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INHIBITIONS, SYMPTOMS AND ANXIETY

BY SIGMUND FREUD

III

To return to the problem of the ego: The apparent contra-
diction of which we have been speaking arises from the fact
that we take abstractions too rigidly, and from out of a com-
plicated state of affairs we pick now one aspect and now another
exclusively. The separation of the ego from the id seems
justified, indeed is forced upon us, by certain findings. Yet
on the other hand the ego is identical with the id, is only a
specially differentiated portion of it. If in our thinking we
contrast this portion with the whole, or if an actual disjunction
of the two has come about, then the weakness of this ego
becomes evident. If, however, the ego remains one with the id
and indistinguishable from it, then it is its strength that is
apparent. The same with the relation of the ego to the super-
ego: as regards many situations they are one and the same; as a
rule we can distinguish them only when a state of tension, a
conflict between them, has arisen. In the case of repression the
fact of crucial importance is that the ego is an organized entity,
whereas the id is not; in fact, the ego is the organized part of
the id. It would be quite unjustifiable to conceive of the ego
and the id as if they were two opposing camps—as though
through repression the ego were seeking to suppress a part of
the id, and that thereupon the rest of the id came to the assist-
ance of the part attacked and measured its strength against that
of the ego. Such may often come about, but it is certainly not
the situation at the outset, at the time when repression is insti-
tuted; as a rule, the instinctual impulse to be repressed remains
isolated. The act of repression has demonstrated to us the
strength of the ego, but it also bears witness at the same time to
the ego’s impotence and to the uninfluenceable character of the
individual instinctual impulse in the id. For the process
which through repression has become a symptom now main-
tains its existence outside of the ego-organization and inde-

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pendent of it. And not it alone, but all its offshoots, enjoy the
same privilege of extraterritoriality, as one might put it; and
where these come into associative contact with parts of the
ego-
organization, it becomes a question whether they will not
win the latter over to their side and batten on this success at
the expense of the ego. A thrice familiar comparison depicts
the symptom as a foreign body which produces and maintains
uninterruptedly symptoms of stimulus and response in the
tissues in which it has become embedded. It may happen, it
is true, that the defensive struggle against the unwelcome
instinctual impulse is terminated when a symptom is formed;
as far as we know, this is most likely to occur in hysterical con-
version, but as a rule the course of events is otherwise; after the
first act of repression there follows a lengthy or never-ending
epilogue: the struggle against the instinctual impulse is con-
tinued in the struggle against the symptom.

This secondary defensive struggle presents two mutually
contradictory aspects. On the one hand, the ego is compelled
by its nature to undertake something which we must regard
as an attempt at reinstatement or propitiation. The ego is an
organization; it is dependent on the free intercommunication
of, and the possibility of reciprocal interplay between, all its
constituent elements; its desexualized energy still gives evi-
dence of its origin in its striving for union and unification, and
this compulsion to synthesis increases in direct proportion to
the strength which the ego attains. It can thus be understood
that the ego also attempts to do away with the alien and isolated
character of the symptom by utilizing every possibility of bind-
ing it to itself in some way and of embodying it within its
organization by means of such ties. We know that an effort
of this kind is already at work in the creating of the symptom.
A classical example of this is afforded by those hysterical symp-
toms which so transparently constitute a compromise between
the wish for gratification and the need for punishment. As
representing the fulfilment of a demand on the part of the
superego such symptoms are ab initio an integral part of the
ego, while on the other hand they signify loci of the repressed

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material and points where the latter has broken into the ego-
organization; they are, so to speak, frontier posts staffed from
both sides of the border. The question whether all primary
hysterical symptoms are so constructed should merit careful
investigation. In the further course of events the ego behaves
as if it were swayed by the consideration that the symptom is
there and cannot be got rid of, and that therefore the thing to
do is to make the best of the situation and extract the greatest
advantage possible from it. There takes place an adaptation
to the ego-
alien bit of the world within, which the symptom
represents-
an adaptation such as otherwise the ego would
normally effect to the outer world of reality. Occasions for so
doing are never lacking. The existence of the symptom may
entail a certain impairment of the efficiency with which a
demand on the part of the superego may be silenced or a claim
on the part of the environment repudiated. Thus the symp-
tom is gradually entrusted with the representing of important
interests; it acquires a value for self-
assertion; it becomes inter-
twined more and more intimately with the ego, becoming ever
more indispensable to the latter. Only in rather rare instances
does the encapsulation of a foreign body reproduce anything
similar to this. One would exaggerate the significance of this
secondary adaptation if one were to say that the ego acquired
the symptom for the sole purpose of enjoying its advantages.
This would be to advance a view as correct or as erroneous as
the opinion that a maimed war veteran had had his leg shot
away only that he might thereafter live in indolence on his
pension.

Other clinical syndromes, those of compulsion neurosis and
paranoia, acquire high value for the ego, not because they
bring it some advantage, but because they yield a narcissistic
gratification otherwise denied. The systems formed by the
compulsion neurotic flatter his self-
love with the illusion that
because of his particular cleanliness and conscientiousness he
is better than other people; the delusions of paranoia open up
to the ingenuity and the fantasy of these patients a field of
activity not easily replaced. From all these interrelationships

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there results what we know as the (secondary) gain of illness of
neurosis. This comes to the aid of the ego in its effort to
incorporate the symptom within itself, and strengthens the
fixation of the latter. When, then, we attempt to render
analytic assistance to the ego in its struggle against the symp-
tom, we find these reconciling bonds between the ego and the
symptom functioning on the side of the resistances. To loosen
them is not made easy for us. The two devices which the ego
employs against the symptom really stand in opposition to each
other.

The other of the two devices has a less friendly character; it
continues the original trend of repression. But it seems that
we need not bring a charge of inconsistency against the ego.
The ego is peace-loving and would like to incorporate the
symptom, to include it in its ensemble. The disturbance pro-
ceeds from the symptom, which, as the true substitute for and
derivative of the repressed striving, continues to play the rôle
of the latter, unceasingly reiterates its demand for gratification,
and thus compels the ego to give the signal of distress and to
put itself on guard.

The secondary struggle of defense against the symptom is
protean in its character, is enacted in various arenas, and makes
use of a multiplicity of means. We shall not be able to say
very much about it, however, unless we take individual
instances of symptom creation as the subject of discussion. In
doing so we shall find occasion to embark upon the problem of
anxiety which for some time now we have felt to be lurking in
the background. It will be desirable to begin with the symp-
toms which hysteria creates; we are not yet prepared for
hypotheses concerning the process of symptom formation in
compulsion neurosis, paranoia and other neuroses.