328

V

THE MOTIVES OF WIT AND WIT
AS A SOCIAL PROCESS

IT SEEMS superfluous to speak of the motives of wit, since the purpose of
obtaining pleasure must be recognized as a sufficient motive of the wit-
work. But on the one hand it is not impossible that still other motives par-
ticipate in the production of wit, and on the other hand, in view of certain
well-known experiences, the theme of the subjective determination of
wit must be discussed.

Two things above all urge us to it. Though wit-making is an excellent
means of obtaining pleasure from the psychic processes, we know that not
all persons are equally able to make use of it. Wit-making is not at the
disposal of all, in general there are but a few persons to whom one can
point and say that they are witty. Here wit seems to be a special ability
somewhere within the region of the old “psychic faculties,” and this
shows itself in its appearance as fairly independent of the other facul-
ties such as intelligence, phantasy, memory, etc. A special talent or psy-
chic determination permitting or favoring wit-making must be presup-
posed in all wit-makers.

I am afraid that we shall not get very far in the exploration of this
theme. Only now and then do we succeed in proceeding from the under-
standing of a single witticism to the knowledge of the subjective deter-
minations in the mind of the wit-maker. It is quite accidental that the
example of wit with which we began our investigation of the wit-tech-
nique permits us also to gain some insight into the subjective determina-
tion of the witticism. I am referring to Heine’s witticism, to which also
Heymans and Lipps have paid attention.

“I was sitting next to Solomon Rothschild and he treated me just as an
equal, quite famillionaire.”

729

SUBJECTIVE DETERMINATION OF THE “FAMILLIONNAIRE” WITTICISM

Heine put this word in the mouth of a comical person, Hirsch-Hyacinth,
collector, operator and tax appraiser from Hamburg, and valet of the
aristocratic baron, Cristoforo Gumpelino (formerly Gumpel). Evidently
the poet has experienced great pleasure in these productions, for he
allows Hirsch-Hyacinth to talk big and puts in his mouth the most amus-
ing and most candid utterances; he positively endows him with the
practical wisdom of a Sancho Panza. It is a pity that Heine, as it seems,
had no liking for this dramatic figure and that he drops the delight-
ful
character so soon. From many passages it would seem that the poet him-
self is speaking behind the transparent mask of Hirsch-Hyacinth, and we
are quite convinced that this person is nothing but a parody of the poet
himself. Hirsch tells of reasons why he has discarded his former name
and now calls himself Hyacinth. “Besides I have the advantage,” he con-
tinues, “of having an H on my seal already, and, therefore, I am in no
need of having a new letter engraved.” But Heine himself resorted to this
economy when he changed his surname “Harry” to “Heinrich” at his
baptism. Every one acquainted with the life of the poet will recall that in
Hamburg, where one also meets the personage Hirsch-Hyacinth, Heine
had an uncle of the same name, who played the greatest rôle in Heine’s
life as the wealthy member of the family. The uncle’s name was likewise
Solomon, just like the elderly Rothschild who treated the impecunious
Hirsch on such a famillionnaire basis. What seems to be merely a jest in
the mouth of Hirsch-Hyacinth soon reveals a background of earnest bit-
terness when we attribute it to the nephew Harry-Heinrich. For he be-
longed to the family, nay, more, it was his earnest wish to marry a daugh-
ter of this uncle, but she refused him, and his uncle always treated him on
a somewhat famillionnaire basis, as a poor relative. His rich relatives in
Hamburg always dealt with him condescendingly. I recall the story of
one of his old aunts by marriage who, when she was still young and pretty,
sat next to some one at a family dinner who seemed to her unprepossess-
ing and whom the other members of the family treated shabbily. She did
not feel herself called upon to be any more condescend-
ing towards him.
Only many years later did she discover that the careless and neglected
cousin was the poet Heine. We know from many a record how
keenly Heine suffered from these repulses at the hands of his wealthy
relatives in his youth and during later years. The witticism “famillion-
aire” grew out of the soil of such a subjective emotional feeling.
One may suspect similar subjective determinations in many other wit-
ticisms of the great scoffers, but I know of no other example by which
one can show this in such a convincing way. It is, therefore, hazardous to
venture a more definite opinion about the nature of this personal deter-

730

miration. Furthermore, one is not inclined in the first place to claim
similar complicated conditions for the origin of each and every witticism.
Neither are the witty productions of other celebrated men better suited
to give us the desired insight into the subjective determination of wit.
In fact, one gets the impression that the subjective determination of wit
production is oftentimes not unrelated to persons suffering from neurotic
diseases, when, for example, one learns that Lichtenberg was a confirmed
hypochondriac burdened with all kinds of eccentricities. The great ma-
jority of witticisms, especially those produced from current happenings,
are anonymous; one might be inquisitive to know what kind of people
they are who originate them. The physician occasionally has an oppor-
tunity to make a study of persons who, if not renowned wits, are recog-
nized in their circle as witty and as originators of many passable wit-
ticisms; he is often surprised to find such persons showing dissociated
personalities and a predisposition to nervous affections. However, owing
to insufficient data, we certainly cannot maintain that such a psycho-
neurotic constitution is a regular or necessary subjective condition for
wit-making.

A clearer case is afforded by Jewish witticisms which, as before men-
tioned, are made exclusively by Jews themselves, whereas Jewish stories
of different origin rarely rise above the level of the comical strain or of
brutal mockery. The determination for the self-participation here, as in
Heine’s joke “famillionaire,” seems to be due to the fact that the person
finds it difficult to express directly his criticism or aggression and is thus
compelled to resort to by-ways.

Other subjective determinations or favorable conditions for wit-making
are less shrouded in darkness. The motive for the production of harmless
wit is usually the ambitious impulse to display one’s spirit or to “show
off.” It is an impulse comparable to the impulse to sexual exhibition. The
existence of numerous inhibited impulses whose suppression retains a cer-
tain degree of liability produces a most favorable disposition for the pro-
duction of tendency-wit. Thus, certain single components of the sexual
constitution may appear as motives for wit-formation. A whole series of
obscene witticisms lead one to the conclusion that a person who gives
origin to such wit conceals a desire to exhibit. Persons having a powerful
sadistical component in their sexuality, which is more or less inhibited
in life, are most successful with the tendency-wit of aggression.

THE IMPULSE TO IMPART WIT

The second fact which impels one to examine the subjective determina-
tion of wit is the common experience that nobody is satisfied with making
wit for himself. Wit-making is inseparably connected with the desire
to impart it; in fact, this impulse is so strong that it is often realized after

731

overcoming strong objections. In the comic, too, one experiences pleasure
by imparting it to another person; but this is not imperative: one can en-
joy the comic alone when one happens on it. Wit, on the other hand, must
be imparted. Apparently the process of wit-formation does not end with
the witty inspiration. There remains something which strives to com-
plete the mysterious process of wit-formation by imparting it.

We cannot conjecture, at first, what may have motivated the impulse
to impart wit. But in wit we notice another peculiarity which again dis-
tinguishes it from the comic. If I encounter the latter, I can laugh heartily
over it alone; I am naturally pleased if by imparting it to some one else
I make him laugh too. In the case of wit, however, which accidentally
occurs to me, which I have made, I cannot laugh over it in spite of the
unmistakable feeling of pleasure which I experience in the witticism. It
is possible that my need to impart the witticism to another is in some
way connected with the resultant laughter, which is manifest in the other,
but denied to me.

But why do I not laugh over my own joke? And what rôle does the
other person play in it?

Let us consider the last query first. In the comic usually two persons
come into consideration. Besides my own ego there is another person in
whom I find something comic; if objects appear comical to me, it takes
place by means of a sort of personification which is not uncommon in our
emotional life. The comic process is satisfied with these two persons, the
ego and the object person; there may also be a third person, but that is
not obligatory. Wit as a play with one’s own words and thoughts at first
dispenses with an object person, but already, upon the first step of the
jest, it demands another person to whom it can impart its result, if it has
succeeded in safeguarding play and nonsense against the remonstrance
of reason. This second person in wit does not, however, correspond to the
object person, but to the third person who is the other person in the
comic. It seems that in the jest the decision as to whether wit has ful-
filled its task is left to the other person, as if the ego were not quite certain
of its opinion in the matter. The harmless wit, too, is in need of the other
person’s support in order to ascertain whether it has accomplished its
purpose. If wit enters the service of sexual or hostile tendencies, it can
be described as a psychic process among three persons, just as in the
comic, with the exception that there the third person plays a different
rôle. The psychic process of wit is consummated here between the first
person—the ego, and the third person—the stranger, and not, as in the
comic, between the ego and the object person.
Also, in the case of the third person of wit, the wit is confronted with
subjective determinations which can make the goal of the pleasure-

732

stimulus unattainable. As Shakespeare states in Love’s Labor’s Lost
(Act V, Scene 2):

“A jest’s prosperity lies in the ear
Of him that hears it, never in the tongue
Of him that makes it.”

He whose thoughts run in sober channels is incompetent to declare
whether or not the jest is a good one. He himself must be in a jovial, or
at least indifferent state of mind, in order to become the third person of
the jest. The same hindrance is present in the case of both harmless and
tendency wit, but in the latter the antagonism which
wishes to serve wit appears as a new hindrance. The readiness to laugh
about an excellent smutty joke cannot manifest itself if the exposure
concerns an honored kinsman of the third person. In an assemblage of
divines and pastors no one would dare to refer to Heine’s comparison of
Catholic and Protestant priests as retail dealers and employees of a
wholesale business. In the presence of my opponent’s friends the witti-
cisms but invectives, and in the minds of my hearers it would create
not pleasure, but indignation. A certain amount of willingness or a cer-
tain indifference, the absence of all factors which might evoke strong
feelings in opposition to the tendency, are absolute conditions for the
participation of the third person in the completion of the wit process.

THE THIRD PERSON OF THE WITTICISM

Wherever such hindrances to the operation of wit fail, we see the phe-
nomenon which we are now investigating, namely, that the pleasure
which the wit has provided manifests itself more clearly in the third per-
son than in the originator of the wit. We must be satisfied to use the ex-
pression “more clearly” where we should be inclined to ask whether the
pleasure of the hearer is not more intensive than that of the wit producer,
because we are obviously lacking the means of measuring and comparing
it. We see, however, that the hearer shows his pleasure by means of explo-
sive laughter after the first person, in most cases with a serious expres-
sion on his face, has related the joke. If I repeat a witticism which I have
heard, I am forced, in order not to spoil its effect, to conduct myself dur-
ing its recital exactly like him who made it. We may now put the ques-
tion of whether we can draw conclusions concerning the psychic process
of wit-formation from this determination of laughter over wit.

Now, it cannot be our intention to take into consideration everything
that has been asserted and printed about the nature of laughter. We are
deterred from this undertaking by the statement which Dugas, one of
Ribot’s pupils, put at the beginning of his book Psychologie du rire

733

MOTIVES OF WIT AND AS A SOCIAL PROCESS
(1902). “Il n’est pas de fait plus banal et plus étudié que le rire, il n’en est
pas qui ait eu le don d’exciter d’avantage la curiosité du vulgaire et celle
des philosophes, il n’en est pas sur lequel on ait recueilli plus d’observa-
tions et bâti plus de théories, et avec cela il n’en est pas qui demeure plus
inexpliqué, on serait tenté de dire avec les sceptiques qu’il faut être con-
tent de rire et de ne pas chercher à savoir pourquoi on rit, d’autant que
peut-être le réflexion tue le rire, et qu’il serait alors contradictoire qu’elle
en découvrit les causes.”

On the other hand, we must make sure to utilize for our purposes a
view of the mechanism of laughter which fits our own realm of thought
excellently. I refer to the attempted explanation of Herbert Spencer in his
essay entitled Physiology of Laughter.¹

According to Spencer laughter is a phenomenon of discharge of psychic
irritation, and an evidence of the fact that the psychic utilization of this
irritation has suddenly met with a hindrance. The psychological situation,
which discharges itself in laughter, he describes in the following words:
“Laughter naturally results only when consciousness is unawares trans-
ferred from great things to small—only when there is what we call a de-
scending incongruity.”²

In an almost analogous sense the French authors (Dugas) designate
laughter as a “détente,” a manifestation of release of tension, and A.
Bain’s theory, “Laughter a relief from restraint,” seems to me to ap-
proach Spencer’s conceptions nearer than many authors would have us
believe.

However, we experience the desire to modify Spencer’s thought; to
give a more definite meaning to some of the ideas and to change others.
We would say that laughter arises when the sum of psychic energy, for
merly used for the occupation of certain psychic channels, has become
unutilizable so that it can experience free discharge. We know what criti-

¹H. Spencer, The Physiology of Laughter (first published in Macmillan’s Magazine
for March, 1860), Essays, Vol. II, 1901.
²Different points in this declaration would demand an exhaustive inquiry into an in-
vestigation of the pleasure of the comic, a thing that other authors have already done,
and which, at all events, does not touch our discussion. It seems to me that Spencer
was not happy in his explanation of why the discharge happens to find just that path,
the excitement of which results in the physical picture of laughter. I should like to
add one single contribution to the subject of the physiological explanation of laugh-
ter, that is, to the derivation or interpretation of the muscular actions that character- ize laughter—a subject that has been often treated before and since Darwin, but
which has never been conclusively settled. According to the best of my knowledge the
grimaces and contortions of the corners of the mouth that characterize laughter ap-
pear first in the satisfied and satiated nursling when he drowsily quits the breasts.
There it is a correct motion of expression since it bespeaks the determination to take
no more nourishment, an “enough,” so to speak, or rather a “more than enough.”
This primal sense of pleasurable satiation may have furnished the smile, which ever
remains the basic phenomenon of laughter, as the later connection with the pleasur-
able processes of discharge.

734

cism such a declaration invites, but for our defense we dare cite a perti-
nent quotation from Lipps’s treatise on Komik und Humor, an analysis
which throws light on other problems besides the comic and humor. He
says: “In the end individual psychological problems always lead us
fairly deeply into psychology, so that fundamentally no psychological
problem may be considered by itself” (p. 71). The terms “psychic en-
ergy,” “discharge,” and the treatment of psychic energy as a quantity
have become habitual modes of thinking since I began to explain to my-
self philosophically the fact of psychopathology. Being of the same
opinion as Lipps I have essayed to represent in my Interpretation of
Dreams the unconscious psychic processes as real entities, and I have
not represented the conscious contents as the “real psychic activity.”¹⁾
Only when I speak about the “investing energy cathexis of psychic chan-
nels,” do I seem to deviate from the analogies that Lipps uses. The knowl-
edge that I have gained about the fact that psychic energy can be dis-
placed from one idea to another along certain association channels, and
about the almost indestructible conservation of the traces of psychic
processes, has actually made it possible for me to attempt such a repre-
sentation of the unknown. In order to obviate the possibility of a mis-
understanding I must add that I am making no attempt to proclaim that
cells and fibers, or the neuron system in vogue nowadays, represent these
psychic paths, even if such paths would have to be represented by the
organic elements of the nervous system in a manner which cannot yet be
indicated.

LAUGHTER AS A DISCHARGE

Thus, according to our assumption, the conditions for laughter are such
that a sum of psychic energy hitherto employed in the cathexis²⁾ of some
paths may experience free discharge. And since not all laughter (but
surely the laughter of wit), is a sign of pleasure, we shall be inclined to
refer this pleasure to the release of previously existing cathectic energy.
When we see that the hearer of the witticism laughs, while the creator
of the same cannot, then that must indicate that in the hearer a sum of
damming energy has been released and discharged, whereas during the

¹ Cf. The Interpretation of Dreams, Chap. VII, also On the Psychic Force, etc., in
the above cited book of Lipps (p. 123), where he says: “This is the general principle:
The dominant factors of the psychic life are not represented by the contents of con-
sciousness but by those psychic processes which are unconscious. The task of psy-
chology, provided it does not limit itself to a mere description of the content of
consciousness, must also consist of revealing the nature of these unconscious processes
from the nature of the contents of consciousness and its temporal relationship. Psy-
chology must itself be a theory of these processes. But such a psychology will soon
find that there exist quite a number of characteristics of these processes which are
unrepresented in the corresponding contents of consciousness.”

² Cathexis, from the Greek cathexo, I occupy; the term refers to a sum of psychic
energy, which oc-
cupies or invests objects or some particular channels.

735

MOTIVES OF WIT AND WIT AS A SOCIAL PROCESS
wit formation, either in the release or in the discharge, inhibitions re-
sulted. One can characterize the psychic processes in the hearer, in the
third person of the witticism, hardly more pointedly than by asserting
that he has bought the pleasure of the witticism with very little expendi-
ture on his part. One might say that it is presented to him. The words of
the witticism which he hears necessarily produce in him that idea or
thought-connection whose formation in him was also resisted by great
inner hindrances. He would have had to make an effort of his own in order
to bring it about spontaneously like the first person, or he would have had
to put forth at least as much psychic expenditure to equalize the force
of the suppression or repression of the inhibition. This psychic expendi-
ture he has saved himself; according to our former discussion, we should
say that his pleasure corresponds to this economy. Following our under-
standing of the mechanism of laughter we should be more likely to say
that the cathexis utilized in the inhibition has now suddenly become
superfluous and neutralized because a forbidden idea came into existence
by way of auditory perception, and is, therefore, ready to be discharged
through laughter. Essentially both statements amount to the same thing,
for the economized expenditure corresponds exactly to the now super-
fluous inhibition. The latter statement is more obvious, for it permits us
to say that the hearer of the witticism laughs with the amount of psychic
energy which was liberated by the suspension of inhibition cathexis; that
is, he laughs away, as it were, this amount of psychic energy.

WHY THE FIRST PERSON DOES NOT LAUGH

If the person in whom the witticism is formed cannot laugh, then it indi-
cates, as we have just remarked, that we deal here with a deviation from
the process of the third person, which concerns either the suspension of
the inhibition cathexis or the discharge possibility of the same. But the
first of the two cases is inconclusive, as we must presently see. The inhibi-
tion cathexis in the first person must have also been suspended, for other-
wise there would have been no witticism, the formation of which had to
overcome just such a resistance. It would have also been impossible for
the first person to have experienced the wit-pleasure, which we have in-
deed been forced to derive from the suspension of inhibition. But there
remains the second case, namely, that even though the first person ex-
perienced pleasure, he cannot laugh, because the possibility of discharge
is disturbed. In the production of laughter such discharge is essential; an
interruption in the possibility of discharge might result from the immedi-
ate attachment of the freed cathexis to some other endopsychic use. It is
well that we have become cognizant of this possibility; we shall soon pay
more attention to it. But still another condition leading to the same result
is possible in the first person of the wit. Perhaps, after all, no appreciable

736

amount of energy has been liberated, in spite of the successful release of
inhibition cathexis. For in the first person of the wit, the wit-work actu-
ally proceeds in a way which must correspond to a certain amount of
fresh psychic expenditure. Thus, the first person contributes the power
which removes the inhibitions and which surely results in a gain of pleas-
ure for himself; in the case of tendency-wit it is indeed a very big gain,
since the fore-pleasure gained from the wit-work takes upon itself the
further removal of inhibitions. But the expenditure of the wit-work is, in
every case, derived from the gain which results from the removal of inhibi-
tions; it is the same expenditure which escapes from the hearer of the
witticism. To confirm what was said it may be added that the witticism
loses its laughter effect in the third person, as soon as an expenditure of
mental work is exacted of him. The allusions of the witticism must be
striking, and the omissions easily supplemented; with the awakening of
conscious interest in thinking, the effect of the witticism is regularly made
impossible. Here lies the real distinction between wit and riddle. It may
be that the psychic constellations during wit-work are not at all favor-
able to the free discharge of the energy gained. We are here in no posi-
tion to gain a deeper understanding; our inquiry as to why the third per-
son laughs we have been able to explain better than the question why
the first person does not laugh.

At any rate, if we have well in mind these views about the conditions
of laughter and about the psychic process in the third person, we have
arrived at a place where we can satisfactorily elucidate an entire series
of peculiarities which are familiar in wit, but which have not been under-
stood. Before an amount of interlocked energy, capable of discharge, is
to be liberated in the third person, there are several conditions which
must be fulfilled, or which at least are desirable. 1. It must be assured that
the third person really makes this cathexis expenditure. 2. Care must be
taken that when the latter becomes freed, that it should find another psy-
chic use instead of offering itself to motor discharge. 3. It can only be of
advantage if the cathexis to be liberated in the third person is first
strengthened and heightened. Certain processes of wit-work which we can
gather together under the caption of secondary or auxiliary techniques
serve all these purposes.

The first of these conditions determines one of the qualifications of the
third person as hearer of the witticism. He must be in every way so com-
pletely in psychic harmony with the first person as to possess the same
inner inhibitions which the wit-work has overcome in the first person.
Whoever is focused on smutty jokes will not be able to derive pleasure
from clever exhibitionistic wit. Mr. N.’s or Mr. Wendell Phillips’ aggres-
sions will not be understood by uncultured people who are wont to give
free rein to pleasure gained by insulting others. Every witticism thus de-

737

mands its own public, and to laugh over the same witticisms is proof of
absolute psychic agreement. We have indeed arrived at a point where we
are at liberty to examine even more thoroughly the process in the third
person’s mind. The latter must be able habitually to produce the same
inhibition which the joke has surmounted in the first person, so that, as
soon as he hears the joke, there awakens within him compulsively and
automatically a readiness for this inhibition. This readiness for the in-
hibition, which I must conceive as a true expenditure analogous to the
mobilization of an army, is simultaneously recognized as superfluous or
as belated, and is thus immediately discharged in its nascent state
through the channel of laughter.¹

The second condition for the production of the free discharge, in which
there is another utilization for the liberated energy, seems to me of far
greater importance. It furnishes the theoretical explanation for the un-
certainty of the effect of wit; if the thoughts expressed in the wit evoke
very exciting ideas in the hearer (depending on the agreement or an-
tagonism between the wit’s tendencies and the train of thought dominat-
ing the hearer), the witty process either receives attention or is deprived
of it. Of still greater theoretical interest, however, are a series of auxiliary
wit-techniques, which obviously serve the purpose of diverting the atten-
tion of the listeners from the wit-process so as to allow the latter to pro-
ceed automatically. I advisedly use the term “automatically” rather than
“unconsciously” because the latter designation might prove misleading.
It is only a question of keeping the psychic process from getting more
than its share of attention during the recital of the witticism, and the
usefulness of these auxiliary techniques permits us to assume rightfully
that it is just the occupation of attention which has a large share in the
control, and in the fresh utilization of the freed cathexis.

THE AUTOMATISM OF THE WIT-PROCESS

It seems by no means easy to avoid the endopsychic utilization of energy
that has become superfluous, for in our mental processes we are con-
stantly in the habit of transferring such emotional outputs from one path
to another without losing any of their energy through discharge. Wit pre-
vents this in the following way. In the first place it strives for the shortest
possible expression in order to expose fewer points of attack to the atten-
tion. Secondly, it strictly adheres to the condition of being easily under-
stood (v. s.), for as soon as there is recourse to mental effort, or a demand
for a choice between different mental paths, it imperils the effect, not only
through the unavoidable mental expenditure, but also through the awak-
ening of attention. Besides this, wit also makes use of the artifice of

¹Heymans (Zeitschrift für Psychol., XI) has used the viewpoint of the nascent state
in a somewhat different connection.

738

diverting the atten-
tion, by offering something in the expression of the wit-
ticism which fascinates the hearer, while the liberation of inhibition ca-
thexis and its discharge can take place undisturbed. The omissions in the
wording of wit already carry out this intention. They impel us to fill in
the gaps and in this way they keep the wit-process free from attention.
The technique of the riddle, as it were, which attracts attention is here
pressed into the service of the wit-work. The façade formations, which
we have already discovered in many groups of tendency-wit, are still more
effective. The syllogistical façades excellently fulfill the purpose of rivet-
ing the attention by an allotted task. While we begin to ponder wherein
the given answer was lacking, we are already laughing; our attention has
been surprised, and the discharge of the liberated inhibition cathexis has
been effected. The same is true of witticisms possessing a comic façade
in which the comic serves to assist the wit-technique. A comic façade pro-
motes the effect of wit in more than one way; it makes possible not only
the automatism of the wit-process by riveting the attention, but it also
facilitates the discharge of wit by sending ahead a discharge from the
comic. Here, the effect of the comic resembles that of a fascinating fore-
pleasure, and we can thus understand why many witticisms are able to
dispense entirely with the fore-pleasures produced by other means of wit,
and make use of only the comic as a fore-pleasure. Among the true tech-
niques of wit it is especially displacement and representation through ab-
surdity which, besides other properties, also develop the deviation of
attention so desirable for the automatic discharge of the wit-process.¹

We already surmise, and later will be able to see it more clearly, that

¹Through an example of displacement-wit I desire to discuss another interesting
character of the technique of wit. The genial actress, Gallmeyer, when once asked how
old she was, is said to have answered this unwelcome question with abashed and
downcast eyes, by saying, “In Brünn.” This is a very good example of displacement.
Having been asked her age, she replied by naming the place of her birth, thus antici-
pating the next query, and in this manner she wishes to imply: “This is a question
which I prefer to pass by.” And still we feel that the character of the witticism does
not here come to expression undimmed. The deviation from the question is too
obvious; the displacement is much too conspicuous. Our attention understands imme-
diately that it is a matter of an intentional displacement. In other displacement-
witticisms the displacement is disguised and our attention is riveted by the effort to
discover it. In one of the above mentioned displacement-witticisms, the reply to
the recommendation of the horse—“What in the world should I do in Monticello at
6:30 in the morning?”—the displacement is also an obtrusive one, but as a substi-
tute for it it acts upon the attention in a senseless and confusing manner, whereas in
the interrogation of the actress we know immediately how to dispose of her displace-
ment answer.
The so-called “facetious questions,” which may make use of the best techniques,
deviate from wit in other ways. An example of the facetious question with displace-
ment is the following: “What is a cannibal who devours his father and mother?—
Answer: An orphan.—And when he has devoured all his other relatives?—Sole-
heir.—And where can such a monster ever find sympathy?”—In the dictionary under
S.” The facetious questions are not full witticisms because the required witty answers
cannot be guessed like the allusions, omissions, etc., of wit.

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MOTIVES OF WIT AND WIT AS A SOCIAL PROCESS

in this condition of deviation of attention we have disclosed no unessen-
tial characteristic of the psychic process in the hearer of wit. In con-
junction with this, we can understand something more. First, how it hap-
pens that we rarely ever know in a joke why we are laughing, although
by analytical investigation we can determine the cause. This laughing
is the result of an automatic process which was first made possible by
keeping our conscious attention at a distance. Secondly, we arrive at an
understanding of that characteristic of wit as a result of which wit can
exert its full effect on the hearer only when it is new and when it comes
to him as a surprise. This property of wit, which causes wit to be short-
lived and forever urges the production of new wit, is evidently due to the
fact that it is inherent in the surprising or the unexpected, to succeed but
once. When we repeat wit the awakened memory leads the attention to
the first hearing. This also explains the desire to impart wit to others who
have not heard it before, for the impression made by wit on the new
hearer replenishes that part of the pleasure which has been lost by the
lack of novelty. And an analogous motive probably impels the wit pro-
ducer to impart his wit to others.

ELEMENTS FAVORING THE WIT-PROCESS

As elements favoring the wit-process, even if we can no longer consider
them as conditions, I present in the third place those three technical aids
to wit-work which are destined to increase the sums of energy to be dis-
charged and thus enhance the effect of the wit. These technical aids also
very often accentuate the attention directed to the wit, but they neutral-
ize its influence by simultaneously fascinating it and impeding its move-
ments. Everything that provokes interest and confusion exerts its influ-
ence in these two directions. This is especially true of the nonsense and
contrast elements, and above all of the “contrast of ideas,” which someauthors consider the essential character of wit, but in which I see only a
means to reinforce the effect of wit. All that is confusing evokes in the
hearer that condition of distribution of energy which Lipps has desig-
nated as “psychic damming”; and, doubtless, he has a right to assume
that the force of the “discharge” varies with the success of the damming
process which precedes it. Lipps’s exposition does not explicitly refer to
wit, but to the comic in general, yet it seems quite probable that the dis-
charge in wit, releasing a gush of inhibition energy, is brought to its
height in a similar manner by means of the damming.

It now dawns upon us that the technique of wit is really determined
by two kinds of tendencies, those which make possible the formation of
wit in the first person, and those guaranteeing that the witticism produces
in the third person as much pleasurable effect as possible. The Janus-like
double-facedness of wit, which safeguards its original resultant pleasure

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against the impugnment of critical reason, belongs to the first tendency
together with the mechanism of fore-pleasure; the other complications
of the technique resulting from the conditions discussed in this chapter
concern the third person of the witticism. Thus, wit in itself is a double-
tongued villain, which serves two masters at the same time. Everything
that aims at gaining pleasure is calculated by the witticism to arouse the
third person, as if inner, unsurmountable inhibitions in the first person
stood in the way of the same. Thus, one gets the full impression of the
absolute necessity of this third person for the completion of the wit-
process. But while we have succeeded in obtaining a good insight into the
nature of this process in the third person, we feel that the corresponding
process in the first person is still shrouded in darkness. So far, we have
not succeeded in answering the first of our two questions: Why can we
not laugh over wit made by ourselves? and: Why are we urged to impart
our own witticisms to others? We can only suspect that there is an inti-
mate connection between the two facts yet to be explained, and that we
must impart our witticisms to others for the reason that we ourselves are
unable to laugh over them. From our examinations of the conditions in
the third person for pleasure gaining and pleasure discharging, we can
draw the conclusion that in the first person the conditions for discharge
are lacking, and that those for gaining pleasure are only incompletely ful-
filled. Thus it is not to be disputed that we supplement our pleasure in
that we attain the—to us impossible—laughter in the roundabout way,
from the impression of the person who was stimulated to laughter. Thus
we laugh, so to speak, par ricochet, as Dugas expresses it. Laughter belongs
to those manifestations of psychic states which are highly infectious; if
I make some one else laugh by imparting my wit to him, I am really
using him as a tool in order to arouse my own laughter. One can really
notice that the person who at first recites the witticism with a serious
mien later joins the hearer with a moderate amount of laughter. Impart-
ing my witticisms to others may thus serve several purposes. First, it
serves to give me the objective certainty of the success of the wit-
work; secondly, it serves to enhance my own pleasure through the reaction of the
hearer upon myself; thirdly, in the case of repeating a not original joke,
it serves to remedy the loss of pleasure due to the lack of novelty.

ECONOMY AND TOTAL EXPENDITURE

At the end of these discussions about the psychic processes of wit, in so far
as they are enacted between two persons, we can glance back to the factor
of economy which impressed us as an important item in the psychological
conception of wit since we offered the first explanation of wit-technique.
Long ago we dismissed the nearest but also the simplest conception of this
economy, where it was a matter of avoiding psychic expenditure in gen-
eral.

741

eral by a maximum restric-
tion in the use of words and by the production
of associations of ideas. We had then already asserted that brevity and
laconisms are not witty in themselves. The brevity of wit is a peculiar
one; it has to be a “witty” brevity. The original pleasure gain produced
by playing with words and thoughts resulted, to be sure, from simple
economy in expenditure, but with the development of play into wit the
tendency to economize also had to shift its goals, for whatever might be
saved by the use of the same words or by avoiding new thought connec-
tions, would surely be of no account when compared to the colossal ex-
penditure of our mental activity. We may be permitted to make a com-
parison between the psychic economy and a business enterprise. So long
as the latter’s transactions are very small, good policy demands that ex-
penses be kept low and that the costs of operation be minimized as much
as possible. The economy still follows the absolute height of the expend-
iture. Later on when the volume of business has increased, the impor-
tance of the business expenses dwindles; increases in the expenditure
totals matter little so long as the transactions and returns can be suffi-
ciently increased. Keeping down running expenses would be parsimoni-
ous; in fact, it would mean a direct loss. Nevertheless, it would be equally
false to assume that with a very great expenditure there would be no
more room for saving. The manager inclined to economize would now
make an effort to save on particular things and would feel satisfied if the
same establishment, with its costly upkeep, could reduce its expenses at
all, no matter how small the saving would seem in comparison to the en-
tire expenditure. In quite an analogous manner the detailed economy in
our complicated psychic affairs remains a source of pleasure, as may be
shown by everyday occurrences. Whoever used to have a gas lamp in his
room, but now uses electric light, will experience for a long time a defi-
nite feeling of pleasure when he presses the electric light button; this
pleasure continues as long as at that moment he remembers the compli-
cated arrangements necessary to light the gas lamp. Similarly the econ-
omy of expenditure in psychic inhibition brought about by wit—small
though it may be in comparison to the sum total of psychic expenditure—
will remain a source of pleasure for us, because we thereby save a par-
ticular expenditure which we are wont to make, and which we were also
ready to make this time. That the expenditure is expected and prepared
for, is a factor which stands unmistakably in the foreground.

A localized economy, as the one just considered, will not fail to give us
momentary pleasure, but it will not bring about a lasting alleviation so
long as what has been saved here can be utilized in another place. Only
when this disposal into a different path can be avoided, will the special
economy be transformed into a general alleviation of the psychic expend-
itures. Thus, with clearer insight into the psychic processes of wit, we

742

see that the factor of alleviation takes the place of economy. Obviously the
former gives us the greater feeling of pleasure. The process in the first
person of the witticism produces pleasure by removing inhibitions and by
diminishing local expenditure; it does not, however, seem to come to rest
until it succeeds through the intervention of the third person, in attaining
general relief through discharge.