V

THE MOTIVES OF WIT AND WIT AS A SOCIAL
PROCESS

"Ír seems superfluous to speak of the
BP
Dor wit, since the purpose of obtaining pl =
| must be recognized as a sufficient motive e
iwit-work. But on the one hand it is not im-
possible that still other motives participate in
\the production of wit, and on the other hand,
lin view of certain well-known experiences, the
|theme of the subjective determination of wit
| must be discussed.
Two things above all urge us to it. Though
J | wit-making is an excellent means of obtaining
pleasure from the psychic processes, we know
that not all persons are equally able to make
use of it. Wit-making is not at the disposal
of all, in general there are but a few persons
to whom one can point and say that they are
witty. Here wit seems to be a special ability
somewhere within the region of the old “ psy-
chic faculties,” and this shows itself in its ap-
pearance as fairly independent of the other
faculties such as intelligence, phantasy, mem-
ory, etc. A special talent or psychic de-
214

THE MOTIVES OF WIT 215

termination permitting or favoring wit-making
must be presupposed in all wit-makers.

I am afraid that we shall not get very far
in the exploration of this theme. Only now
and then do we succeed in proceeding from
the understanding of a single witticism to the
knowledge of the subjective determinations in
the mind of the wit-maker. It is quite acci-
dental that the example of wit with which we
began our investigation of the wit-technique
permits us also to gain some insight into the
subjective determination of the witticism. I
am referring to Heine’s witticism, to which also
Heymans and Lipps have paid attention.

“I was sitting next to Solomon Rothschild
and he treated me just as an equal, quite fa-
millionaire ” (“ Bäder von Lucca ”).

Subjective Determination of the “ Famillion-
aire” Witticism

Heine put this word in the mouth of a com-
ical person, Hirsch-Hyacinth, collector, oper-
ator and tax appraiser from Hamburg, and
valet of the aristocratic baron, Cristoforo Gum-
pelino (formerly Gumpel). Evidently the
poet has experienced great pleasure in these
productions, for he allows Hirsch-Hyacinth to
talk big and puts in his mouth the most amus-

216 SYNTHESIS

ing and most candid utterances; he positively
endows him with the practical wisdom of a
Sancho Panza. It is a pity that Heine, as it
seems, had no liking for this dramatic figure
and that he drops the delightful character so
soon. From many passages it would seem that
the poet himself is speaking behind the trans-
parent mask of Hirsch-Hyacinth, and we are
quite convinced that this person is nothing but
a parody of the poet himself. Hirsch tells of
reasons why he has discarded his former name
and now calls himself Hyacinth. " Besides I
have the advantage,” he continues, “ of having
an H on my seal already, and therefore I am
in no need of having a new letter engraved.”
But Heine himself resorted to this economy
when he changed his surname “Harry” to
“Heinrich” at his baptism. Every one ac-
quainted with the life of the poet will recall
that in Hamburg, where one also meets the
personage Hirsch-Hyacinth, Heine had an un-
cle of the same name, who played the greatest
role in Heine's life as the wealthy member of
the family. The uncle’s name was likewise Sol-
omon, just like the elderly Rothschild who
treated the impecunious Hirsch on such a fa-
millionaire basis. What seems to be merely
a jest in the mouth of Hirsch-Hyacinth soon
reveals a background of earnest bitterness

THE MOTIVES OF WIT 217

when we attribute it to the nephew Harry-
Heinrich. For he belonged to the family, nay,
more, it was his earnest wish to marry a
daughter of this uncle, but she refused him,
and his uncle always treated him on a some-
what famillionaire basis, as a poor relative.
His rich relatives in Hamburg always dealt
with him condescendingly. I recall the story
of one of his old aunts by marriage who, when
she was still young and pretty, sat next to some
one at a family dinner who seemed to her un-
prepossessing and whom the other members
of the family treated shabbily. She did not
feel herself called upon to be any more con-
descending towards him. Only many years
later did she discover that the careless and
neglected cousin was the poet Heinrich Heine.
We know from many a record how keenly
Heine suffered from these repulses at the
hands of his wealthy relatives in his youth and
during later years. The witticism “ famillion-
aire” grew out of the soil of such a subjective
emotional feeling.

One may suspect similar subjective determin-
ations in many other witticisms of the great Y
scoffers, but I know-of no other example by
which one can show this in such a convincing
way. It is therefore hazardous to venture a
more definite opinion about the nature of this

218 SYNTHESIS

personal determination. Furthermore, one is
not inclined in the first place to claim similar
complicated conditions for the origin of each
and every witticism. Neither are the witty
productions of other celebrated men better
suited to give us the desired insight into the
subjective determination of wit. In fact, one
gets the impression that the subjective de-
/ termination of wit production is oftentimes not
unrelated to persons suffering from neurotic
diseases, when, for example, one learns that
Lichtenberg was a confirmed hypochondriac
burdened with all kinds of eccentricities. The
great majority of witticisms, especially those
produced from current happenings, are anony-
mous; one might be inquisitive to know what
kind of people they are who originate them.
The physician occasionally has an opportunity
to make a study of persons who, if not re-
nowned wits, are recognized in their circle as
witty and as originators of many passable wit-
ticisms; he is often surprised to find such per-
sons showing dissociated personalities and a
predisposition to nervous affections. However,
owing to insufficient data, we certainly cannot
maintain that such a psychoneurotic constitu-
tion is a regular or necessary subjective con-
dition for wit-making.
A clearer case is afforded by Jewish witti-

THE MOTIVES OF WIT 219

cisms which, as before mentioned, are made ex-
clusively by Jews themselves, whereas Jewish
stories of different origin rarely rise above the
level of the comical strain or of brutal mock-
ery (p. 166). The determination for the self-
participation here, as in Heine's joke “ fa-
millionaire,” seems to be due to the fact that
the person finds it difficult to express directly
his criticism or aggression and is thus com-
pelled to resort to by-ways.

Other subjective determinations or favora-
ble conditions for wit-making are less shrouded
in darkness. The motive for the production of

a ess wit is isually the ambitious impulse 、
to display one’s spirit or to “ show off.” It is
an impulse comparable to the impulse toward
sexual exhibition. . The existence of numerous
inhibited impulses whose suppression retains
some weakness produces a state favorable for
the production of tendency-wit. Thus certain
single components of the sexual constitution
may appear as motives for wit-formation. A
whole series of obscene witticisms lead one to
the conclusion that a person who gives origin
to such wit conceals a desire to exhibit. Per-
sons having a powerful sadistical component in
ет sexuality, which is more or less inhibited
in life, are most successful ‘with the tendency-
wit of aggression.

220 SYNTHESIS

The Impulse to Impart Wit

The second fact which impels one to examine
the subjective determination of wit is the com-
mon experience that nobody is satisfied with
making wit for himself. Wit-making is insep-
arably connected with the desire to impart it;
in fact this impulse is so strong that it is often
realized after overcoming strong objections.
In the comic, too, one experiences pleasure by
imparting it to another person; but this is not
imperative; one can enjoy the comic alone
when one happens on it. Wit, on the other
hand, must be imparted. Apparently the
process of wit-formation does not end with the
conception of wit. There remains something
which strives to complete the mysterious process
of wit-formation by imparting it.

We cannot conjecture, in the first place,
what may have motivated the impulse to im-
part wit. But in wit we notice another pe-
culiarity which again distinguishes it from the
comic. If I encounter the latter I can laugh
heartily over it alone; I am naturally pleased
if by imparting it to some one else I make him
laugh too. In the case of wit, however, which
occurs to me or which I have made, I cannot
laugh over it in spite of the unmistakable feel-
ing of pleasure which I experience in the wit-

THE MOTIVES OF WIT 221

ticism. It is possible that my need to impart
the witticism to another is in some way con-
nected with the resultant laughter, which is
manifest in the other, but denied to me.

But why do I not laugh over my own joke?
And what role does the other person play in
it?

Let us consider the last query first. In the
comic usually two persons come into considera-
tion. Besides my own ego ‘here is another per-
son in whom I find something comic; if ob-
jects appear comical to me, it takes place by
means of a sort of personification which is not
uncommon in our notional life. The comic
process is satisfied with these two persons, the
ego and the object person; there may also be
a third person, but it is not obligatory Wit
as a play with one’s own words and thoughts
at first dispenses with an object person, but
already, upon the first step of the jest, it de-
mands another person to whom it can impart
its result, if it has succeeded in safeguarding
play and nonsense against the remonstrance
of reason. The second person in wit does not,
however, correspond to the object person, but
to the third person who is the other person in
the comic. It seems that in the jest the deci-
sion as to whether wit has fulfilled its task is
transferred to the other person, as if the ego

と

222 SYNTHESIS

were not quite certain of its opinion in the
matter. The harmless wit is also in need of
the other person’s support in order to ascer-
tain whether it has accomplished its purpose.
If wit enters the service of sexual or hostile
tendencies, it can be described as a psychic
process among three persons, just as in the
comic, with the exception that there the third
person plays a different role. The psychic:
process of wit is consummated here between
the first person—the ego, and the third person
—the stranger, and not, as in the comic, be-
tween the ego and the object person.

Also, in the case of the third person of wit,
the wit is confronted with subjective determina-
tions which can make the goal of the pleasure-
stimulus unattainable. As Shakespeare says
in Love's Labor's Lost (Act V, Scene 2) :

* A jest's prosperity lies in the ear
Of him that hears it, never in the tongue
Of him that makes it.”

He whose thoughts run in sober channels is
incompetent to declare whether or not the jest
is a good one. He himself must be in a jovial,
or at least indifferent, state of mind in order
to become the third person of the jest. The
same hindrance is present in the case of both

THE MOTIVES OF WIT 228

harmless and tendency wit; but in the latter
the antagonism to the tendency which wishes
to serve wit, appears as a new hindrance. The
readiness to laugh about an excellent smutty
joke cannot manifest itself if the exposure con-
cerns an honored kinsman of the third person.
In an assemblage of divines and pastors no one
would dare to refer to Heine's comparison of
Catholic and Protestant priests as retail deal-
ers and employees of a wholesale business. In
the presence of my opponent’s friends the wit-
tiest invectives with which I might assail- him
would not be considered witticisms but invec-
tives, and in the minds of my hearers it would
create not pleasure, but indignation. A cer-
tain amount of willingness or a certain indif-
ference, the absence of all factors which might
evoke strong feelings in opposition to the tend-
ency, are absolute conditions for the participa-
tion of the third person in the completion of
the wit process.

The Third Person of the Witticism

Wherever such hindrances to the operation
of wit fail, we see the phenomenon which we
are now investigating, namely, that the pleas-
ure which the wit has provided manifests itself
more clearly in the third person than in the

224 SYNTHESIS

originator of the wit. We must be satisfied to
use the expression “ more clearly “ where we
should be inclined to ask whether the pleasure
of the hearer is not more intensive than that of
the wit producer, because we are obviously
lacking the means of measuring and comparing
it. We see, however, that the hearer shows his
pleasure by means of explosive laughter after
the first person, in most cases with a serious
expression on his face, has related the joke.
If I repeat a witticism which I have heard, I
am forced, in order not to spoil its effect, to
conduct myself during its recital exactly like
him who made it. We may now put the ques-
tion whether from this determination of
laughter over wit we can draw conclusions con-
cerning the psychic process of wit-formation.
Now it cannot be our intention to take into
consideration everything that has been asserted
and printed about the nature of laughter. We
are deterred from this undertaking by the
statement which Dugas, one of Ribot’s pupils,
put at the beginning of his book Psychologie
du rire (1902). “Il mest pas de fait plus
banal et plus étudié que le rire, il n’en est pas
qui ait eu le don d'exciter davantage la curi-
osité du vulgaire et celle des philosophes, il n’ent
est pas sur lequel on ait recueilli plus d’ob-
servations et bâti plus de théories, et avec cela

THE MOTIVES OF WIT 225

il n’en est pas qui demeure plus inexpliqué, on
serait tenté de dire avec les sceptiques qu'il
faut être content de rire et de ne pas chercher
à savoir pourquoi on rit, d'autant que peut-être
le réflexion tue le rire, et qu’il serait alors con-
tradictoire qu’elle en découvrit les causes”
(page 1).

On the other hand, we must make sure to
utilize for our purposes a view of the mechan-
ism of laughter which fits our own realm of
thought excellently. I refer to the attempted
explanation of cer in his essay entitled
Physiology of Laughter.

According to Spencer laughter is a phenom-
enon of discharge of psychic irritation, and an
evidence of the fact that the psychic utilization レ
of this irritation has suddenly met with a |
hindrance. The psychological situation, which ~
discharges itself in laughter, he describes in the
following words: “ Laughter naturally results |
only when consciousness is unawares trans- | 〆
ferred from great things to small—only when |
there is what we call a descending incongru- /
ity.” *

*H. Spencer, The Physiology of Laughter (first published in
Macmillan's Magazine for March; 1860), Essays, Vol. 11, 1901.

? Different points in this declaration would demand an ex-
haustive inquiry into an investigation of the pleasure of the

comic, a thing that other authors have already done, and which,
at all events, does not touch our discussion. It seems to me

226 SYNTHESIS

In an almost analogous sense the French
authors (Dugas) designate laughter as a
“ détente,” a manifestation of release of ten-
sion, and A; Bain's theory, “ Laughter a re-
lief. from restraint," seems to me to approach
Spencer’s conceptions nearer than many
authors would have us believe. «

However, we experience the desire to mod-
ify Spencer's thought; to give a more definite
meaning to some of the ideas and to change
others. We would say that laughter arises
when the sum total of psychic energy, formerly
used for the occupation of certain psychic
channels, has become unutilizable so that it can
experience absolute discharge. We know what
criticism such a declaration invites, but for our

that Spencer was not happy in his explanation of why the dis-
charge happens to find just that path, the excitement of which
results in the physical picture of laughter. I should like to add
one single contribution to the subject of the physiological ex-
planation of laughter, that is, to the derivation or interpretation
of the muscular actions that characterize laughter—a subject
that has been often treated before and since Darwin, but which
has never been conclusively settled. According to the best of
my knowledge the grimaces and contortions of the corners of the
mouth that characterize laughter appear first in the satisfied ind
satiated nursling when he drowsily quits the breasts. There it
is a correct motion of expression since it bespeaks the deter-
mination to take no more nourishment, an “enough,” so to speak,
or rather a “more than enough.” This primal sense of pleasur-
able satiation may have furnished the smile, which ever remains
the basic phenomenon of laughter, the later connection with the
pleasurable processes of discharge.

THE MOTIVES OF WIT 227

defense we dare cite a pertinent quotation from
Lipps's treatise on Komik und Humor, an
analysis which throws light on other problems
besides the comic and humor. He says: “In
the end individual psychological problems al-
ways lead us fairly deeply into psychology, so
that fundamentally no psychological problem
may be considered by itself” (p. 71). The
terms “ psychic energy,” “ discharge," and the
treatment of psychic energy as a quantity have
become habitual modes of thinking since I be-
gan. to explain to myself the fact of psycho-
pathology philosophically. Being of the same
opinion as Lipps I have essayed to represent
in my Interpretation of Dreams the un-
conscious psychic processes as real entities, and
I have not represented the conscious contents
as the “real psychic activity.” * Only. when I
speak about the “ investing energy (Besetzung)

* Cf. The Interpretation ој Dreams, Chap. VII, also On the
Psychic Force, etc., in the above cited book of Lipps (p. 123),
where he says: * This is the general principle: The dominant
factors of the psychic life are not represented by the contents
of consciousness but by those psychic processes which are un-
conscious. The task of psychology, provided it does not limit
itself to a mere description of the content of consciousness, must
also consist of revealing the nature of.these-unconscious processes
from the nature of the contents of consciousness and its tem-
poral relationship. Psychology must itself be a theory of these
processes. But such a psychology will soon find that there

exist quite a number of characteristics of these processes which
&re unrepresented in the corresponding contents of consciousness,

228 SYNTHESIS

of psychic channels,” do I seem to devi-
ate from the analogies that Lipps uses. The
knowledge that I have gained about the fact
that psychic energy can be displaced from one
idea to another along certain association chan-
nels, and about the almost indestructible con-
servation of the traces of psychic processes,
have actually made it possible for me to at-
tempt such a representation of the unknown.
In order to obviate the possibility of a misun-
derstanding I must add that I am making no
attempt to proclaim that cells and fibers, or
the neuron system in vogue nowadays, repre-
sent these psychic paths, even if such paths
would have to be represented by the organic
elements of the nervous system in a manner
which cannot yet be indicated.

Laughter as a Discharge

Thus, according to our assumption, the con-
ditions for laughter are such that a sum of
psychic energy hitherto employed in the occu-
pation of some paths may experience free dis-
charge. And since not all laughter, (but
surely the laughter of wit), is a sign of pleas-
ure, we shall be inclined to refer this pleasure
to the release of previously existing static
energy (Besetzungsenergie). When we see

THE MOTIVES OF WIT 229

that the hearer of the witticism laughs, while
the creator of the same cannot, then that must"
indicate that in the hearer a sum of damming "
energy has been released and discharged,
whereas during the wit formation, either in the
release or in the discharge, inhibitions resulted.
One can characterize the psychic process in the
hearer, in the third person of the witticism,
hardly more pointedly than by asserting that
he has bought the pleasure of the witticism
with very little expenditure on his part. One
might say that it is presented to him. The
words of the witticism which he hears necessar-
ily produce in him that idea or thought-connec-
tion whose formation in him was also resisted
by great inner hindrances. He would have
had to make an effort of his own in order to
bring it about spontaneously like the first per-
son, or he would have had to put forth at least
as much psychic expenditure as to equalize the
force of the suppression or repression of the
inhibition. This psychic expenditure he has
saved himself; according to our former discus-
sion (p. 80) we should say that his pleasure
corresponds to this economy. Following our
understanding of the mechanism of laughter
we should be more likely to say that the static
energy utilized in the inhibition has now sud-
denly become superfluous and neutralized be-

280 SYNTHESIS

cause a forbidden idea came into existence on
the way to auditory perception and is there-
fore ready to be discharged through laughter.
Essentially both statements amount to the
same thing, for the. economized expenditure
corresponds exactly to the now superfluous in-
hibition. The latter statement is more obvious,
for it permits us to say that the hearer of the
witticism laughs with the amount of psychic
energy which was liberated by the suspension
of inhibition energy; that is, he laughs away,
as it were, this amount of psychic energy.

Why the First Person Does Not Laugh

If the person in whom the witticism is
formed cannot laugh, then it indicates, as we
have just remarked, that there is a deviation
from the process in the case of the third per-
son which concerns either the suspension of the

. inhibition energy or the discharge possibility of

the same. But the first of the two cases is in-
conclusive, as we must presently see. The in-
hibition energy of the first person must have
been dissipated, for otherwise there would have
been no witticism, the formation of which had
to overcome just such a resistance. Otherwise,
too, it would have been impossible for the first
person to experience the wit-pleasure which the |

THE MOTIVES OF WIT 281

removal of the inhibition forced us to deduce.
But there remains a second possibility, namely, :
that even though he experienced pleasure the „“
first person cannot laugh, because the possibil-
ity of discharge has been disturbed. In the
production of laughter such discharge is es-
sential; an interruption in the possibility of dis-
charge might result from the attachment of
the freed occupation energy to some immediate
endopsychic possibility. It is well that we have
become cognizant of this possibility; we shall
soon pay more attention to it. But with the
wit-maker still another condition leading to the
same result is possible. Perhaps, after all, no
appreciable amount of energy has been liber- +
ated, in spite of the successful release of occu-
pation energy. In the first person of the wit-
ticism wit-work actually takes place which
must correspond to a certain amount of fresh
psychic expenditure. Thus the first person
contributes the power which removes the inhibi-
tions and which surely results in a gain of
pleasure for himself; in the case of tendency-
wit it is indeed a very big gain, since the fore- ・
pleasure gained from the wit-work takes upon
itself the further removal of inhibitions. But
the expenditure of-the wit-work is, in every
case, derived from the gain which is the result
of the removal of inhibitions; it is the same

232 SYNTHESIS

expenditure which escapes from the hearer of
the witticism. 'To confirm what was said above
it may be added that the witticism loses its
laughter effect in the third person as soon as
an expenditure of mental work is exacted of
him. The allusions of the witticism must be
striking, and the omissions easily supplemented;
with the awakening of conscious interest in
thinking, the effect of the witticism is regularly
made impossible. Here lies the real distinction
between the witticism and the riddle. It may
be that the psychic constellations during wit-
work are not at all favorable to the free dis-
charge of the energy gained. We are not here
in a position to gain a deeper understanding;
our inquiry as to why the third person laughs
we have been able to clear up better than the
question why the first person does not laugh.
At any rate, if we have well in mind these
views about the conditions of laughter and
about the psychic process in the third person,
we have arrived at a place where we can sat-
isfactorily elucidate an entire series of peculiar-
ities which are familiar in wit, but which have
not been understood. Before an amount of
interlocked energy, capable of discharge, is to
be liberated in the third person, there are sev-
eral conditions which must be fulfilled or which at
least are desirable. 1. It must be definitely

THE MOTIVES OF WIT 238

established that the third person really pro-
duces this expenditure of energy. 2. Care
must be taken that when the latter becomes
freed that it should find another psychic use
instead of offering itself to the motor dis-
charge. 8. It can be of advantage only if the
energy to be liberated in the third person is
first strengthened and heightened. Certain
processes of wit-work which we can gather to-
gether under the caption of secondary or auxil-
iary techniques serve all these purposes.

The first of these conditions determines one
of the qualifications of the third person as
hearer of the witticism. 116 must throughout
be so completely in psychic harmony with the
first person that he makes use of the same inner
inhibitions which the wit-work has overcome in
the first person. Whoever is focused on smutty
jokes will not be able to derive pleasure from
clever exhibitionistic wit. Mr. N.'s aggressions’
will not be understood by uncultured people
who are wont to give free rein to their pleas-
ure gained by insulting others. Every witti-
cism thus demands its own public, and to laugh
over the same witticisms is a proof of absolute
"psychic agreement. We have indeed arrived at
a point where we are at liberty to examine even
more thoroughly the process in the third per-
son's mind. The latter must be able habitually

234 SYNTHESIS

to produce the same inhibition which the joke
has surmounted in the first person, so that, as
' soon as he hears the joke, there awakens within
him compulsively and automatically a readiness
for this inhibition. This readiness for the in-
hibition, which I must conceive as a true ex-
penditure analogous to the mobilization. of an
army, is simultaneously recognized as super-
fluofis or as belated, and is thus immediately
discharged in its nascent state through the
channel of laughter."

The second condition for the production of
the free discharge, a cutting off of any other
outlets for the liberated energy, seems to me of
far greater importance. It furnishes the theo-
retical explanation for the uncertainty of the
effect of wit; if the thoughts expressed in the
witticism evoke very exciting ideas in the
hearer, (depending on the agreement or antag-
onism between the wits tendencies and the
train of thought dominating the hearer), the
witty process either receives or is refused at-
tention. Of still greater theoretical interest,
however, are a series of auxiliary wit-tech-
niques which obviously serve the purpose of
diverting the attention of the listeners from the

3 Heymans (Zeitschrift für Psychol, XI) has taken up the
viewpoint of the nascent state in a somewhat different con-
nection.

THE MOTIVES OF WIT 285

wit-process so as to allow the latter to proceed
automatically. I advisedly use the term “ auto-
matically “ rather than “ unconsciously” be-
cause the latter designation might prove mis-
leading. It is only a question of keeping the
psychic process from getting more than its
share of attention during the recital of the wit-
ticism, and the usefulness of these auxiliary
techniques permits us to assume rightfully that
it is just the occupation of attention which ‘has
a large share in the control and in the fresh
utilization of the freed energv of occupation.

The Automatism of the Wit-process

It seems to be by no means easy to avoid
the endopsychic utilization of energy that has
become superfluous, for in our mental processes
we are constantly in the habit of transferring
such emotional outputs from one path to
another without losing any of their energy
through discharge. Wit prevents this in the
following way. In the first place it strives
for the shortest possible expression in order
te expose less points of attack to the attention.
Secondly, it strictly adheres to the condition
tnat it be easily understood (v. s.), for as soon
as it has recourse to mental effort or demands
a choice between different mental paths, it

v

236 SYNTHESIS

imperils the effect not only through the un-
avoidable mental expenditure, but also through
the awakening of attention. Besides this, wit
also makes use of the artifice of diverting the
ご attention by offering to it something in the ex-
pression of the witticism which fascinates it so
that meanwhile the liberation of inhibition
energy and its discharge can take place undis-
turbed. The omissions in the wording of wit
already carry out this intention. They impel
us to fill in the gaps and in this way they keep
the wit-process free from attention. The tech-
nique of the riddle, as it were, which attracts
attention is here pressed into the service of the
wit-work. The fagade formations, which we
/ have already discovered in many groups of
tendency-wit, are still more effective (see p.
155). The syllogistical facades excellently ful-
fill the purpose of riveting the attention by an
allotted task. While we begin to ponder
wherein the given answer was lacking already
we are laughing; our attention has been sur-
prised, and the discharge of the liberated emo-
tional inhibition has been effected. The same
is true of witticisms possessing a comic façade
in which the comic serves to assist the wit-
technique. A comic facade promotes the ef-
“ect of wit in more than one way; it makes
possible not only the automatism of the wit-

THE MOTIVES OF WIT 237

process by riveting the attention, but also it
facilitates the discharge of wit by sending
ahead a discharge from the comic. Here the
effect of the comic resembles that of a fascinat-
ing fore-pleasure, and we can thus understand
that many witticisms are able to dispense en-
tirely the fore-pleasures produced by other
means of wit, and make use of only the comic
as a fore-pleasure. Among the true techniques
of wit it is especially displacement and rep-
resentation through absurdity which, besides
other properties, also develop the deviation of
attention so desirable for the automatic dis-
charge of the wit-process.*

We already surmise, and later will be able
to see more clearly, that in this condition of
deviation of attention we have disclosed no un-

3 Through an example of displacement-wit I desire to discuss
another interesting character of the technique of wit. The
genial actress Gallmeyer when once asked how old she was is
said to have answered this unwelcome question with abashed and
downcast eyes, by saying, “In Brünn.” This is a very good
example of displacement. Having been asked her age, she re-
plied by naming the place of her birth, thus anticipating the
next query, and in this manner she wishes to imply: “ This is a
question which I prefer to pass by.” And still we feel that the
character of the witticism does not here come to expression un-
dimmed. The deviation from the question is too obvious; the
displacement is much too-conspicuous. Our attention under-
stands immediately that it is a matter of an intentional dis-
placement. In other displacement-witticisms the displacement
is disguised and our attention is riveted by the effort to dis-
cover it. In one of the displacement-witticisms (p. 69) the reply

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238 SYNTHESIS

essential characteristic of the psychic process
in the hearer of wit. In conjunction with this,
we can understand something more. First,
how it happens that we rarely ever know in a
joke why we are laughing, although by an-
alytical investigation we can determine the
cause. This laughing is the result of an auto-
matic process which was first made possible by
keeping our conscious attention at a distance.
Secondly, we arrive at an understanding of
that characteristic of wit as a result of which

„wit can exert its full effect on the hearer only

when it is new and when it comes to him as
a surprise. This property of wit, which causes
wit to be short-lived and forever urges the
production of new wit, is evidently due to the
fact that it is inherent in the surprising or the
unexpected to succeed but once. When we re-

to the recommendation of the horse—“ What in the world should
I do in Monticello at 6:30 in the morning? ”—the displacement is
also an obtrusive one, but as a substitute for it it acts upon
the attention in a senseless and confusing manner, whereas in
the interrogation of the actress we know immediately how to
dispose of her displacement answer.

The so-called “facetious questions” which may make use of
the best techniques deviate from wit in other ways. An example
of the facetious question with displacement is the following:
“What is a cannibal who devours his father and mother?—An-
swer: An orphan.—And when he has devoured all his other rela-
tives?—Sole-heir.—And where can such a monster ever find
sympathy?—In the dictionary under S." The facetious ques-
tions are not full witticisms because the required witty answers
cannot be guessed like the allusions, omissions, etc., of wit.

THE MOTIVES OF WIT 239

peat wit the awakened memory leads the at-
tention to the first hearing. This also explains
the desire to impart wit to others who have not
heard it before, for the impression made by
wit on the new hearer replenishes that part of
the pleasure which has been lost by the lack of
novelty. And an analogous motive probably
urges the wit producer to impart his wit to
others.

Elements Favoring the Wit-process

As elements favoring the wit-process, even
if we can no longer consider them essentials,
I present in the third place three technical
aids to wit-work which are destined to increase
the sums of energy to be discharged and thus
enhance the effect of the wit. These technical
aids also very often accentuate the attention
directed to the wit, but they neutralize its in-
fluence by simultaneously fascinating it and
impeding its movements. Everything that
provokes interest and confusion exerts its in-
fluence in these two directions. This is espe-
cially true of the nonsense and contrast ele-
ments, and above all-the “contrast of ideas,”
which some authors consider the essential char- '
acter of wit, but in which I see only a means
to reinforce the effect of wit. All that is con-

240 SYNTHESIS

fusing evokes in the hearer that condition of
distribution of energy which Lipps has desig-
nated as " psychic damming ”; and, doubtless,
he has a right to assume that the force of the
“discharge “ varies with the success of the
damming process which precedes it. Lipps's ex-
position does not explicitly refer to wit, but to
the comic in general, yet it seems quite prob-
able that the discharge in wit, releasing a gush
of inhibition energy, is brought to its height
in a similar manner by means of the damming.
At length we are aware that the technique
of wit is really determined by two kinds of
/ tendencies, those which make possible the
formation of wit in the first person, and those
guaranteeing that the witticism produces in the
third person as much pleasurable effect as pos-
sible. The Janus-like double-facedness of
wit, which safeguards its original resultant
pleasure against the impugnment of critical
reason, belongs to the first tendency together
with the mechanism of fore-pleasure; the other
complications of technique produced by the
conditions discussed in this chapter concern the
third person of the witticism. Thus wit in it-
self is a double-tongued villain which serves
two masters at the same time. Everything
that aims toward gaining pleasure is calculated
by the witticism to arouse the third person, as

THE MOTIVES OF WIT 241

if inner, unsurmountable inhibitions in the first
person were in the way of the same. Thus one
gets the full impression of the absolute neces-
sity of this third person for the completion of
the wit-process. But while we have succeeded
in obtaining a good insight concerning the na-
ture of this process in the third person, we feel
that the corresponding process in the first per-
son is still shrouded in darkness. So far we
have not succeeded in answering the first of
our two questions: Why can we not laugh
over wit made by ourselves? and: Why are we
urged to impart our own witticisms to others?
We can only suspect that there is an intimate
connection between the two facts yet to be ex-
plained, and that we must impart our wit-
ticisms to others for the reason that we our-
selves are unable to laugh over them. From
our examinations of the conditions in the third
person for pleasure gaining and pleasure dis-
charging we can draw the conclusion that in
the first person the conditions for discharge
are lacking and that those for gaining pleasure
are only incompletely fulfilled. Thus it is not
to be disputed that we enhance our pleasure
in that we attain the—to us impossible—
laughter in this roundabout way from the im-
pression of the person who was stimulated to
laughter. Thus we laugh, so to speak, par

242 SYNTHESIS

ricochet, as Dugas expresses it. Laughter
belongs to those manifestations of psychic
states which are highly infectious; if I make
some one else laugh by imparting my wit to
/ |him, I am really using him as a tool in order
y |to arouse my own laughter. One can really
{notice that the person who at first recites the
す witticism with a serious mien later joins the
^hearer with a moderate amount of laughter.
Imparting my witticisms to others may thus
ク serve several purposes. First, it serves to give
me the objective certainty of the success of the
wit-work; secondly, it serves to enhance my
own pleasure through the reaction of the hearer
upon myself; thirdly, in the case of repeating
a not original joke, it serves to remedy the loss
of pleasure due to the lack of novelty.

Economy and Full Expenditure

At the end of these discussions about the
psychic processes of wit, in so far as they are
enacted between two persons, we can glance
back to the factor of economy which impressed
us as an important item in the psychological
conception of wit since we offered the first ex-
planation of wit-technique. Long ago we dis-
missed the nearest but also the simplest con-
ception of this economy, where it was a matter

THE MOTIVES OF WIT 243

of avoiding psychic expenditure in general by
a maximum restriction in the use of words and
by the production of associations of ideas. We
had then already asserted that brevity and
laconisms are not witty in themselves. The
brevity of wit is a peculiar one; it has to be
a “witty” brevity. The original pleasure
gain produced by playing with words and
thoughts resulted, to be sure, from simple
economy in expenditure, but with the develop-
ment of play into wit the tendency to econ- ෴~
omize also had to shift its goals, for whatever
might be saved by the use of the same words
or by avoiding new thought connections would
surely be of no account when compared to the
colossal expenditure of our mental activity.
We may be permitted to make a comparison
between the psychic economy and a business
enterprise. So long as the latter’s transactions
are very small, good policy demands that ex-
penses be kept low and that the costs of op-
eration be minimized as much as possible.
The economy still follows the absolute height
of the expenditure. Later on when the vol-
ume of business has increased, the importance
of the business expenses dwindles; increases in
the expenditure totals matter little so long as
the transactions and returns can be sufficiently
increased. Keeping down running expenses

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244 SYNTHESIS

would be parsimonious; in fact, it would mean
a direct loss. Nevertheless it would be equally
false to assume that with a very great expendi-
ture there would be no more room for saving.
The manager inclined to economize would now
make an effort to save on particular things and
would feel satisfied if the same establishment,
with its costly upkeep, could reduce its ex-
penses at all, no matter how small the saving
would seem in comparison to the entire ex-
penditure. In quite an analogous manner the
detailed economy in our complicated psychic
affairs remains a source of pleasure, as may be
shown by everyday occurrences. Whoever
used to have a gas lamp in his room, but now
uses electric light, will experience for a long
time a definite feeling of pleasure when he
presses the electric light button; this pleasure
continues as long as at that moment he rémem-
bers the complicated arrangements necessary
to light the gas lamp. Similarly the economy
of expenditure in psychic inhibition brought
about by wit—small though it may be in com-
parison to the sum total of psychic expendi-
ture—will remain a source of pleasure for us,
because we thereby save a particular expendi-
ture which we were wont to make and which
as before we were ready to make. That the
expenditure is expected and prepared for is a

THE MOTIVES OF WIT 245

factor which stands unmistakably in the fore-
ground. .

A localized economy, as the one just consid-
ered, will not fail to give us momentary pleas-
ure, but it will not bring about a lasting al-
leviation so long as what has been saved here
can be utilized in another place. Only when
this disposal into a different path can be
avoided, will the special economy be trans-
formed into a general alleviation of the psychic
expenditures, Thus, with clearer insight into
the psychic processes of wit, we see that the fac-
tor of alleviation takes the place of economy.
Obviously the former gives us the greater feel-
ing of pleasure. The process in the first person
of the witticism produces pleasure by remov- У,
ing inhibitions and by diminishing local ex- У |
penditure; it does not, however, seem to come
to rest until it succeeds through the interven-
tion of the third person in attaining general
relief through discharge.

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