VIL.

THE RELATION OF WIT TO DREAMS AND TO THE
UNCONSCIOUS

Ar the end of the chapter which dealt with)
the elucidation of the technique of wit (p. 125) |
we asserted that the processes of condensation |
with and without substitutive formation, dis- |
placement, representation through absurdity, |
representation through the opposite, indirect
representation, etc., all of which we found par-
ticipated in the formation of wit, evinced a
far-reaching agreement with the processes of
“ dream-work.” We promised, at that time, |
first to examine more carefully these similari-
ties, and secondly, so far as such indications
point to search for what is common to both wit
and dreams. The discussion of this compar-
ison would be much easier for us if we could
assume that one of the subjects to be com-
pared—the “ dream-work ”—were well known.
But we shall probably do better not to take
this assumption for granted. I received the
impression that my book The Interpretation
of Dreams created more “confusion” than
“ enlightenment “ among my colleagues, and I

249

250 THEORETICAL PART

know that the wider reading circles have con-
tented themselves to reduce the contents of
the book to-a-catchword, “ Wish fulfillment”
—a term easily remembered and easily abused.

However, in my continued occupation with
the problems considered therein, for the study
of which my practice as a psychotherapeutist
affords me much opportunity, I found nothing
that would impel me to change or improve on
my ideas; I can therefore peacefully wait until
the reader’s comprehension has risen to my
level, or until an intelligent critic has pointed
out to me the basic faults in my conception.
For the purposes of comparison with wit, I
shall briefly review the most important features
of dreams and dream-work.

We know dreams by the recollection which
usually seems fragmentary and which occurs
upon awakening. It is then a structure made
up mostly of visual or other sensery impres-
sions, which represents to us a deceptive pic-
ture of an experience, and may be mingled
with mental processes (the “knowledge” in
the dream) and emotional manifestations.
What we thus remember as a dream I call
“the manifest dream-content.” The latter is
often altogether absurd and confused, at other
times it is merely one part or another that is
so affected. But even if it be entirely coherent,

THE RELATION OF WIT 251

as in the case of some anxiety dreams, it stands
out in our psychic life as something strange,
for the origin of which one cannot account.
Until recently the explanation for these pe-
culiarities of the dream has been sought in the
dream itself in that it was considered roughly
speaking an indication of a muddled, dissoci-
ated, and “sleepy ” activity of the nervous ele-
ments.

As opposed to this view I have shown that
the excessively peculiar “ manifest” dream-
content ean regularly be made comprehensible,
and that it is a disfigured and changed
transcription of certain correct psychic forma-
tions which deserve the name of “latent dream-
thoughts.” One gains an understanding of
the latter by resolving the manifest dream-con-
tent into its component parts without regard
for its apparent meaning, and then by follow-
ing up the threads of associations which ema-
nate from each one of the now isolated ele-
ments. These become interwoven and in the
end lead to a structure of thoughts, which is
not only entirely accurate, but also fits easily
into the familiar associations of our psychic
processes. During this “ analysis ” the dream-
content loses all of the peculiarities so strange
to us; but if the analysis is to be successful,
we must firmly cast aside the critical objections

252 THEORETICAL PART

which incessantly arise against the reproduc-
tion of the individual associations.

The Dream-work

From the comparison of the remembered
manifest dream-content with the latent dream-
thoughts thus discovered there arises the con-
ception of “ dream-work.“ The entire sum of
the transforming processes which have changed

V the latent dream-thought into the manifest

へ

dream is called the dream-work. The aston-
ishment which formerly the dream evoked in
us is now perceived to be due to the dream-
work.

The function of the dream-work may be
described in the following manner. A struc-
ture of thoughts, mostly very complicated,
which has been built up during the day and
not brought to settlement—a day remnant—
clings firmly even during night to the energy
which it had assumed—the underlying center
of interest—and thus threatens to disturb sleep.
This day remnant is transformed into a dream
by the dream-work and in this way rendered
harmless to sleep. But in order to make pos-
sible its employment by the dream-work, this
day remnant must be capable of being cast
into the form of a wish, a condition that is not

THE RELATION OF WIT 258

difficult to fulfill. The wish emanating from
the dream-thoughts forms the first step and
later on the nucleus of the dream. Experience
gained from analyses—not the theory of the
dream—teaches us that with children a fond
wish left from the waking state suffices to
evoke a dream, which is coherent and senseful,
but almost always short, and easny recogniz-
able as a “wish fulfillment.” In the case of
adults the universally valid condition for the
dream-creating wish seems to be that the latter
should appear foreign to conscious thinking,
that is, it should be a repressed wish, or that
it should supply consciousness with reinforce-
ment from unknown sources. Without the as-
sumption of the unconscious activity in the
sense used above, I should be at a loss to de-
velop further the theory of dreams and to ex-
plain the material gleaned from experience in
dream-analyses. The action of this unconscious
wish upon the logical conscious material of
dream-thoughts now results in the dream. The
latter is thereby drawn down into the uncon-
scious, as it were, or to speak more precisely,
it is exposed to a treatment which usually
takes place at the level of unconscious mental
activity, and which is characteristic of this
mental level. Only from the results of the
“ dream-work " have we thus far learned to

254 THEORETICAL PART

know the qualities of this unconscious mental
activity and its differentiation from the “ fore-
conscious ” which is capable of consciousness.

The Unconscious

A novel and difficult theory that runs
counter to our habitual modes of thinking can
hardly gain in lucidity by a condensed exposi-
tion. I can therefore accomplish little more
in this discussion than refer the reader to the
detailed treatment of the unconscious in my
Interpretation of Dreams, and also to Lipps's
work, which I consider most important. I
am aware that he who is under the spell of
a good old philosophical training, or stands
aloof from a so-called philosophical system,
will oppose the assumption of the “ unconscious
psychic processes ” in Lipps’s sense and in mine
and will desire to prove the impossibility of it
preferably by means of definitions of the term
psychic. But definitions are conventional and
changeable. I have often found that persons
who dispute the unconscious on the grounds of
its absurdity or impossibility have not received
their impressions from those sources from
which I, at least, have found it necessary to
draw, in order to become aware of its existence.
These opponents had never witnessed the ef-

THE RELATION OF WIT 255

fect of a posthypnotic suggestion, and they
were immensely surprised at the evidence I
imparted to them gleaned from my analysis of
unhypnotized neurotics. They had never
gained the conception of the unconscious as
something which one does not really know,
while cogent proofs force one to supplement
this idea by saying that one understands by
the unconscious something capable of con-
sciousness, something concerning which one has
not thought and which is not in the field of
vision of consciousness. Nor had they at-
tempted to convince themselves of the existence
of such unconscious thoughts in their own
psychic life by means of an analysis of one
of their own dreams, and when I attempted
this with them, they could perceive their
own mental occurrences only with astonish-
ment and confusion. I have also gotten
the impression that these are essentially af-
fective resistances which stand in the way of
the acceptation of the “ unconscious,” and that
they are based on the fact that no one is de-
sirous of becoming acquainted with his un-
conscious, and it is most. convenient to deny al-
together its possibility.

256 THEORETICAL PART

Condensation and Displacement in the Dream-
« work

The dream-work, to which I return after

/ this digression, subjects the thought material
uttered in the optative mood to a very peculiar
elaboration. First of all it proceeds from the
optative to the indicative mood; it substitutes
“it is” for “would it were!” This “it
is ” is destined to become part of an hallucina-

ン tory representation which I have called the
“regression” of the dream-work. This re-
gression represents the path from the mental
images to the sensory perceptions of the same,
or if one chooses to speak with reference to
the still unfamiliar—not to be understood
anatomically—topic of the psychic apparatus,
it is the region of the thought-formation to the
region of the sensory perception. Along this
road which runs in an opposite direction to the
course of development of psychic complications
the dream-thoughts gain in clearness; a plastic

* situation finally results as a nucleus of the
manifest “dream picture.” In order to arrive
at such a sensory representation the dream-
` thoughts have had to experience tangible
changes in their expression. But while the
thoughts are changed back into mental images
they are subjected to still greater changes,

THE RELATION OF WIT 257

some of which are easily conceivable as neces-
sary, while others are surprising. As a nec-
essary secondary result of the regression one
understands that nearly all relationships within
the thoughts which have organized the same
are lost to the manifest dream. The dream-
‘work takes over, as it were, only the raw ma-
terial of the ideas for representation, and not
the thought-relations which held each other in
check; or at least it reserves the freedom of
leaving the latter out of the question. On the
other hand, there is a certain part of the dream-
work which cannot be traced to the regression
or to the recasting into mental images; it is
Jjust that part which is significant to us for the
analogy to wit-formation. (The material of the
dream-thoughts experiences an extraordinary
compression or condensation during the dream-
work. The starting-points of this condensa-
tion are those points which are common to two
or more dream-thoughts because they naturally
pertain to both or because they are inevitable
consequences of the contents of two or more
dream-thoughts, and since these points do not
regularly suffice for a prolific condensation
new artificial and fleeting common points come
into existence, and for this purpose preferably
words are used which combine different mean-
ings in their sounds. The newly framed com-

SS

238 THEORETICAL PART

mon points of condensation enter as represent-
atives of the dream-thoughts into the manifest
dream-content, so that an element of the dream
corresponds to a point of junction or intersec-
tion of the dream-thoughts, and with regard
to the latter it must in general be called “ over-
determined.” The process of condensation is
that part of the dream-work which is most
easily recognizable; it suffices to compare the
recorded wording of a dream with the written
dream-thoughts gained by means of analysis,
in order to get a good impression of the pro-
ductiveness of dream condensation.

It is not easy to convince one's self of the
second great change that takes place in the
dream-thoughts through the agency of the
dream-work. I refer to that process which I
have called the dream displacement. It man-
ifests itself by the fact that what occupies the
center of the manifest dream and is endowed
with vivid sensory intensity has occupied a
peripheral and secondary position in the dream-
thoughts, and vice versa. "This process causes
the dream to appear out of proportion when
compared with the dream-thoughts, and it is:
because of this displacement that it seems
strange and incomprehensible to the waking
state. In order that such a displacement
should occur it must be possible for the occu-

THE RELATION OF WIT 259

pation energy to pass uninhibited from im-
portant to insignificant ideas,—a process which
in normal conscious thinking can only give the
impression of “faulty thinking.”
Transformation into expressive activity, con-
densation, and displacement are the three
great functions which we can ascribe to the
dream-work. A fourth, to which too little at-
tention was given in The Interpretation of
. Dreams, does not come into consideration here
for our purpose. In a consistent elucidation
of the ideas dealing with the “topic of the
psychic apparatus” and “regression,” which
alone can lend value to these working hy-
potheses, an ‘effort would have to be made to
determine at what stages of regression the vari-
ous transformations of the dream-thoughts oc-
cur. As yet no serious effort has been made
in this direction;-but at least we can speak
definitely about displacement when we say that
: it must arise in the thought material while the
latter is in the level of the unconscious proc-
esses. One will probably have to think of
condensation as a process that extends over the
entire course up to the outposts of the percep-
— tive region; but in general it suffices to assume
that there is a simultaneous activity of all the
forces which participate in the formation of
dreams. In view of the reserve which one must

/

260 THEORETICAL PART

naturally exercise in the treatment of such
problems, and in consideration of the inability
to discuss here the main objections to these
problems, I should like to trust somewhat to
the assertion that the process of the dream-
work which prepares the dream is situated in
the region of the unconscious. Roughly speak-
ing, one can distinguish three general stages

“in the formation of the dream; first, the trans-

ー

ference of the conscious day remnants into the
unconscious, a transference in which the condi-
tions of the sleeping state must co-operate;
secondly, the actual dream-work in the

„ unconscious; and thirdly, the regression of

the elaborated dream material to the region
of perception, whereby the dream becomes
conscious.

The forces participating in the dream-forma-
tion may be recognized as the following: the
wish to sleep; the sum of occupation energy
which still clings to the day remnants after the
depression brought about by the state of sleep;
the psychic energy of the unconscious wish
forming the dream; and the opposing force of
the " censor,” which exercises its authority in
our waking state, and is not entirely abolished
during sleep. The task of dream-formation is,
above all, to overcome the inhibition of the
censor, and it is just this task that is fulfilled

THE RELATION OF WIT 261

by the displacement of the psychic energy
within the material of the dream-thoughts.

The Formula for Wit-work

Now we recall what caused us to think of
the dream while investigating wit. We found
that the character and activity of wit were
bound up in certain forms of expression and
technical means, among which the various
forms of condensation, displacement, and indi-
rect representation were the most conspicuous.
But the processes which led to the same results
—condensation, displacement, and indirect ex-
pression—we learned to know as peculiarities
of dream-work. Does not this analogy almost
force us to the conclusion that wit-work and

-work must be identical at least in one
essential point? I believe that the dream-work
lies revealed before us in its most important
characters, but in wit we find obscured just
that portion of the psychic processes which we
may compare with the -dream-work, namely,
the process of wit-formation in the first per-
son. Shall we not yield to the temptation to
construct this process according to the analogy
of dream-formation? Some of the characteris-
tics of dreams are so foreign to wit that that
part of the dream-work corresponding to them

262 THEORETICAL PART

cannot be carried over to the wit-formation. The
regression of the stream of thought to percep-
tion certainly falls away as far as wit is con-
cerned. However, the other two stages of
dream-formation, the sinking of a forecon-
scious * thought into the unconscious, and the
unconscious elaboration, would give us exactly
the result which we might observe in wit if we
assumed this process in wit-formation. Let us
decide to assume that this is the proceeding of
wit-formation in the case of the first person.
A foreconscious thought is left for a moment
to unconscious elaboration and the results are
forthwith grasped by the conscious perception.

Before, however, we attempt to prove the
details of this assertion we wish to consider an
objection which may jeopardize our assumption,
We start with the fact that the techniques of
wit point to the same processes which become
known to us as peculiarities of dream-work.
Now it is an easy matter to say in opposition
that we would not have described the tech-
niques of wit as condensation, displacement,
etc., nor would we have arrived at such a com-
prehensive agreement in the means of repre-
sentation of wit and dreams, if our previous
knowledge of dream-work had not influenced
our conception of the technique of wit; so that

+Cf. The Interpretation of Dreams, Chapter VII.

THE RELATION OF WIT 268

at the bottom we find that wit confirms only
those tentative theories which we brought to it
from our study of dreams. Such a genesis of
igreement would be no certain guarantee of its
stability beyond our preconceived judgment.
No other author has thought of considering
condensation, displacement, and indirect ex-
pression-as-aetive-factors of wit. This might
be a possible objection, but nevertheless it
would not be justified. It might just as well
be said that in order to recognize the real
agreement between dreams and wit our ordi-
nary knowledge must be augmented by a
specialized knowledge of dream-work. How-
ever, the decision will really depend only upon
the question whether the examining critic can
prove that such a conception of the technique
of wit in the individual examples is forced, and
that other nearer and farther-reaching inter-
pretations have been suppressed in favor of
mine; or whether the critic will have to admit
that the tentative theories derived from the
study of dreams can be really confirmed
through wit. My opinion is that we have
nothing to fear from such a critic and that
our processes of reduction have confidently
pointed out in which forms of expression
we must search for the techniques of wit.
That we designated these techniques by names

264 THEORETICAL PART

which previously anticipated the result of the
agreement between the technique of wit and
the dream-work was our just prerogative, and
really nothing more than an easily justified
simplification.

There is still another objection which would
not be vital, but which could not be so com-
pletely refuted. One might think that the
techniques of wit that fit in so well considering
the ends we have in view deserve recognition,
but that they do not represent all possible
techniques of wit or even all those in use.
Also that we have selected only the techniques
of wit which were influenced by and would suit
the pattern of the dream-work, whereas others
ignored by us would have demonstrated that
such an agreement was not common to all
cases. I really do not trust myself to make the
assertion that I have succeeded in explaining
all the current witticisms with reference to
their techniques, and I therefore admit the
possibility that my enumeration of wit-tech-
niques may show many gaps. But I have not
purposely excluded from my discussion any
" form of technique that was clear to me, and I
can affirm that the most frequent, the most es-
sential, and the most characteristic technical
means of wit have not eluded my attention.

THE RELATION OF WIT 265

Wit as an Inspiration

Wit possesses still another character which
entirely corresponds to our conception of the
wit-work as originally discovered in our study
of dreams. It is true that it is common to hear
one say “I made a joke,” but one feels that
one behaves differently during this process
than when one pronounces a judgment or of-
fers an objection. Wit shows in a most pro-
nounced manner the character of an invol-
untary “inspiration” or a sudden flash of
thought. A moment before one cannot tell
what kind of joke one is going to make, though
it lacks only the words to clothe it. One
usually experiences something indefinable
which I should like most to compare to an
absence, or sudden drop of intellectual tension;
then all of a sudden the witticism appears,

usually simultaneously with its verbal invest-

ment. Some of the means of wit are also
utilized in the expression of thought along
other lines, as in the cases of comparison and
allusion. I can purposely will to make an al-
lusion. In doing this I have first in mind (in
the inner hearing) the direct expression of my
thought, but as I am inhibited from expressing
the same through some objection from the situ-
ation in question, I almost resolve to substi-

-

5

266 THEORETICAL PART

tute the direct expression by a form of indirect
expression, and then I utter it in the form
of an allusion. But the allusion that comes
into existence in this manner having been
‘formed under my continuous control is never
witty, no matter how useful it may be. On
the other hand, the witty allusion appears
without my having been able to follow
up these preparatory stages in my mind.
I do not wish to attribute too much value to
this procedure, it is scarcely decisive, but it
does agree well with our assumption that in
wit-formation a stream of thought is dropped
for a moment and suddenly emerges from the
unconscious as a witticism.

Witticisms also evince a peculiar behavior
along the lines of association of ideas. Fre-
quently they are not at the disposal of our
memory when we look for them; on the other
hand, they often appear unsolicited and at
places in our train of thought where we cannot
understand their presence. Again, these are
only minor qualities, but none the less they
point to their unconscious origin.

Let us now collect the properties of wit
whose formation can be referred to the uncon-
scious. Above all there is the peculiar brevity
of wit which, though not an indispensable, is a
marked and distinctive characteristic feature.

THE RELATION OF WIT 267

When we first encountered it we were inclined
to see in it an expression of a tendency to
economize, but owing to very evident objec-
tions we ourselves depreciated the value of this
conception. At present we look upon it more
as a sign of the unconscious elaboration which
the thought of wit has undergone. The
process of condensation which corresponds to
it in dreams we can correlate with no other
factor than with the localization in the uncon-
scious, and we must assume that the conditions
for such condensations which are lacking in the
foreconscious are present in the unconscious
mental process. It is to be expected that in
the process of condensation some of the ele-
ments subjected to it become lost, while others
which take over their occupation energy are
strengthened by the condensation or are built
up too energetically. The brevity of wit, like
the brevity of dreams, would thus be a neces-
sary concomitant manifestation of the con
densation which occurs in both cases: both
times it is a result of the condensation process.

Besides the dream-work and the technique of wit I have been
able to demonstrate condensation as a regular and significant
process in another psychic Occurrence, in the mechanism of
normal (not purposive) forgetting. Singular impressions put
difficulties in the way of forgetting; impressions in any way
analogous are forgotten by becoming fused at their points of
contact. The confusion of analogous impressions is one of the

first steps in forgetting.

268 THEORETICAL PART

The brevity of wit is indebted also to this
origin for its peculiar character which though
not further assignable produces a striking im-
pression.

The Unconscious and the Infantile

We have defined above the one result
of condensation—the manifold application
of the same material, play upon words, and
similarity of sound—as a localized. economy,
and have also referred the pleasure produced
by harmless wit to that economy. At a later

J place we have found that the original purpose

<

of wit consisted in producing this kind of pleas-
ure from words, a process which was permitted
to the individual during the stage of playing,
but which became banked in during the course
of intellectual development or by rational crit-
icism. Now we have decided upon the assump-
tion that such condensations as serve the tech-
nique of wit originate automatically and with-
out any particular purpose during the process
of thinking in the unconscious. Have we not
here two different conceptions of the same fact
which seem to be incompatible with each other?
I do not think so. To be sure, there are two
different conceptions, and they demand to be
brought in unison, but they do not contradict

THE RELATION OF WIT 269

each other. They are merely somewhat
strange to each other, and as soon as we have
established a relationship between them we
shall probably gain in knowledge. That such
condensations are sources of pleasure is in per-
fect accord with the supposition that they
easily find in the unconscious the conditions
necessary for their origin; on the other hand,
we see the motivation for the sinking into the
unconscious in the circumstance that the pleas-
ure-bringing condensation necessary to wit
easily results there. Two other factors also,
which upon first examination seem entirely
foreign to each other and which are brought
together quite accidentally, will be recog-
nized on deeper investigation as intimately
connected, and perhaps may be found to
be substantially the same. I am referring
to the two assertions that on the one hand
wit could form such pleasure-bringing con-
densations during its development in the stage
of playing, that is, during the infancy of rea-
son; and, on the other hand, that it accom-
plishes the same function on higher levels by
submerging the thought into. the unconscious.
For the infantile is the source of the uncon-/
scious. The unconscious mental processes are
no others than those which are solely produced
during infancy. The thought which sinks into

270 THEORETICAL PART

the unconscious for the purpose of wit-forma-
tion only revisits there the old homestead of
the former playing with words. The thought
is put back for a moment into the infantile
state in order to regain in this way childish
pleasure-sources. If, indeed, one were not al-
ready acquainted with it from the investigation
of the psychology of the neuroses, wit would
surely impress one with the idea that the pe-
culiar unconscious elaboration is nothing else
but the infantile type of the mental process.
Only it is by no means an easy matter to
grasp, in the unconscious of the adult, this pe-
culiar infantile manner of thinking, because it
is usually corrected, so to say, statu nascendi.
However, it is successfully grasped in a series
of cases, and then we always laugh about the
“childish stupidity." In fact every exposure
of such an unconscious fact affects us in a
“ comical ” manner."

It is easier to comprehend the character of
these unconscious mental processes in the utter-
ances of patients suffering from various psy-

+ Many of my patients while under psychoanalytic treatment
are wont to prove regularly by their laughter that I have suc-
ceeded in demonstrating faithfully to their conscious perception
the veiled unconscious; they laugh also when the content of
what is disclosed does not at all justify this laughter. To be sure,
it is conditional that they have approached this unconscious
closely enough to grasp it when the physician has conjectured it
and presented it to them.

THE RELATION OF WIT 271

chic disturbances. It is very probable that,
following the assumption of old Griesinger,
we would be in a position to understand the
deliria of the insane and to turn them to good
account as valuable information, if we would
not make the demands of conscious thinking
upon them, but instead treat them as we do
dreams by means of our art of interpretation."
In the dream, too, we were able to show the
“return of psychic life to the embryonal state.” 2

In discussing the processes of condensation.
we have entered so deeply into the signification
of the analogy between wit and dreams that we
can here be brief. As we know that displace-
ments in dream-work point to the influence of
‘the censor of conscious thought, we will con-
sequently be inclined to assume that an inhibit-
ing force also plays a part in the formation of
wit when we find the process of displacement
among the techniques of wit. We also know
that this is commonly the case; the endeavor of
wit to revive the old pleasure in nonsense or
the old pleasure in word-play meets with re-
sistance in every normal state, a resistance
which is exerted by the protest of critical rea-
son, and which must be overcome in each in-

*In doing this we must not forget to reckon with the distor-
tion brought about by the censor which is still active in the

* The Interpretation of Dreams.

272 THEORETICAL PART

dividual case. But a radical distinction be-
tween wit and dreams is shown in the manner
in which the wit-work solves this difficulty. In
‚the dream-work the solution of this task is
У brought about regularly through displacements
and through the choice of ideas which are re-
mote enough from the objectionable ones to
secure passage through the censor; the latter
emselves are but offsprings of those whose
psychic energy they have taken upon them-
.selves through full transference. The dis-
placements are therefore not lacking in any
dream and are far more comprehensive; they not
only comprise the deviations from the trend of
thought but also all forms of indirect expression,
the substitution for an important but offensive
element of one seemingly indifferent and harm-
less to the censor which form very remote allu-
sions to the first, they include substitution also
occurring through symbols, comparisons, or
trifles. It is not to be denied that parts of this
indirect representation really originate in the
foreconscious thoughts of the dream,—as, for
example, symbolical representation and repre-
sentation through comparisons—because other-
wise the thought would not have reached the state
of the foreconscious expression. Such indi-
rect expressions and allusions, whose reference
to the original thought is easily findable, are

THE RELATION OF WIT 278

really permissible and customary means of ex-
pression even in our conscious thought. The
dream-work, however, exaggerates the applica-
tion of these means of indirect expression to an
unlimited degree. Under the pressure of the
censor any kind of association becomes good ~~
enough for substitution by allusion; the dis-
placement from one element to any other is
permitted. The substitution of the inner as-
sociations (similarity, causal connection, etc.)
by the so-called outer associations (simultane-
ity, contiguity in space, assonance) is partic-
ularly conspicuous and characteristic of the
dream-work.

The Difference between Dream-technique and
Wit-technique

All these means of displacement also occur
as techniques of wit, but when they do occur ,
they usually restrict themselves to those limits EM
prescribed for their use in conscious thought;
in fact they may be lacking, even though wit
must regularly solve a task of inhibition. One
can comprehend this retirement of the process
of displacement in wit-work when one remem-
bers that wit usually has another technique at
its disposal through which it defends itself

_ against inhibitions. Indeed, we have discov-

274 THEORETICAL PART
ered nothing more characteristic of it than just

this technique. "For wit does not have recourse —

to compromises as does the dream, nor does it |

evade the inhibition; it insists upon retaining
the play with words or nonsense unaltered, but
thanks to the ambiguity of words and multi-
plicity of thought-relations, it restricts itself to
the choice of cases in which this play or non-
sense may appear at the same time admissible
(jest) or senseful (wit). Nothing distin-
guishes wit from all other psychic formations
better than this double-sidedness and this dou-
ble-dealing; by emphasizing the “ sense in non-
sense,” the authors have approached nearest
the understanding of wit, at least from this an-
gle.

Considering the unexceptional predominance
of this peculiar technique in overcoming inhibi-
tions in wit, one might find it superfluous that
wit should make use of the displacement-tech-
nique even in a single case. But on the one
hand certain kinds of this technique remain
useful for wit as objects and sources of pleas-
ure—as, for example, the real displacement
(deviation of the trend of thought) which in
fact shares in the nature of nonsense,—and on
the other hand one must not forget that the
highest stage of wit, tendency-wit, must fre-
quently overcome two kinds of inhibitions which

THE RELATION OF WIT 275

oppose both itself and its tendency (p. 147),
and that allusion and displacements are qual-
ified to facilitate this latter task.

The numerous and unrestricted application
of indirect representation, of displacements,
and especially of allusions in the dream-work,
has a result which I mention not because of
its own significance but because it became for
me the subjective inducement to occupy my-
self with the problem of wit. If a dream
analysis is imparted to one unfamiliar with the
subject and unaccustomed to it, and the pe-
culiar ways of ions o displacements
(objectionable to the thoughts but
utilized by the o: are explained, the
hearer an uncomfortable impres-
sion; he declares these interpretations to be
“ witty,” but it seems obvious to him that these
are not successful jokes but forced ones which
run contrary to the rules of wit. This impres-
sion can be easily explained; it is due to the
fact that the dream-work operates with the
same means as wit, but in the application of
the same the dream exceeds the bounds which
wit restricts. We shall soon learn that in con-
of the rôle of the third person wit
is bound by a certain condition which does not
affect the dream.

276 THEORETICAL PART

Irony—Negativism.

| Among those techniques which are common
| to both wit and dreams representation through
the opposite and the application of absurdity
are especially interesting. The first belongs
to the strongly effective means of wit as shown
in the examples of “ out-doing wit” (p. 98).
The representation through the opposite, un-
like most of the wit-techniques, is unable to
/ withdraw itself from conscious attention. He
who intentionally tries to make use of wit-
work, as in the case of the “ habitual wit,” soon
discovers that the easiest way to answer an as-
sertion with a witticism is to concentrate one’s
mind on the opposite of this assertion and
trust to the chance flash of thought to brush
aside the feared objection to this opposite by
means of a different interpretation. Maybe
the representation through its opposite is in-
debted for such a preference to the fact that
it forms the nucleus of another pleasurable
mode of mental expression, for an understand-
ing of which we do not have to consult the un-
conscious. I refer to irony, which is very sim-
ilar to wit and is considered a sub-species of
the comic. The essence of irony consists in im- ご .
| parting the very opposite of what one intended 4
to express, but it precludes the anticipated

THE RELATION OF WIT 277

contradiction by indicating through the inflec-
tions, concomitant gestures, and through slight
changes in style—if it is done in writing—that |
the speaker himself means to convey the op- こ 、 /
pesite-of what he says— Irony is applicable
only in cases where the other person is pre-
pared to hear the reverse of the statement
actually made, so that he cannot fail to be in-
clined to contradict. As a consequence of this
condition ironic expressions are particularly
subject to the danger of being misunderstood.
To the person who uses it, it gives the advan- .
tage of readily avoiding the difficulties to which ・
direct expressions, as, for example, invectives,
are subject. In the hearer it produces comic
pleasure, probably by causing him to make
preparations for contradiction, which are im-
mediately found to be unnecessary. Such a
comparison of wit with a form of the comical
that is closely allied to it might strengthen us ,
in the assumption that the relation of wit to”
the unconscious is the peculiarity that also dis-
tinguishes it from the comical.

In dream-work, representation through the
opposite has a far more important part to play
than in wit. The dream not only delights in

<

* The character of the comical which is referred to as its
“dryness” also depends in the broadest sense upon the differen-
tiation of the things spoken from the antics accompanying it.

278 THEORETICAL PART

representing a pair of opposites by means of
one and the same composite image, but in ad-
dition it often changes an element from the
dream-thoughts into its opposite, thus causing
considerable difficulty in the work of interpre-
tation. In the case of any element capable of
having an opposite it is impossible to tell
whether it is to be taken negatively or posi-
tively in the dream-thoughts."

I must emphasize that as yet this fact has
by no means been understood. Nevertheless,
it seems to give indications of an important
characteristic of unconscious thinking which in
all probability results in a process comparable
to “ judging.” Instead of setting aside judg-
ments the unconscious forms “ repressions.”
The repression may correctly be described as
a stage intermediate between the defense re-
flex and condemnation.’

3 The Interpretation of Dreams, p. 296.

2 This very remarkable and still inadequately understood be-
havior of antagonistic relationships is probably not without value
for the understanding of the symptom of negativism in neurotics
and in the insane. Cf. the two latest works on the subject: Bleu-
ler, “ Uber die negative Suggestibilität,” Psych.-Neurol. Wochen-
schrift, 1904, and Otto Groos’s Zur Differential diagnostik nega-
tivistischer Phänomene, also my review of the Gegensinn der
Urworte, in Jahrb, f. Psychonalyse II, 1910.

THE RELATION OF WIT 279

The Unconscious as the Psychic Stage of the
— Wit-work

E or NE which _ occurs so

often in dreams and which has made them the

object of so much contempt, has never really

come into being as the result of an accidental

shuffling of conceptual elements, but may in

every case be proven to have been purposely

admitted by the dream-work. Nonsense and |
absurdity a intended to express (embittered
criticism) and (scornful contradiction within the
dream thoughts. Absurdity in the dream-con-
tent thus stands for the judgment: “ It's pure
nonsense,” expressed in dream-thoughts. In
my work on the Interpretation of Dreams,
I have placed great emphasis on the demon-
stration of this fact because I thought that I
could in this manner most strikingly contro-
vert the error expressed by many that the
dream is no psychic phenomenon at all—an
error which bars the way to an understanding
of the unconscious. Now we have learnt (in
the analysis of certain tendency-witticisms on
р. 73). that nonsense in wit is made to serve
the same purposes of expression. We also
know that a nonsensical facade of a witticism
is peculiarly adapted to enhance the psychic
expenditure in the hearer and hence also to in-

280 THEORETICAL PART

crease the amount to be discharged through
laughter. Moreover, we must not forget that
nonsense in wit is an end in itself, since the
purpose of reviving the old pleasure in non-
sense is one of the motives of the wit-work.
There are other ways to regain the feeling of
nonsense in order to deri pleasure from it;
caricature, exaggeration, parody, and” Travesty
utilize the same and thus produce “comical
nonsense.” If we subject these modes of ex-
pression to an analysis similar to the one used
in studying wit, we shall find that there is no
occasion in any of them for resorting to un-
conscious processes in our sense for the pur-
pose of getting explanations. We are now
also in a position to understand why the
“ witty ” character may be added as an em-
bellishment to caricature, exaggeration, and .
parody; it is the manifold character of the per-
formance upon the * psychic stage”* that
makes this possible.

I am of the opinion that by transferring the
wit-work into the system of the unconscious we
have made a distinet gain, since it makes it pos-
sible for us to understand the fact that the
various techniques to which wit admittedly ad-
heres are on the other hand not its exclusive

3 An expression of G. T. Fechner's which has acquired signifi-
cance from the point of view of my conception.

THE RELATION OF WIT 281

property. Many doubts, which have arisen in
the beginning of our investigation of these
techniques and which we were forced temporar-
ily to leave, can now be conveniently cleared
up. Hence we shall give due consideration to
the doubt which expresses itself by asserting
that the undeniable relation of wit to the un-
conscious is correct only for certain categories
of tendency-wit, while we are ready to claim
this relation for all forms and all the stages of
development of wit. We may not shirk the duty
of testing this objection.

We may assume that we deal with a sure
case of wit-formation in the unconscious when
it concerns witticisms that serve unconscious
tendencies, or those strengthened by uncon-
scious tendencies, as, for example, most “ cyn-
ical “ witticisms. For in such cases the un-
conscious tendency draws the foreconscious
thought down into the unconscious in order to
remodel it there; a process to which the study
‘of the psychology of the neuroses has added
many analogies with which we are acquainted.
But in the case of tendency-wit of other vari-
eties, namely, harmless wit and the jest, this
power seems to fall away, and the relation of
the wit to the unconscious is an open question

But now let us consider the case of the witty
expression of a thought that is not without

282 THEORETICAL PART

value in itself and that comes to the surface in
the course of the association of mental

‘processes. In order that this thought may be-

come a witticism, it is of course necessary that
it make a choice among the‘ possible forms of
expression in order to find the exact form that
will bring along the gain in word-pleasure.
We know from self-observation that this choice
is not made by conscious attention; but the
selection will certainly be better if the occu-
pation energy of the foreconscious thought is
lowered to the unconscious. For in the uncon-
scious, as we have learnt from the dream-work,
the paths of association emanating from a
word are treated on a par with associations
from objects. The occupation energy from
the unconscious presents by far the more fa-
vorable conditions for the selection of the ex-
pression. Moreover, we may assume without
going farther that the possible expression
which contains the gain in word-pleasure exerts
a lowering effect on the still fluctuating self-
command of the foreconscious, similar to that
exerted in the first case by the unconscious
tendency. As an explanation for the simpler
case of the jest we may imagine that an ever-
watchful intention of attaining the gain in
word-pleasure seizes the opportunity offered
in the foreconscious of again drawing the in

THE RELATION OF WIT 288

vesting energy down into the unconscious, ac-
ing to the familiar scheme. :
| I earnestly wish that it were possible for me
on the one hand to present one decisive point
in my conception of wit more clearly, and on
the other hand to fortify it with compelling
arguments. But as a matter of fact it is not
a question here of two failures, but of one
and the same failure. I can give no clearer
exposition because I have no further testimony
on behalf of my conception. The latter has
developed as the result of my study of the
technique and of comparison with dream-work,
and indeed from this one side only. I now
find that the dream-work is altogether excel-
lently adapted to the peculiarities of wit. This
conception is now concluded; if the conclusion
leads us not to a familiar province, but rather
to one that 15 strange and novel to our modes
of thought, the conclusion is called a “ hy-
pothesis," and the relation of the hypothesis to
the material from which it is drawn is justly
not accepted as “ proof,” The hypothesis is
admitted as “ proved “ only if it can be reached
by other ways and if it can be shown to be the
junction point for other associations. But
such proof, in view of the fact that our knowl-
edge of unconscious processes has hardly be-
gun, cannot be had. Realizing then that we are

マ

284 THEORETICAL PART

on soil still virgin, we shall be content to pro-
ject from our viewpoint of observation one nar-
row slender plank into the unexplored region.
We shall not build a great structure on such
a foundation as this. If we correlate the dif-
ferent stages of wit to the mental dispositions
favorable to them we may say: The jest has —
_its origin in the happy mood; what seems to
be peculiar to it is an inclination to lower the
psychic static energies (Besetzungen). The
jest already makes use of all the characteristic
techniques of wit and satisfies the fundamental
conditions of the same through the choice of
such an assortment of words or mental associa-
tions as will conform not only to the require-
ments for the production of pleasure, but also
conform to the demands of the intelligent critic.
We shall conclude that the sinking of the men-
tal energy to the unconscious stage, a process
facilitated by the happy mood, has already
taken place in the case of the jest. The mood
does away with this requirement in the case of
harmless wit connected with the expression of
a valuable thought; here we must assume a
particular personal adaptation which finds it as
easy to come to expression as it is for the fore-
conscious thought to sink for a moment into
the unconscious. An ever watchful tendency
to renew the original resultant pleasure of wit

THE RELATION OF WIT 285

exerts thereby a lowering effect upon the still
fluctuating foreconscious expression of the
thought. Most people are probably capable of
making jests when in a happy mood; aptitude
for joking independent of the mood is found
only in a few persons. Finally, the most pow-
erful incentive for wit-work is the presence of
strong tendencies which reach back into the un- A
conscious and which indicate a particular fit-
ness for witty productions; these tendencies
might explain to us why the subjective condi-
tions of wit are so frequently fulfilled in the
case of neurotic persons. Even the most in- | , |
apt person may become witty under the influ- -
ence of strong tendencies.
«Ct

Differences Between Wit and Dreams

'This last contribution, the explanation of
wit-work in the first person, though still hy-
pothetical, strictly speaking, ends our interest
in wit. There still remains a short comparison
of wit to the more familiar dream and we may
expect that, outside of the one agreement al-
ready considered, two such diverse mental ac-
tivities should show nothing but differences.
The most important difference lies in their so- 、
cial behavior. The dream is a perfectly asocial
psychic product. It has nothing to tell to any-

286 THEORETICAL PART

one else, having originated in an individual as
a compromise between conflicting psychic
forces it remains incomprehensible to the per-
son himself and has therefore altogether no
interest for anybody else. Not only does the
dream find it unnecessary to place any value
on intelligibleness, but it must even guard
against being understood, as it would then be
destroyed; it can only exist in disguised form.
For this reason the dream may make use
freely of the mechanism that controls uncon-
scious thought processes to the extent of pro-
ducing undecipherable disfigurements. Wit, on
ソ the other hand, is the most social of all those
psychic functions whose aim is to gain pleas-
ure. It often requires three persons, and the
psychic process which it incites always requires
the participation of at least one other person.
It must therefore bind itself to the condition
of intelligibleness; it may employ disfigure-
ment made practicable in the unconscious
through condensation and displacement, to no
greater extent than can be deciphered by the
intelligence of the third person. As for the
rest, wit and dreams have developed in alto-
gether different spheres of the psychic life, and
are to be classed under widely separated cate-
gories of the psychological system. No matter "
how concealed the dream is still a wish, while

ー

THE RELATION OF WIT 287

wit is a developed play. Despite its apparent
unreality the dream retains its relation to the
great interests of life; it seeks to supply what
is lacking through a regressive detour of hal-
lucinations; and it owes its existence solely to
the strong need for sleep during the night.
Wit, on the other hand, seeks to draw a small
amount of pleasure from the free and unen-
cumbered activities of our psychic apparatus,
and later to seize this pleasure as an incidental
gain. It thus secondarily reaches to important
functions relative to the outer world. The
dream serves preponderately to guard from
pain while wit serves to acquire pleasure; in
these two aims all our psychic activities meet.