merges into the habit of practicing this activ-
ity for its own sake, that is, he experiments
playfully with it. In fact, Aris-
totle recognized
in the joy of rediscovery the basis of artistic
pleasure, and it cannot be denied that this
principle must not be overlooked even if it has
not such a far-reaching significance as Aris-
totle assumes.

Groos then discusses the games, whose char-
acter consists of heightening the pleasure of
rediscovery by putting hindrances in its path,
or in other words by raising a “psychic dam”
which is removed by the act of recognition.
However, his attempted explanation leaves the
assumption that recognition as such is pleasur-
able, in that he attributes the pleasure of rec-
ognition connected with these games to the
pleasure in power or to the surmounting of a
difficulty. I consider this latter factor as sec-
ondary, and I find no occasion for abandoning
the simpler explanation, that the recognition
per se, i.e., through the alleviation of the psy-

185

chic expenditure, is pleasurable, and that the
games founded upon this pleasure make use
of the damming-
mechanism merely in order to
intensify their effect.

We know also that the source of pleasure in
rhyme, alliteration, refrain, and other forms of
repetition of similar sounding words in poetry,
is due merely to the discovery of the familiar.
A “sense of power” plays no perceptible rôle
in these techniques, which show so marked an
agreement with the “manifold application” in
wit.

Considering the close connection between rec-
ognition and remembering, the assumption is
no longer daring that there exists also a pleas-
ure in remembering, i.e., that the act of remem-
bering in itself is accompanied by a feeling of
pleasure of a similar origin. Groos seems to
have no objection to such an assumption, but
he again deducts the pleasure of remembering
from the “sense of power” in which he seeks—
as I believe unjustly—the principal basis of
pleasure in almost all games.

The Factor of Actuality

The use of another technical expedient of
wit, which has not yet been mentioned, is also
dependent upon “the rediscovery of the fa-

186

miliar.” I refer to the factor of actuality
(dealing with actual persons, things, or events),
which in many witticisms provides a prolific
source of pleasure and explains several pe-
culiarities in the life history of wit. There are
witticisms which are entirely free from this con-
dition, and in a treatise on wit it is incumbent
upon us to make use of such examples almost
exclusively. But we must not forget that we
laughed perhaps more heartily over such peren-
nial witticisms than over others; witticisms
whose application now would be difficult, be-
cause they would require long commentaries,
and even with that aid the former effect could
not be attained. These latter witticisms con-
tained allusions to persons and occurrences
which were “actual” at the time, which had
stimulated general interest and were endowed
with tension. After the cessation of this
interest, after the settlement of these par-
ticular affairs, the witticisms lost a part of
their pleasurable effect, and a very consider-
able. Thus, for example, the joke which
my friendly host made when he called
the dish that was being served a “Home-
Roulard,” seems to me by no means as good
now as when the question of Home Rule was
a continuous headline in the political columns
of our newspaper. If I now attempt to ex-

187

press my appreciation of this joke by stating
that this one word led us from the idea of the
kitchen to the distant field of politics, and
saved us a long mental detour, I should have
been forced at that time to change this descrip-
tion as follows: “That this word led us from
the idea of the kitchen to the very distant field
of politics; but that our lively interest was all
the keener because this question was constantly
absorbing us.” The same thing is true of
another joke: “This girl reminds me of
Dreyfus; the army does not believe in her in-
nocence,” which has become blurred in spite of
the fact that its technical means has remained
unchanged. The confusion arising from the
comparison with, and the double meaning of,
the word “innocence” cannot do away with the
fact that the allusion, which at that time
touched upon a matter pregnant with excite-
ment, now recalls an interest set at rest. The
many irresistible jokes about the present war
will sink in our estimation in a very short time.

A great many witticisms in circulation reach
a certain age or rather go through a course
composed of a flourishing season and a mature
season, and then sink into complete oblivion.
The need that people feel to draw pleasure
from their mental processes continually creates
new witticisms which are supported by current

188

interests of the day. The vitality of actual wit-
ticisms is not their own, it is borrowed by way
of allusion from those other interests, the ex-
piration of which determines the fate of the
witticism. The factor of actuality which may
be added as a transitory pleasure-source of wit,
although it is productive in itself, cannot be
simply put on the same basis as the rediscovery
of the familiar. It is much more a question of
a special qualification of the familiar which
must be aided by the quality of freshness and
recency and which has not been affected by for-
getfulness. In the formation of the dream one
also finds that there is a special preference for
what is recent, and one cannot refrain from in-
ferring that the association with what is recent
is rewarded or facilitated by a special pleas-
ure premium.

Unification, which is really nothing more
than repetition in the sphere of mental as-
sociation instead of

189

old the pleasure with its peculiar character
which the cases here belonging can furnish.”¹⁾

In all of these cases of repetition of the same
association or of the same word-
material, of re-
finding the familiar and recent, we surely can-
not be prevented from referring the pleasure
thereby experienced to the economy in psychic
expenditure; providing that this viewpoint
proves fertile for the explanation of single
facts as well as for bringing to light new gen-
eralities. We are fully conscious of the fact
that we have yet to make clear the manner in
which this economy results and also the mean-
ing of the expression “psychic expenditure.”

The third group of the technique of wit,
mostly thought-
wit, which includes false logic,
displacement, absurdity, representation through
the opposite, and other varieties, may seem at
first sight to present special features and to be
unrelated to the techniques of the discovery
of the familiar, or the replacing of object-
as-
sociations by word-
associations. But it will not
be difficult to demonstrate that this group, too,
shows an economy or facilitation of psychic
expenditure.

It is quite obvious that it is easier and more
convenient to turn away from a definite trend
of thought than to stick to it; it is easier to

¹⁾ Chapter XVII.

190

mix up different things than to distinguish
them; and it is particularly easier to travel
over modes of reasoning unsanctioned by logic;
finally in connecting words or thoughts it is
especially easy to overlook the fact that such
connections should result in sense. All this is
indubitable and this is exactly what is done by
the techniques of the wit in question. It will
sound strange, however, to assert that such
processes in the wit-
work may produce pleas-
ure, since outside of wit we can experience only
unpleasant feelings of defense against all these
kinds of inferior achievement of our mental ac-
tivity.

Word-pleasure and Pleasure in Nonsense

The “pleasure in nonsense,” as we may call
it for short, is, in the seriousness of our life,
crowded back almost to the vanishing point.
To demonstrate it we must enter into the study
of two cases in one of which it is still visible
and in the other becomes visible for the second
time. I refer to the behavior of the learning
child and to the behavior of the adult under un-
stable toxic influences. When the child learns
to control the vocabulary of its mother tongue
it apparently takes great pleasure in “ex-
perimenting playfully” with that material

191

(Groos); it connects words without regard for
their meaning in order to obtain pleasure from
the rhyme and rhythm. Gradually the child
is deprived of this pleasure until only the-
ful connection of words is allowed him. But
even in later life there is still a tendency to
overstep the acquired restrictions in the use of
words, a tendency which manifests itself in
disfiguring the same by definite appendages,
and in changing their forms by means of-
tain contrivances (reduplication, trembling
speech) or even by developing an individual
language for use in playing,—efforts which-
appear also among the insane of a certain-
gory.

I believe that whatever the motive which
actuated the child when it began such playings,
in its further development the child indulges in
them fully conscious that they are nonsensical
and derives pleasure from this stimulus which
is interdicted by reason. It now makes use
of play in order to withdraw from the pressure
of critical reason. More powerful, however,
are the restrictions which must develop in-
cation along the lines of right thinking and in
the separation of reality from fiction, and it is
for this reason that the resistance against the
pressures of thinking and reality is far-reach-
ing and persistent; even the phenomena of

192

phantasy formation come under this point of
view. The power of reason usually grows so
strong during the later part of childhood and
during that period of education which extends
over the age of puberty, that the pleasure in
“freed nonsense” rarely dares manifest itself.
One fears to utter nonsense; but it seems to
me that the inclination characteristic of boys
to act in a contradictory and inexpedient man-
ner is a direct outcome of this pleasure in non-
sense. In pathological cases one often sees
this tendency so accentuated that it again con-
trols the speeches and answers of the pupils.
In the case of some college students who
merged into neuroses I could convince myself
that the unconscious pleasure derived from the
nonsense produced by them is just as much
responsible for their mistakes as their actual
ignorance.

Reproduction of Old Liberties

The student does not give up his demonstra-
tions against the pressures of thinking and
reality whose domination becomes unceasingly
intolerant and unrestricted. A good part of
the tendency of students to skylarking is re-
sponsible for this reaction. Man is an “untir-
ing pleasure seeker”—I can no longer recall

193

which author coined this happy expression—
and finds it extremely difficult to renounce
pleasure once experienced. With the hilarious
nonsense of “sprees” (Bierschwefel), college
cries, and songs, the student attempts to pre-
serve that pleasure which results from freedom
of thought, a freedom of which he is more and
more deprived through scholastic discipline.
Even much later, when as a mature man he
meets with others at scientific congresses and
class reunions and feels himself a student
again, he must read at the end of the session
the “Kneipzeitung,” or the comic college paper,
which distorts the newly gained knowledge into
the nonsensical and thus compensates him for the
newly added mental inhibitions.

The very terms “Bierschwefel” and “Kneip
zeitung” are proof that the reason which has
stifled the pleasure in nonsense has become so
powerful that not even temporarily can it be
abandoned without toxic agency. The change
in the state of mind is the most valuable thing
that alcohol offers man, and that is the reason
why this “poison” is not equally indispensable
for all people. The hilarious humor, whether
due to endogenous origin or whether produced
toxically, weakens the inhibiting forces among
which is reason and thus again makes acces-
sible pleasure-sources which are burdened by.

194

suppression. It is very instructive to see how
the demand made upon wit sinks with the rise
in spirits. The latter actually replace wit, just
as wit must make an effort to replace the men-
tal state in which the otherwise inhibited pleas-
ure possibilities (pleasure in nonsense among
the rest) assert themselves.
“With little wit and much comfort.”

Under the influence of alcohol the adult
again becomes a child who derives pleasure
from the free disposal of his mental stream
without being restricted by the pressure of
logic.

We hope we have shown that the technique
of absurdity in wit corresponds to a source of
pleasure. We need hardly repeat that this
pleasure results from the economy of psychic
expenditure or alleviation from the pressure
of reason.

On reviewing again the wit-
technique classi-
fied under three headings we notice that the
first and last of these groups—the replacement
of object-
association by word-
association, and
the use of absurdity as a restorer of old lib-
erties and as a relief from the pressure of
intellectual upbringing—can be taken collect-
ively. Psychic relief may in a way be com-
pared to economy, which constitutes the tech-
nique of the second group. Alleviation of the

195

already existing psychic expenditure, and econ-
omy in the yet to be offered psychic expendi-
ture, are two principles from which all tech-
niques of wit and with them all pleasure in
these techniques can be deduced. The two
forms of the technique and the resultant pleas-
ures correspond more or less in general to the
division of wit into word-
and thought-witti-
cisms.

Play and Jest

The preceding discussions have led us unex-
pectedly to an understanding of the history of
the development of psychogenesis of wit which
we shall now examine still further. We have
become acquainted with the successive steps in
wit, the development of which up to tendency-
wit will undoubtedly reveal new relationships
between the different characters of wit. An-
tedating wit there exists something which we
may designate as “play” or “jest.” Play–
we shall retain this name–appears in children
while they are learning how to use words and
connect thoughts; this playing is probably the
result of an impulse which urges the child to
exercise its capacities (Groos). During this
process it experiences pleasurable effects which
originate from the repetition of similarities,
the rediscovery of the familiar, sound-associa-

196

tions, etc., which may be explained as an un
expected economy of psychic expenditure.
Therefore it surprises no one that these result
ing pleasures urge the child to practice play
ing and impel it to continue without regard
for the meaning of words or the connections
between sentences. Playing with words and
thoughts, motivated by certain pleasures in
economy, would thus be the first step of wit.
This playing is stopped by the growing
strength of a factor which may well be called
criticism or reason. The play is then rejected
as senseless or as directly absurd, and by virtue
of reason it becomes impossible. Only acci
dentally is it now possible to derive pleasure
from those sources of rediscovery of the fa
miliar, etc., which is explained by the fact that
the maturing person has then merged into a
playful mood which, as in the case of merri
ment in the child, removes inhibitions. In this
way only is the old pleasure-giving playing
made possible, but as men do not wish to wait
for these propitious occasions and also hate to
forego this pleasure, they seek means to make
themselves independent of these pleasant states.
The further development of wit is directed by
these two impulses; the one striving to elude
reason and the other to substitute for the adult
an infantile state of mind.

197

This gives rise to the second stage of wit, the
jest (Scherz). The object of the jest is to
bring about the resultant pleasure of playing
and at the same time appease the protesting
reason which strives to suppress the pleasant
feeling. There is but one way to accomplish
this. The senseless combination of words or
the absurd linking of thoughts must make sense
after all. The whole process of wit production
is therefore directed towards the discovery of
words and thought constellations which fulfill
these conditions. The jest makes use of almost
all the technical means of wit, and usage of
language makes no consequential distinction
between jest (Scherz) and wit (Witz). What
distinguishes the jest from wit is the fact that
the pith of the sentence withdrawn from criti-
cism does not need to be valuable, new, or even
good; it matters only that it can be expressed,
even though what it may say is obsolete, super-
fluous, and useless. The most conspicuous fac-
tor of the jest is the gratification it affords by
making possible that which reason forbids.

A mere jest is the following of Professor
Kästner, who taught physics at Göttingen in
the 16th century, and who was fond of mak-
ing jokes. Wishing to enroll a student named
Warr in his class, he asked him his age, and
upon receiving the reply that he was thirty

198

years of age he exclaimed: “Aha, so I have
the honor of seeing the thirty years’ War.”¹⁾
When asked what vocations his sons followed
Rokitansky jestingly answered: “Two are heal-
ing and two are howling,” (two physicians and
two singers). The reply was correct and there-
fore unimpeachable, but it added nothing to
what is contained in the parenthetic expression.
There is no doubt that the answer assumed
another form only because of the pleasure
which arises from the unification and assonance
of both words.

I believe that we now see our way clear. In
estimating the techniques of wit we were con-
stantly disturbed by the fact that these are not
peculiar to wit alone, and yet the nature of wit
seemed to depend upon them, since their re-
moval by means of reduction nullified the char-
acter as well as the pleasure of wit. Now we
become aware that what we have described as
techniques of wit—and which in a certain sense
we shall have to continue to call so—are really
the sources from which wit derives pleasure;
nor does it strike us as strange that other
processes draw from the same sources with the
same object in view. The technique, however,
which is peculiar to and belongs to wit alone
consists in a process of safeguarding the use

¹⁾Kleinpaul: Die Rätsel der Sprache, 1890.

199

of this pleasure-
forming means against the
protest of reason which would obviate the pleas-
ure. We can make few generalizations about
this process. The wit-
work, as we have already
remarked, expresses itself in the selection of
such word-
material and such thought-
situations
as to permit the old play with words and
thoughts to stand the test of reason; but to ac-
complish this end the cleverest use must be
made of all the peculiarities of the stock of
words and of all constellations of mental com-
binations. Later on perhaps we shall be in a
position to characterize the wit-
work by a
definite attribute; for the present it must re-
main unexplained how our wit makes its ad-
vantageous selections. The tendency and ca-
pacity of wit to guard the pleasure-
forming
word and thought combinations against reason,
already makes itself visible as an essential cri-
terion in jests. From the beginning its object
is to remove inner inhibitions and thereby ren-
der productive those pleasure-
sources which have
become inaccessible, and we shall find that it
remains true to this characteristic throughout
the course of its entire development.
We are now in a position to prescribe a cor-
rect place for the factor “sense in nonsense,”
(see Introduction, page 8), to which the authors
ascribe so much significance in respect to the

200

recognition of wit and the explanation of the
pleasurable effect. The two firmly established
points in the determination of wit–its tendency
to carry through the pleasureful play, and its
effort to guard it against the criticism of reason
–make it perfectly clear why the individual
witticism, even though it appear nonsensical
from one point of view, must appear full of
meaning or at least acceptable from another.
How it accomplishes this is the business of the
wit-
work; if it is not successful it is relegated
to the category of “nonsense.” Nor do we find
it necessary to deduce the resultant pleasure
of wit from the conflict of feelings which
emerge either directly or by way of “confu-
sion and clearness,” from the simultaneous
sense and nonsense of the wit. There is just
as little necessity for our delving deeper into
the question how pleasure can come from the
succession of that part of the wit considered
senseless and from that part recognized as
senseful. The psychogenesis of wit has taught
us that the pleasure of wit arises from word-
play or from the liberation of nonsense, and
that the sense of wit is meant only to
guard this pleasure against suppression through
reason.

201

Jest and Wit

Thus the problem of the essential character
of wit could almost be explained by means of
the jest. We may follow the development of
the jest until it reaches its height in the tend-
ency-wit. The jest gives tendency a prior
position when it is a question of supplying us
with pleasure, and it is content when its utter-
ance does not appear utterly senseless or in-
sipid. But if this utterance is substantial and
valuable the jest changes into wit. A thought,
which would have been worthy of our interest
even when expressed in the most unpretentious
form, is now invested in a form which must in
itself excite our sense of satisfaction. Such
an association we cannot help thinking cer-
tainly has not come into existence unintention-
ally; we must make effort to divine the inten-
tion at the bottom of the formation of wit.
An incidental observation, made once before,
will put us on the right track. We have al-
ready remarked that a good witticism gives
us, so to speak, a general feeling of satisfac-
tion without our being able to decide offhand
which part of the pleasure comes from the
witty form and which part from the excellent
thought contained in the context (p. 131). We
are deceiving ourselves constantly about this

202

division; sometimes we overvalue the quality of
the wit on account of our admiration for the
thought contained therein, and then again we
overestimate the value of the thought on ac-
count of the pleasure afforded us by the witty
investment. We know not what gives us pleas-
ure nor at what we are laughing. This un-
certainty of our judgment, assuming it to be
a fact, may have given the motive for the
formation of wit in the literal sense. The
thought seeks the witty disguise because it
thereby recommends itself to our attention and
can thus appear to us more important and val-
uable than it really is; but above all because
this disguise fascinates and confuses our rea-
son. We are apt to attribute to the thought
the pleasure derived from the witty form, and
we are not inclined to consider improper what
has given us pleasure, and in this way deprive
ourselves of a source of pleasure. For if wit
made us laugh it was because it established in
us a mood most unfavorable to reason, which
in turn has forced upon us that state of mind
which was once contented with mere playing
and which wit has attempted to replace with
all the means at its command. Although we
have already established the fact that such wit
is harmless and does not yet show a tendency,
we may not deny that, strictly speaking, it is

203

the jest alone which shows no tendency; that
is, it serves to produce pleasure only. For wit
is really never purposeless even if the thought
contained therein shows no tendency and
merely serves a theoretical, intellectual interest.
Wit carries out its purpose in advancing the
thought by magnifying it and by guarding it
against reason. Here again it reveals its orig-
inal nature in that it sets itself up against an
inhibiting and restrictive power, or against the
critical judgment.
The first use of wit, which goes beyond the
mere production of pleasure, points out the
road to be followed. Wit is now recognized
as a powerful psychic factor whose weight can
decide the issue if it falls into this or that side
of the scale. The great tendencies and im-
pulses of our psychic life enlist its service for
their own purposes. The original purposeless
wit, which began as play, becomes related in a
secondary manner to tendencies from which
nothing that is formed in psychic life can
escape for any length of time. We already
know what it can achieve in the service of the
exhibitionistic, aggressive, cynical, and scepti-
cal tendencies. In the case of obscene wit,
which originated in the smutty joke, it makes
a confederate of the third person who orig-
inally disturbed the sexual situation, by giving

204

him pleasure through the utterance which
causes the woman to be ashamed in his pres-
ence. In the case of the aggressive tendency,
wit by the same means changes the original in-
different hearers into active haters and scorn-
ers, and in this way confronts the enemy with
a host of opponents where formerly there was
but one. In the first case it overcomes the in-
hibitions of shame and decorum by the pleas-
ure premium which it offers. In the second
case it overthrows the critical judgment which
would otherwise have examined the dispute in
question. In the third and fourth cases where
wit is in the service of the cynical and sceptical
tendency, it shatters the respect for institu-
tions and truths in which the hearer had be-
lieved, first by strengthening the argument,
and secondly by resorting to a new method of
attack. Where the argument seeks to draw
the hearer’s reason to its side, wit strives to
push aside this reason. There is no doubt that
wit has chosen the way which is psychologically-
more efficacious.

The Development into Tendency-wit

What impressed us in reviewing the achieve-
ments of tendency-wit was the effect it pro-
duced on the hearer. It is more important,

205

however, to understand the effect produced by
wit on the psychic life of the person who makes
it, or more precisely expressed, on the psychic
life of the person who conceives it. Once be-
fore we have expressed the intention, which we
find occasion to repeat here, that we wish to
study the psychic processes of wit in regard
to its apportionment between two persons.
We can assume for the present that the psychic
process aroused by wit in the hearer is usually
an imitation of the psychic processes of the wit
producer. The outer inhibitions which are to
be overcome in the hearer correspond to the
inner inhibitions of the wit producer. In the
latter the expectation of the outer hindrance
exists, at least as an inhibiting idea. The inner
hindrance, which is overcome in tendency-
wit, is evident in some single cases; for example, in
Mr. N.’s joke (p. 28) we can assume that it
not only enables the hearer to enjoy the pleas-
ure of the aggression through injuries but it
also makes it possible for him to produce the
wit in the first place. Of the different kinds
of inner inhibitions or suppressions one is
especially worthy of our interest because it is
the most far-
reaching. We designate that
form by the term “repression.” It is char-
acterized by the fact that it excludes from con-
sciousness certain former emotions and their

206

products. We shall learn that tendency-
wit itself is capable of liberating pleasure from
sources that have undergone repression. If the
overcoming of outer hindrances can be re-
ferred, in the manner indicated above, to inner
inhibitions and repressions we may say that
tendency-wit proves more clearly than any
other developmental stage of wit that the main
character of wit-making is to set free pleasure
by removing inhibitions. It reinforces tendencies
to which it gives its services by bringing them
assistance from repressed emotions; or it puts
itself at the disposal of the repressed tend-
encies directly.

One may readily concede that these are the
functions of tendency-wit, but one must nev-
ertheless admit that we do not understand in
what manner these functions can succeed in
accomplishing their end. The power of tend-
ency-wit consists in the pleasure which it de-
rives from the sources of word-plays and lib-
erated nonsense, and if one can judge from
the impressions received from purposeless jests,
one cannot possibly consider the amount of the
pleasure so great as to believe that it has the
power to annul deep-rooted inhibitions and re-
pressions. As a matter of fact we do not deal
here with a simple propelling power but rather
with a more complicated mechanism. Instead

207

of covering the long circuitous route through
which I arrived at an understanding of this re-
lationship, I shall endeavor to demonstrate it by
a short synthetic route.

G. Th. Fechner has established the principle
of æsthetic assistance or enhancement which he
explains in the following words: “From the
unopposed meeting of pleasurable states (Be-
dingungen) which individually accomplish lit-
tle, there results a greater, often much greater
resultant pleasure than is warranted by the
sum of the pleasure values of the separate
states, or a greater result than could be ac-
counted for as the sum of the individual ef-
fects; in fact the mere meeting of this kind can
result in a positive pleasure product which
overflows the threshold of pleasure when the
factors taken separately are too weak to ac-
complish this. The only condition is that in
comparison to others they must produce a
greater sense of satisfaction.”¹⁾ I am of the
opinion that the theme of wit does not give us
the opportunity to test the correctness of this
principle which is demonstrable in many other
artistic fields. But from wit we have learned
something, which at least comes near this prin-
ple, namely, that in a co-operation of many

¹⁾Vorschule der Aesthetik, Vol. 1, V, p. 51, 2nd Ed., Leipzig,
1897.

208

pleasure-producing factors we are in no posi-
tion to assign to each one the resultant part
which really belongs to it (see p. 131). But the
situation assumed in the principle of assistance
can be varied, and for these new conditions we
can formulate the following combination of
questions which are worthy of a reply. What
usually happens if in one constellation there is
a meeting of pleasurable and painful condi-
tions? Upon what depends the result and the
previous intimations of the result? Tendency-
wit particularly shows these possibilities.
There is one feeling or impulse which strives
to liberate pleasure from a certain source and
under unrestricted conditions certainly would
liberate it, but there is another impulse which
works against this development of pleasure,
that is, which inhibits or suppresses it. The
suppressing stream, as the result shows, must
be somewhat stronger than the one suppressed,
which however is by no means destroyed.

The Fore-pleasure Principle

But now there appears another impulse
which strives to set free pleasure by this identi-
cal process, even though from different sources
it thus acts like the suppressed stream. What
can be the result in such a case? An example
can make this clearer than this schematization.

209

THE PLEASURE MECHANISM

There is an impulse to insult a certain person;
but this is so strongly opposed by a feeling
of decorum and æsthetic culture that the im-
pulse to insult must be crushed. If, for exam-
ple, by virtue of some changed emotional state
the insult should happen to break through, this
insulting tendency would subsequently be pain-
fully perceived. Therefore the insult is omit-
ted. There is a possibility, however, of mak-
ing good wit from the words or thoughts which
would have served in the insult; that is, pleas-
ure can be set free from other sources without
being hindered by the same suppression. But
the second development of pleasure would have
to be foregone if the insulting quality of the
wit were not allowed to come out, and as the
latter is allowed to come to the surface, it is
connected with the new release of pleasure.
Experience with tendency-wit shows that under
such circumstances the suppressed tendency
can become so strengthened by the aid of wit-
pleasure as to overcome the otherwise stronger
inhibition. One resorts to insults because wit
is thereby made impossible. But the satisfac-
tion thus obtained is not produced by wit
alone; it is incomparably greater, in fact it is
by so much greater than the pleasure of the
wit, that we must assume that the former sup-
pressed tendency has succeeded in breaking

210

through, perhaps without the need of an out-
let. Under these circumstances tendency-wit
causes the most prolific laughter.

Perhaps the investigation of the determina-
tions of laughter will aid us in forming a
clearer picture of the process of the aid of wit
against suppression. But we see even now
that the case of tendency-wit is a special case
of the principle of aid. A possibility of the
development of pleasure enters into a situation
in which another pleasure possibility is so
hindered that individually it would not result
in pleasure. The result is a development of
pleasure which is greater by far than the added
possibility. The latter acted, as it were, as an
alluring premium; with the aid of a small sum
of pleasure a very large and almost inaccessi-
ble amount is obtained. I have good grounds
for thinking that this principle corresponds to
an arrangement which holds true in many
widely separated spheres of the psychic life,
and I consider it appropriate to designate the
pleasure serving to liberate the large sum of
pleasure as fore-pleasure and the principle as
the principle of fore-pleasure.

Play-pleasure and Removal-pleasure

The effect of tendency-wit may now be
formulated as follows: It enters the service of

211

tendencies in order to produce new pleasure by
removing suppressions and repressions. This it
does, using wit-
pleasure as fore-
pleasure. When we now review its development we may
say that wit has remained true to its nature
from beginning to end. It begins as play in
order to obtain pleasure from the free use of
words and thoughts. As soon as the growing
reason forbids this senseless play with words
and thoughts, it turns to the jest or joke in
order to hold to these sources of pleasure and
in order to be able to gain new pleasure from
the liberation of the absurd. In the rôle of
harmless wit it assists the thoughts and forti-
fies them against the impugnment of the criti-
cal judgment, whereby it makes use of the
principle of intermingling the pleasure-
sources. Finally, it enters into the great struggling
suppressed tendencies in order to remove inner
inhibitions in accordance with the principle of
fore-
pleasure. Reason, critical judgment, and
suppression, these are the forces which it com-
bats in turn. It firmly holds on to the original
word-
pleasure sources, and beginning with the
stage of the jest opens for itself new pleasure
sources by removing inhibition. The pleasure
which it produces, be it play-
pleasure or re-
moval-
pleasure, can at all times be traced to
the economy of psychic expenditure, in so far

212

as such a conception does not contradict the
nature of pleasure, and proves itself produc-
tive also in other fields.¹

¹ The nonsense-witticisms, which have been somewhat slighted
in this treatise, deserve a short supplementary comment.

In view of the significance attributed by our conception to the
factor “sense in nonsense,” one might be tempted to demand
that every witticism should be a nonsense-joke. But this is not
necessary, because only the play with thoughts inevitably leads
to nonsense, whereas the other source of wit-
pleasure, the play
with words, makes this impression incidental and does not regu-
larly invoke the criticism connected with it. The double root of
wit-
pleasure—from the play with words and thoughts, which
corresponds to the most important division into word-
and thought-
witticisms—sets its face against a short formulation of general
principles about wit as a tangible aggravation of difficulties.
The play with words produces laughter, as is well known, in con-
sequence of the factor of recognition described above, and there-
fore suffers suppression only in a small degree. The play with
thoughts cannot be motivated through such pleasure: it has
suffered a very energetic suppression and the pleasure which it
can give is only the pleasure of released inhibitions. Accordingly
one may say that wit-
pleasure shows a kernel of the original
play-
pleasure and a shell of removal-
pleasure. Naturally we
do not grant that the pleasure in nonsense-
wit is due to the
fact that we have succeeded in making nonsense despite the sup-
pression, while we do notice that the play with words gives us
pleasure. Nonsense, which has remained fixed in thought wit,
acquires secondarily the function of stimulating our attention
through confusion, it serves as a reinforcement of the effect of
wit, but only when it is insistent, so that the confusion can
anticipate the intellect by a definite fraction of time. That
nonsense in wit may also be employed to represent a judgment
contained within the thought has been demonstrated by the ex-
ample on p. 73. But even this is not the primal signification of
nonsense in wit.

A series of wit-
like productions for which we have no appro-
priate name, but which may lay claim to the designation of

213

THE PLEASURE MECHANISM

“witty nonsense,” may be added to the nonsense-
jokes. They are very numerous, but I shall cite only two examples: As the
fish was served to a guest at the table he put both hands twice
into the mayonnaise and then ran them through his hair. Being
looked at by his neighbor with astonishment he seemed to have
noticed his mistake and excused himself, saying: “Pardon me,
I thought it was spinach.”

Or: “Life is like a suspension bridge,” said the one. “How is
that?” asked the other. “How should I know?” was the answer.

These extreme examples produce an effect through the fact that
they give rise to the expectation of wit, so that one makes the
effort to find the hidden sense behind the nonsense. But none
is found, they are really nonsense. Under that deception it was
possible for one moment to liberate the pleasure in nonsense.
These witticisms are not altogether without tendencies, they fur-
nish the narrator a certain pleasure in that they deceive and
annoy the hearer. The latter then calms his anger by resolving
that he himself should take the place of the narrator.