Psycho-analysis and the ascertaining of truth in courts of law 1906-002/1924.en

Freud, Sigmund (1906-002/1924.en): Psycho-analysis and the ascertaining of truth in courts of law

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    I

    PSYCHO-ANALYSIS AND THE ASCERTAINING
    OF TRUTH IN COURTS OF LAW1

    (1906)

    THERE is a growing recognition of the untrust-
    worthiness of statements made by witnesses, at
    present the basis of so many judgements in
    Courts of Law; and this has quickened in all of you,
    who are to become judges and advocates, an interest in
    a new method of investigation, the purpose of which
    is to lead the accused person to establish his own
    guilt or innocence objectively. This method is of a
    psychological and experimental character, and is based
    upon psychological research; it is closely connected
    with certain views which have only recently been
    propounded in medical psychology. I understand that
    you are already engaged in testing the utility and
    bearing of this new method by means of what one
    might call ‘mock trials’, and I have gladly accepted
    the invitation of your President, Professor Löffler, to
    explain to you more fully the relation of this method
    to psychology.

    You are all acquainted with the game played at
    parties, where a word is called out at random and some-
    one has to add a second word forming a compound
    with the first—for example, ‘steam’, ‘ship’, giving the
    compound word ‘steam-ship’. It is nothing more
    than a modification of this children’s game which the
    Wundt school has introduced into psychology under
    the name of ‘association test’, and it omits only one

    1Lecture delivered to Prof. Löffler’s Seminar in June 1906. First
    published in the Archiv für Kriminalanthropologie und Kriminalistik,
    von H. Gross, Bd. 26, 1906; reprinted in Sammlung, Zweite Folge.
    [Translated by E. B. M. Herford.]

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    rule of the game. The experiment is as follows: a
    word (termed the ‘stimulus-
    word’) is called out to
    the subject, and he replies as quickly as possible with
    some other word that occurs to him (the so-
    called
    ‘reaction’), his choice of this reaction not being
    restricted in any way. The points to be specially
    observed are the time required for this reaction, and
    the very variable relation of the stimulus-
    word to the
    reaction-
    word. Now it cannot be claimed that much
    fresh knowledge was gained as the immediate result of
    these experiments. This was to be expected, however,
    since they were carried out without any decided aim
    in view, and without any guiding principle which
    could be brought to bear on the results. The experi-
    ments only became significant and fruitful when
    Bleuler in Zurich and his pupils, especially Jung,
    began to pay attention to ‘association tests’. Their
    experiments acquired practical value when the hypo-
    thesis was applied that the connection between the
    stimulus-
    word and the reaction-
    word could not be
    one of chance, but must be determined by a pre-
    existing group of ideas in the mind of the person
    reacting.

    It has become customary to call a group of ideas
    of this kind, having an influence on the reaction to
    the stimulus-
    word, a ‘complex’. The influence works
    either by the stimulus-
    word actually touching a
    complex directly or by the complex succeeding in
    getting into touch with the word by intermediate links.
    This determination of the reaction is a very remarkable
    fact, as you can see by the undisguised amazement
    expressed in the literature on the subject. The truth
    of it admits of no doubt, however; for as a rule you
    can lay bare the particular complex at work by asking
    the subject of the experiment to give the reasons for
    his reaction, and so explain a reaction which could not
    otherwise be understood. Examples like those given
    by Jung, on pp. 6 and 8–9 of his treatise,1) are well

    1)Jung, Die psychologische Diagnose des Tatbestandes, 1906.

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    suited to make us doubt the existence of chance and
    of what appears to be arbitrariness in mental processes.
    Let us consider for a moment the early history of
    the view put forward by Bleuler and Jung, namely,
    that these reactions are determined by complexes in
    the mind of the subject. In 1901 I published a work 1
    in which I pointed out that a whole series of actions
    previously held to be due to chance were on the
    contrary strictly determined, and to that extent I have
    therefore contributed towards circumscribing the field
    of mental free will. I took as examples slight slips of
    memory, tongue or pen, and the mislaying of objects.
    I showed that when someone makes a slip of the tongue
    it is not chance, nor difficulty in articulation either,
    nor similarity in sound that is responsible; but that
    in every case a disturbing group of ideas—a complex
    —can be brought to light which alters the meaning of
    the intended speech under the guise of an apparent
    slip of the tongue. Further, I took for consideration
    people’s little actions that are apparently purposeless
    and due to chance—their petty habits of playing
    fiddling with things and so on—and revealed them as
    ‘symptomatic actions’ connected with a hidden mean-
    ing and intended to give this hidden meaning un-
    obtrusive expression. I found, moreover, that even a
    Christian name cannot occur to the mind by chance,
    but must have been determined by a powerful complex ;
    and that the numbers that one may think one chooses
    arbitrarily can be traced to the influence of such a
    hidden complex. A few years later a colleague of
    mine, Dr. Alfred Adler, was able to substantiate this
    most astonishing statement of mine by some very
    striking examples.2 Once one has accustomed oneself
    to such a conception of determinism in mental pro-
    cesses it is a justifiable deduction, drawn from the
    study of the psychopathology of everyday life, that the

    1Freud, Zur Psychopathologie des Alltagslebens.

    2Adler, Drei Psychoanalysen von Zahleneinfällen und obsedierenden
    Zahlen, 1905.

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    associations given by a person under experimental
    conditions are not arbitrary but are conditioned by
    the operation of an idea in his mind.

    Now let us return to the association test. In the
    kind of experiment we have already referred to, it is
    the subject under examination who gives us the origin
    of his reactions, and this fact has made these experi-
    ments somewhat unprofitable from the point of view of
    legal cases. But might we not change the order of
    things, somewhat as in an equation with several un-
    knowns which can be solved by interchanging one or
    the other (taking either the a or the b as the x we are
    seeking) ? Up to now in our experiments the complex
    has been unknown to us. We tested with any chance
    stimulus-word, and the subject under examination
    revealed the complex which was brought to expression
    by means of this word. Suppose we reverse the
    process. Suppose we start with some known complex,
    take chosen words with which to stimulate reactions
    in the subject, and put x in the mind of the subject
    himself. Is it possible on this basis thus to decide
    whether the known complex is present in the subject
    under examination, by a study of the associations given
    as reactions ? You observe that this method of
    enquiry corresponds exactly with that adopted by an
    examining judge who wishes to discover whether an
    acknowledged fact of which he is aware is also known
    to the accused in the rôle of perpetrator. It seems that
    Wertheimer and Klein, two pupils of Hans Gross, the
    Professor of Criminal Law in Prague, were the first 1
    to put into practice this change in the methods of
    investigation, a most important change from your
    point of view.

    You know already from your own experience that
    in such investigations several points in the reactions
    help to decide whether the subject under examination
    possesses a complex which you are testing with your
    stimulus-word. I will enumerate them for you in

    1 According to Jung, op. cit.

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    order. (1) An unusual content in the reaction which
    requires explanation. (2) Increase of reaction-
    time, for stimulus-words which have touched the complex
    are reacted to after considerable delay (the delay may
    be several times longer than the normal reaction-time).
    (3) Faulty reproduction. You know what remarkable
    fact is meant by this. When a longish series of
    stimulus-words is repeated after a short interval, the
    subject will give the same reactions except where the
    stimulus-word has touched a complex, and then another
    reaction will often be substituted. (4) Perseveration
    (or perhaps better ‘after-effects’). It often happens
    that the action of the complex which has been awakened
    through an effective (‘critical’) stimulus continues
    after that word has been passed and changes the
    reactions (e.g. by lengthening the reaction-time) to the
    non-critical stimuli which follow immediately after.
    When all or several of these signs are simultaneously
    present it proves that the complex known to us is
    present as a disturbing element in the mind of the
    person under examination. The disturbance is attri-
    buted to the fact that the complex present in the mind
    of the subject is charged with feeling, and enabled to
    distract his attention from the task of reacting. This
    irregularity is regarded as a ‘mental betrayal’.

    I know that you are at the moment concerned with
    the potentialities and pitfalls of this experimental
    technique, the aim of which is to lead the accused to
    betray himself objectively. I would therefore draw
    your attention to the fact that an exactly similar
    method of discovering hidden material in the mind has
    been practised for more than a decade in a very
    different field of investigation. It is my purpose to
    lay before you the points of resemblance and difference
    in the two cases.

    This field is indeed a very different one from yours.
    I refer to the therapy for certain nervous complaints,
    the so-called psychoneuroses, of which hysteria and
    obsessions may be taken as examples. In this case

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    the method is called psycho-
    analysis ; it was evolved
    by me from the ‘cathartic’ method of therapeutics
    first practised by Breuer in Vienna.1 To allay your
    surprise I must work out an analogy between the
    criminal and the hysteric. In both we are concerned
    with a secret, with something hidden. But in order
    that I may not appear paradoxical, I must point out
    the difference at once. In the case of the criminal it is
    a secret which he knows and hides from you, but in the
    case of the hysteric it is a secret hidden from him, a
    secret he himself does not know. How is this possible?
    Now, through laborious investigations, we know
    that all these illnesses are the result of the patient
    having succeeded in repressing certain ideas charged
    with strong feeling, together with the wishes that arise
    from them, in such a way that they play no part in his
    deliberate thought-
    processes, cannot enter into his
    conscious thoughts, and therefore remain unknown to
    him. But from this repressed psychic material
    (complexes) are generated the somatic and psychic
    symptoms, which plague the patient just as a guilty
    conscience does. In this one point, therefore, the
    difference between the criminal and the hysterical is
    fundamental.

    The task of the therapeutist is, however, the same
    as the task of the judge ; he must discover the hidden
    psychic material. To do this we have invented
    various methods of detection, some of which lawyers
    are now going to imitate.

    It will interest you, from the point of view of your
    own profession, to hear how we physicians proceed in
    psycho-
    analysis. When the patient has recapitulated
    his history for the first time, we ask him to be com-
    pletely passive and to allow all thoughts that occur to
    him free expression without any selection, criticism or
    suppression on his part. We start, as you see, with an
    assumption he does not in any way share, that his
    thoughts are not arbitrary but are determined by

    1Breuer und Freud, Studien über Hysterie, 1895.

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    their reaction to his secret complexes, and may be
    regarded to a certain extent as derived from these
    complexes. You will note it is the same assumption
    which helped us to arrive at the significance of the
    association test. But although we have impressed
    upon the patient the rule to communicate all his
    thoughts, he does not seem able to keep to it. He
    holds back first this and then the other thought, and
    gives various reasons to account for this, either that
    it is unimportant or that it is irrelevant, or that it is
    quite meaningless. We insist that he should com-
    municate the thought in spite of these objections and
    that he should follow it up; for this criticism is pre-
    cisely evidence to us that the thought belongs to the
    ‘complex’ which we are seeking. It is precisely in
    this attitude of the patient that we recognize a mani-
    festation of his ‘resistance’, which will continue
    through the whole course of his treatment. I would
    only indicate briefly that this conception of resistance
    has gained the utmost significance for us in under-
    standing the origin of the illness as well as the
    mechanism of the healing process.

    Now a similar attitude of criticism of associations
    does not occur directly in your tests, whereas we are
    able in psycho-analysis to observe all those striking
    signs of a ‘complex’ which you notice in your tests.
    Even when the patient no longer ventures to evade the
    rule which has been imposed upon him, we notice that
    sometimes, nevertheless, he hesitates and stops, some-
    times pauses in his flow of ideas. Every hesitation of
    this kind is to us an expression of his resistance and
    an indication of its relation to the ‘complex’. Indeed,
    for us it is the most important sign of such a signifi-
    cance, just as for you the lengthening of reaction-time
    is a very important indication. We are accustomed
    to interpret the hesitation in this light even when the
    content of the idea held back seems to contain nothing
    difficult, and when the patient assures us he cannot
    imagine why he should hesitate to communicate it.

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    The pauses which occur in psycho-analysis are as a
    rule many times longer than the delays which you
    notice in reaction-tests.

    The second of your complex-indicators, the altera-
    tion of the reaction-content, also plays its part in the
    technique of psycho-analysis. We are wont to regard
    even the smallest digressions from the ordinary form of
    expression in our patients generally as a sign of some
    hidden meaning; and for the time being we lay our-
    selves open to the ridicule of the patient by such
    interpretations. We are literally on the alert for
    remarks that hint at a double meaning, and in which
    the hidden meaning glimmers through the harmless
    expression. Not only patients, but colleagues ignorant
    of the technique of psycho-analysis and its immediate
    bearings, are incredulous and accuse us of petty jokes
    and of playing with words, but we are nearly always in
    the right. After all, it is not difficult to understand
    that the only way in which a carefully guarded secret
    betrays itself is by distant, or at best by ambiguous,
    allusions. At last the patient becomes accustomed to
    disclosing, by means of so-called ‘indirect representa-
    tion’, all we require in order to discover the complex.

    The third of your complex-indicators, that of error
    in reproduction (such as you observe when something
    repeated a second time shows a discrepancy with the
    first), is also made use of in a narrower field in the
    technique of psycho-analysis. One task which is often
    set us is the interpretation of dreams, i.e. the trans-
    lation of the remembered dream-content into its
    hidden meaning. It sometimes happens that we are
    uncertain at which point to begin the task, and in
    this case we make use of a rule discovered empiric-
    ally, according to which we let the dreamer recount
    his dream again. In doing so he usually changes
    the expressions used in some parts whilst faithfully
    repeating the rest. These points, in regard to which
    discrepancies arise in the two accounts or which are
    omitted in the second telling, are the points to which

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    we pay special attention ; for the inaccuracy indicates
    that the complex is being touched, and promises the
    best approach to the secret meaning of the dream.1)

    You will not now suppose that the points of simi-
    larity are exhausted when I state that a phenomenon
    corresponding exactly to perseveration does not appear
    in psycho-analysis. This apparent difference only
    arises from the particular conditions of your test.
    For you do not allow the effect on the complex time
    to develop itself. It has scarcely begun to act when
    you distract the attention of the subject under examina-
    tion by a new and probably harmless stimulus-word,
    and then you may observe that the subject delays,
    being still occupied with the complex in spite of your
    interference. On the other hand, in psycho-analysis
    we avoid such interruptions, keeping the patient
    occupied with his complex, and since in our method
    everything is, so to speak, ‘perseveration’, we cannot
    observe the phenomenon as an isolated occurrence.

    We may claim that it is by means of this kind of
    technique that we, on the whole, succeed in making
    the patient aware of what he has repressed, of his
    secret, and thus in removing the psychological cause
    of the symptom from which he is suffering. Before
    you draw any conclusions as to the possibilities these
    successful results offer for your profession, we will
    consider some points of difference in the psychological
    situation in the two cases.

    We have already pointed out the chief difference.
    With the neurotic, the secret is hidden from his own
    consciousness ; with the criminal it is hidden only from
    you. In the first, we have a genuine ignorance (though
    not altogether complete), whilst in the latter this
    ignorance is merely simulated. Connected with this is
    another difference more important in practice. In
    psycho-analysis the patient consciously helps to over-
    come his resistance because he expects to gain some-
    thing from the investigation—cure. The criminal, on

    1)Cf. Freud, Die Traumdeutung.

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    the contrary, does not co-operate with you ; he would
    be working against his whole ego. As a compensation
    for this, however, you are only endeavouring to arrive
    at a conviction objectively ; whereas our therapy
    demands that the patient himself should also arrive at
    the same conviction subjectively. It remains to be
    seen, however, how far your difficulties are increased or
    altered by the lack of co-operation on the part of the
    subject ; for this is a situation which you can never
    bring about in your class experiments, since your
    colleague playing the part of the accused is, in spite
    of his conscious determination not to betray himself,
    your co-worker and assistant.

    Looking more deeply into the comparison of the
    two situations, it will become clear to you that on the
    whole psycho-
    analysis is concerned with a simple,
    special form of the problem of discovery of hidden
    material in the mind ; whereas in your profession, on
    the other hand, the problem is a much broader one.
    The case of the psychoneurotic is regularly concerned
    with a repressed sexual complex (in the widest sense
    of the term), but this is a difference which does not
    concern you. There is another point, however, which
    does. The aim of psycho-analysis is identical in all
    cases ; the analysis aims at laying bare the complexes
    which have been repressed as a result of the painful
    feelings associated with them, and which produce
    signs of resistance when there is an attempt to bring
    them into consciousness. The resistance is localized ;
    it arises at the boundary between the unconscious
    and the conscious. In your case we are concerned with
    a resistance originating entirely within the conscious life.
    You cannot simply discount this difference. You must
    first determine experimentally whether the conscious
    resistance betrays itself by exactly the same signs as
    the unconscious resistance does. Further, in my
    opinion you cannot yet be certain whether you may
    interpret your objective signs of a ‘complex’ as
    resistance in the same way that we psychotherapeutists

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    do. It may happen in the case of your experimental
    subjects, though not very often in the case of criminals,
    that the complex you touch on is one tinged with
    pleasure, and the question then arises whether this
    complex will give the same reaction as one charged
    with painful affect.

    I would also lay stress on the considera-
    tion that your experiments may possibly be subject to a com-
    plication which naturally does not arise in psycho-
    analysis. You may be led astray in your examination
    by a neurotic who reacts as though he were guilty even
    though he is innocent–because a lurking sense of guilt
    already existing in him assimilates the accusation made
    against him on this particular occasion. You must
    not regard this possibility as an idle one ; you have only
    to think of the nursery, where you can often observe
    it. It sometimes happens that a child who has been
    accused of a misdeed denies the accusation, but at the
    same time weeps like a sinner who has been caught.
    You might think that the child lies, even while it
    asserts its innocence ; but this need not be so. The
    child is really not guilty of the specific misdeed of which
    he is being accused, but he is guilty of a similar mis-
    demeanour of which you know nothing and of which
    you do not accuse him. He therefore quite truly denies
    his guilt in the one case, but in doing so betrays his
    sense of guilt with regard to the other. The adult
    neurotic behaves in this and in many other ways just
    as the child does. People of this kind are often to be
    met, and it is indeed a question whether your technique
    will succeed in distinguishing such self-accused persons
    from those who are really guilty. Finally, one more
    point : you know that, according to law, you may not
    use any procedure which takes the accused off his
    guard. He will therefore be aware that his whole
    effort must be directed to avoid betraying himself in
    your experiments ; and a further question then arises,
    whether you can expect the same reactions when
    attention is directed towards the complex as when it

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    is diverted from it? How far does the conscious
    intention to avoid self-betrayal affect reactions in
    different people?

    Just because the situations on which your investiga-
    tions are based can be so manifold, psychology takes
    a very lively interest in its results, and one would like
    to suggest that you should not too readily doubt their
    practical value. Although my work lies so far from
    the sphere of your legal practice, allow me to make one
    other suggestion. In spite of the fact that experiments
    in class are essential for your training and for the
    examination of witnesses, you will never be able to
    reproduce in your experiments the same psychological
    situation as in the examination of a guilty person in
    the criminal court. They remain ‘mock trials’, and
    no practical conclusions can be based on them for use
    in a criminal case. If we do not wish to give up
    experimental study, the following alternative suggests
    itself: it might be arranged for you, even to the extent
    of becoming a duty, to undertake such examinations
    for a series of years in all actual cases of accusation
    without your conclusions being allowed to influence the
    decision of the judge. It would, indeed, be best if the
    latter never knew the conclusions which you drew from
    your experiments with regard to the guilt of the
    accused. After years of collecting and comparing the
    results thus obtained, all doubt with regard to the value
    of this psychological method of examination should be
    solved. I know, however, that the realization of this
    proposal does not rest only with you or with your
    eminent teachers.