711

IV

THE PLEASURE MECHANISM AND THE
PSYCHOGENESIS OF WIT

We can now definitely assert that we know from what sources the peculia-
pleasure arises furnished us by wit. We know that we can be easily misled
to mistake our sense of satisfaction experienced through the thought-
content of the sentence for the actual pleasure derived from the wit, on
the other hand, the latter itself has two intrinsic sources, namely, the
wit-technique and the wit-tendency. What we now desire to ascertain is
by what manner pleasure originates from these sources, and the mecha-
nism of this resultant pleasure.

It seems to us that the desired explanation can be more easily ascer-
tained in tendency-wit than in harmless wit. We shall therefore commence
with the former.

The pleasure in tendency-wit results from the fact that a tendency,
whose gratification would otherwise remain unfulfilled, is actually grati-
fied. That such gratification is a source of pleasure is self-evident with-
out further discussion. But the manner in which wit brings about gratifi-
cation is connected with special conditions from which we may perhaps
gain further information. Here two cases must be differentiated. The
simpler case is the one in which the gratification of the tendency is op-
posed by an external hindrance which is eluded by the wit. This process
we found, for example, in the reply which Augustus received to his query
whether the mother of the stranger he addressed had ever sojourned in his
home, and likewise in the question of the art critic who asked: “And
where is the Savior?” when the two rich rogues showed him their por-
traits. In one case the tendency serves to answer one insult with another;
in the other case it offers an affront instead of the demanded expert
opinion; in both cases the tendency was opposed by purely external
factors, namely, the powerful position of the persons who are the targets
of the insult. Nevertheless it may seem strange to us that these and

712

WIT AND ITS RELATION TO THE UNCONSCIOUS

analogous tendency-
effect of laughter no matter how much they may gratify us.
It is different, however, if no external factors but internal hindrances
stand in the way of the direct realization of the tendency—that is, if an
inner feeling opposes the tendency. This condition, according to our as-
sumption, was present in the aggressive joke of Mr. N. and in the one of
Wendell Phillips, in whom a strong inclination to use invectives was
stifled by a highly developed æsthetic sense. With the aid of wit the
inner resistances in these special cases were overcome and the inhibition
removed. As in the case of external hindrances, the gratification of the
tendency is made possible, and a suppression with its concomitant “psy-
chic damming” is thus obviated. So far, the mechanism of the develop-
ment of pleasure would seem to be identical in both cases.
At this place, however, we are inclined to feel that we should enter
more deeply into the differentiation of the psychological situation between
the cases of external and internal hindrance, as we have a faint notion
that the removal of the inner hindrance might possibly result in a dis-
proportionately higher contribution to pleasure. But I propose that we
rest content here, that we be satisfied for the present with this one collec-
tion of evidence which adheres to what is essential to us. The only dif-
ference between the cases of outer and inner hindrances consists in the
fact that here an already existing inhibition is removed, while there the
formation of a new inhibition is avoided. We hardly resort to speculation
when we assert that a “psychic expenditure” is required for the formation
as well as for the retention of a psychic inhibition. Now if we find that in
both cases the use of the tendency-wit produces pleasure, then it may be
assumed that such resultant pleasure corresponds to the economy of psy-
chic expenditure.
Thus we are once more confronted with the principle of economy which
we noticed first in the study of the technique of word-wit. But whereas
the economy we believed to have found at first was in the use of few or
possibly the same words, we can here foresee an economy of psychic ex-
penditure in general in a far more comprehensive sense, and we think it
possible to come nearer to the nature of wit through a better determina-
tion of the as yet very obscure idea of “psychic expenditure.”
A certain amount of haziness which we could not dissipate during the
study of the pleasure mechanism in tendency-wit we accept as a slight
punishment for attempting to elucidate the more complicated problem
before the simpler one, or the tendency-wit before the harmless wit. We
observe that “economy in the expenditure of inhibitions or suppressions”
seems to be the secret of the pleasurable effect of tendency-wit, and we
now turn to the mechanism of the pleasure in harmless wit.
While examining appropriate examples of harmless witticisms, in which

713

we had no fear of false judgment through content or tendency, we were
forced to the conclusion that the techniques of wit themselves are pleas-
ure-sources; now we wish to ascertain whether the pleasure may be traced
to the economy in psychic expenditure. In a group of these witticisms
(plays on words) the technique consisted in directing the psychic focus
upon the sound instead of upon the sense of the word, and in allowing the
(acoustic) word-disguise to take the place of the meaning accorded to it
by its relations to reality. We are really justified in assuming that great
relief is thereby afforded to the psychic work, and that in the serious use
of words we refrain from this convenient procedure only at the expense
of a certain amount of exertion. We can observe that abnormal mental
states, in which the possibility of concentrating psychic expenditure on
one place is probably restricted, actually allow to come to the foreground
word-sound associations of this kind rather than the significance of the
words, and that such patients react in their speech with “outer” instead
of “inner” associations. Also, in children who are still accustomed to treat
the word as an object, we notice the inclination to look for the same mean-
ing in words of the same or of similar sounds, which is a source of great
amusement to adults. If we experience in wit an unmistakable pleasure,
because through the use of the same or similar words we reach from one
set of ideas to a distant other one (as in “Home-Roulard” from the
kitchen to politics), we can justly refer this pleasure to the economy of
psychic expenditure. The pleasure of the wit resulting from such a “short-
circuit” appears greater the more remote and foreign the two series of
ideas which become related through the same word are to each other, or
the greater the economy in thought brought about by the technical means
of wit. We may add that in this case wit makes use of a means of connec-
tion which is rejected by, and carefully avoided in serious thinking.¹

¹If I may be permitted to anticipate what later is discussed in the text, I can here
throw some light upon the condition which seems to be authoritative in the usage of
language when it is a question of calling a joke “good” or “poor.” If by means of a
double meaning or slightly modified word I have gotten from one idea to another
by a short route, and if this does not also simultaneously result in senseful association
between the two ideas, then I have made a “poor” joke. In this poor joke one word or
the “point” forms the only existing association between the two widely separated
ideas. The joke “Home-Roulard” used above is such an example. But a “good” joke
results if the infantile expectation is right in the end and if with the similarity of the
word another essential similarity in meaning is really simultaneously produced—
as in the examples Traduttore—Traditore (translator—traitor) and Amantes—
Amentes (lovers—lunatics). The two disparate ideas which are here linked by an
outer association are held together besides by a senseful connection which expresses
an important relationship between them. The outer association only replaces the
inner connection; it serves to indicate the latter or to clarify it. Not only does
“translator” sound somewhat similar to “traitor,” but he is a sort of a traitor whose
claims to that name are good. The same may be said of Amantes—Amentes. Not only
do the words bear a resemblance, but the similarity between “love” and “lunacy” has
been noted from time immemorial.
The distinction made here agrees with the differentiation, to be made later, be-

714

A second group of technical means of wit—unification, similar sound-
ing words, manifold application, modification of familiar idioms, allu-
sions to quotations—all evince one common character, namely, that one
always discovers something familiar where one expects to find something
new instead. To discover the familiar is pleasurable and it is not difficult
to recognize such pleasure as economy-pleasure and to refer it to the
economy of psychic expenditure.

That the discovery of the familiar—“recognition”—causes pleasure
seems to be universally admitted. Groos says: ¹⁾ “Recognition is every-
where bound up with feelings of pleasure where it has not been made too
mechanical (as perhaps in dressing …). Even the mere quality of
acquaintanceship is easily accompanied by that gentle delight which
Faust experiences when, after an uncanny experience, he steps into his
study.” If the act of recognition is so pleasureful, we may expect that
man merges into the habit of practicing this activity for its own sake,
that is, he experiments playfully with it. In fact, Aristotle recognized in
the joy of rediscovery the basis of artistic pleasure, and it cannot be de-
nied that this principle must not be overlooked even if it has not such a
far-reaching significance as Aristotle assumes.

Groos then discusses the games, whose character consists of heighten-
ing the pleasure of rediscovery by putting hindrances in its path, or in
other words by raising a “psychic dam” which is removed by the act of
recognition. However, his attempted explanation leaves the assumption
that recognition as such is pleasurable, in that he attributes the pleasure
of recognition connected with these games to the pleasure in power, or to
the surmounting of a difficulty. I consider this latter factor as secondary,
and I find no occasion for abandoning the simpler explanation, that the
recognition per se, i.e., through the alleviation of the psychic expenditure,
is pleasurable, and that the games founded upon this pleasure make use
of the damming-mechanism merely in order to intensify their effect.

We know also that the source of pleasure in rhyme, alliteration, refrain,
and other forms of repetition of similar sounding words in poetry, is due
merely to the discovery of the familiar. A “sense of power” plays no per-
ceptible rôle in these techniques, which show so marked an agreement
with the “manifold application” in wit.

Considering the close connection between recognition and remember-
ing, the assumption is no longer daring that there exists also a pleasure

tween a “witticism” and a “jest.” However, it would not be correct to exclude ex-
amples like Home-Roulard from the discussion of the nature of wit. As soon as we
take into consideration the peculiar pleasure of wit, we discover that the “poor”
witticisms are by no means poor as witticisms, i.e., they are by no means unsuited
for the production of pleasure.

¹Die Spiele der Menschen, 1899, p. 153.

715

in remembering, i.e., that the act of remembering in itself is accompanied
by a feeling of pleasure of a similar origin. Groos seems to have no ob-
jection to such an assumption, but he again deducts the pleasure of re-
membering from the “sense of power” in which he seeks—as I believe
unjustly—the principal basis of pleasure in almost all games.

THE FACTOR OF ACTUALITY

The use of another technical expedient of wit, which has not yet been
mentioned, is also dependent upon “the rediscovery of the familiar.” I
refer to the factor of actuality (dealing with actual persons, things, or
events), which in many witticisms provides a prolific source of pleasure
and explains several peculiarities in the life history of wit. There are witti-
cisms which are entirely free from this condition, and in a treatise on wit it
is incumbent upon us to make use of such examples almost exclusively.
But we must not forget that we laughed perhaps more heartily over such
perennial witticisms than over others; witticisms whose application now
would be difficult, because they would require long commentaries, and
even with that aid the former effect could not be attained. These latter
witticisms contained allusions to persons and occurrences which were
“actual” at the time, which had stimulated general interest and were en-
dowed with tension. After the cessation of this interest, after the settle-
ment of these particular affairs, the witticisms lost a part of their pleasur-
able effect, and a very considerable part at that. Thus, for example, the
joke which my friendly host made when he called the dish that was being
served a “Home-Roulard,” seems to me by no means as good now as when
the question of Home Rule was a continuous headline in the political
columns of our newspaper. If I now attempt to express my appreciation
of this joke by stating that this one word led us from the idea of the
kitchen to the distant field of politics, and saved us a long mental detour,
I should have been forced at that time to change this description as fol-
lows: “That this word led us from the idea of the kitchen to the very
distant field of politics; but that our lively interest was all the keener
because this question was constantly absorbing us.” The same thing is
true of another joke: “This girl reminds me of Dreyfus; the army does
not believe in her innocence,” which has become blurred in spite of the
fact that its technical means has remained unchanged. The confusion
arising from the comparison with, and the double meaning of, the word
“innocence” cannot do away with the fact that the allusion, which at that
time touched upon a matter pregnant with excitement, now recalls an
interest set at rest. The many irresistible jokes about the world war have
sunk in our estimation in a very short time. “Gone with the Windsor,” a
condensation of the popular book, “Gone with the Wind,” and the abdi-

716

WIT AND ITS RELATION TO THE UNCONSCIOUS
cation of Edward VIII, now the Duke of Windsor, no longer evokes the
mirth that it did a year ago.¹

A great many witticisms in circulation reach a certain age or rather go
through a course composed of a flourishing season and a mature season,
and then sink into complete oblivion. The need that people feel to draw
pleasure from their mental processes continually creates new witticisms
which are supported by current interests of the day. The vitality of actual
witticisms is not their own, it is borrowed by way of allusion from those
other interests, the expiration of which determines the fate of the wit-
ticism. The factor of actuality which may be added as a transitory pleas-
ure-source of wit, although it is productive in itself, cannot be simply put
on the same basis as the rediscovery of the familiar. It is much more a
question of a special qualification of the familiar which must be aided by
the quality of freshness and recency and which has not been affected by
forgetfulness. In the formation of the dream one also finds that there is a
special preference for what is recent, and one cannot refrain from infer-
ring that the association with what is recent is rewarded or facilitated by
a special pleasure premium.

Unification, which is really nothing more than repetition in the sphere
of mental association instead of in material, has been accorded an espe-
cial recognition as a pleasure-source of wit by G Th. Fechner.² He says:
“In my opinion the principle of uniform connection of the manifold,
plays the most important rôle in the field under discussion; it needs, how-
ever, the support of subsidiary determinations in order to drive across
the threshold the pleasure with its peculiar character which the cases
here belonging can furnish.”³

In all of these cases of repetition of the same association or of the same
word-material, of refinding the familiar and recent, we surely cannot be
prevented from referring the pleasure thereby experienced to the econ-
omy in psychic expenditure; providing that this viewpoint proves fertile
for the explanation of single facts as well as for bringing to light new
generalities. We are fully conscious of the fact that we have yet to make
clear the manner in which this economy results and also the meaning of
the expression “psychic expenditure.”

The third group of the technique of wit, mostly thought-wit, which in-
cludes false logic, displacement, absurdity, representation through the
opposite, and other varieties, may seem at first sight to present special
features and to be unrelated to the techniques of the discovery of the
familiar, or the replacing of object-associations by word-associations. But

¹Translator’s example.
²Vorschule der Aesthetik, I, XVII.
³Chapter XVII has for its title: “Concerning senseful and witty comparisons, play
on words, and similar cases, which have the character of enjoyment, merriment and
laughter.”

717

PLEASURE MECHANISM AND PSYCHOGENESIS

it will not be difficult to demonstrate that this group, too, shows an econ-
omy or facilitation of psychic expenditure.

It is quite obvious that it is easier and more convenient to turn away
from a definite trend of thought than to stick to it; it is easier to mix up
different things than to distinguish them; and it is particularly easier to
travel over modes of reasoning unsanctioned by logic; finally in connect-
ing words or thoughts it is especially easy to overlook the fact that such
connections should result in sense. All this is indubitable and this is ex-
actly what is done by the techniques of the wit in question. It will sound
strange, however, to assert that such processes in the wit-work may pro-
duce pleasure, since outside of wit we can experience only unpleasant
feelings of defense against all these kinds of inferior achievement of our
mental activity.

WORD-PLEASURE AND PLEASURE IN NONSENSE

The “pleasure in nonsense,” as we may call it for short, is, in the serious-
ness of our life, crowded back almost to the vanishing point. To demon-
strate it we must enter into the study of two cases in one of which it is
still visible and in the other becomes visible for the second time. I refer
to the behavior of the learning child and to the behavior of the adult
under unstable toxic influences. When the child learns to control the
vocabulary of its mother tongue it apparently takes great pleasure in
“experimenting playfully” with that material (Groos); it connects words
without regard for their meaning in order to obtain pleasure from the
rhyme and rhythm. Gradually the child is deprived of this pleasure until
only the senseful connection of words is allowed him. But even in later
life there is still a tendency to overstep the acquired restrictions in the
use of words, a tendency which manifests itself in disfiguring the same
by definite appendages, and in changing their forms by means of certain
contrivances (reduplication, trembling speech), or even by developing an
individual language for use in playing—efforts which reappear also
among the insane of a certain category.¹

I believe that whatever the motive which actuated the child when it
began such playings, in his further development the child indulges in
them fully conscious that they are nonsensical and derives pleasure from
this stimulus which is interdicted by reason. He now makes use of play in
order to withdraw from the pressure of critical reason. More powerful,
however, are the restrictions which must develop in education along the
lines of right thinking, and in the separation of reality from fiction, and
it is for this reason that the resistance against the pressures of thinking
and reality is far-reaching and persistent; even the phenomena of phan-
tasy

1) Cf. Brill: Poetry as an Oral Outlet, Psychoanalytic Review, Vol. XVIII, No. 4,
October, 1931.

718

tasy formation come under this point of view. The power of reason usually
grows so strong during the later part of childhood and during that period
of education which extends over the age of puberty, that the pleasure in
“freed nonsense” rarely dares manifest itself. One fears to utter nonsense;
but it seems to me that the inclination characteristic of boys to act in a
contradictory and inexpedient manner is a direct outcome of this pleasure
in nonsense. In pathological cases one often sees this tendency so accen-
tuated that it again controls the speeches and answers of the pupils. In
the case of some college students who merged into neuroses I could con-
vince myself that the unconscious pleasure derived from the nonsense
produced by them is just as much responsible for their mistakes as their
actual igonarnce.

REPRODUCTION OF OLD LIBERTIES

The student does not give up his demonstrations against the pressures of
thinking and reality whose domination becomes unceasingly intolerant
and unrestricted. A good part of the tendency of students to skylarking is
responsible for this reaction. Man is an “untiring pleasure seeker”—I can
no longer recall which author coined this happy expression—and finds it
extremely difficult to renounce pleasure once experienced. With the
hilarious nonsense of “sprees,” college cheers and songs, the student at
tempts to preserve that pleasure which results from freedom of thought,
a freedom of which he is more and more deprived through scholastic disci-
pline. Even much later, when as a mature alumnus he meets with others
at scientific congresses and class reunions and feels himself a student
again, he then reads again the comic college paper, which distorts the
newly gained knowledge into the nonsensical, and thus, compensates him
for the newly added mental inhibitions.

Reason, which has stifled the pleasure in nonsense, has become so
powerful that not even temporarily can it be abandoned without a toxic
agency. The change in the state of mind is the most valuable thing that
alcohol offers man, and that is the reason why this “poison” is not
equally indispensable for all people. The hilarious humor, whether due
to endogenous origin or whether produced toxically, weakens the inhibit-
ing forces, among which is reason, and thus, again makes accessible
pleasure-sources, which are burdened by suppression. It is very instruc-
tive to see how the demand made upon wit sinks with the rise in spirits.
The latter actually replace wit, just as wit must make an effort to replace
the mental state in which the otherwise inhibited pleasure possibilities
(pleasure in nonsense among the rest) assert themselves.
“With little wit and much comfort.”
Under the influence of alcohol the adult again becomes a child who

710

PLEASURE MECHANISM AND PSYCHOGENESIS

derives pleasure from the free disposal of his mental stream without being
restricted by the pressure of logic.

We hope we have shown that the technique of absurdity in wit cor-
responds to a source of pleasure. We need hardly repeat that this pleasure
results from the economy of psychic expenditure or alleviation from the
pressure of reason.

On reviewing again the wit-
technique classified under three headings,
we notice that the first and last of these groups—the replacement of
object-
association by word-
association, and the use of absurdity as a
restorer of old liberties and as a relief from the pressure of intellectual
up-
bringing—can be taken collectively. Psychic relief may in a way be
compared to economy, which constitutes the technique of the second
group. Alleviation of the already existing psychic expenditure, and
economy in the yet to be offered psychic expenditure, are two principles
from which all techniques of wit and with them all pleasure in these tech-
niques can be deduced. The two forms of the technique and the resultant
pleasures, correspond more or less in general to the division of wit into
word-
and thought-
witticisms.

PLAY AND JEST

The preceding discussions have led us unexpectedly to an understanding
of the history of the development of psychogenesis of wit which we shall
now examine still further. We have become acquainted with the suc-
cessive steps in wit, the development of which up to tendency-
wit, will
undoubtedly reveal new relationships between the different characters of
wit. Antedating wit there exists something which we may designate as
“play” or “jest.” Play—we shall retain this name—appears in children
while they are learning how to use words and connect thoughts; this
playing is probably the result of an impulse which urges the child to
exercise his capacities (Groos). During this process he experiences pleas-
urable effects which originate from the repetition of similarities, the
rediscovery of the familiar, sound-
associations, etc., which may be ex-
plained as an unex-
pected economy of psychic expenditure. Therefore it
surprises no one that these resulting pleasures urge the child to practice
playing and impel him to continue without regard for the meaning of
words or the connections between sentences. Playing with words and
thoughts, motivated by certain pleasures in economy, would thus be the
first step of wit.

This playing is stopped by the growing strength of a factor which may
well be called criticism or reason. The play is then rejected as senseless
or as directly absurd, and by virtue of reason it becomes impossible. Only
accidentally is it now possible to derive pleasure from those sources of
re-
discovery of the familiar, etc., which is explained by the fact that the

720

maturing person has then merged into a playful mood which, as in the
case of merriment in the child, removes inhibitions. In this way only is
the old pleasure-
giving playing made possible, but as men do not wish to
wait for these propitious occasions and also hate to forego this pleasure,
they seek means to make themselves independent of these pleasant states.
The further development of wit is directed by these two impulses; the
one striving to elude reason, and the other to substitute for the adult an
infantile state of mind.

This gives rise to the second stage of wit, the jest. The object of the
jest is to bring about the resultant pleasure of playing and at the same
time appease the protesting reason which strives to suppress the pleasant
feeling. There is but one way to accomplish this. The senseless combina-
tion of words or the absurd linking of thoughts must make sense after all.
The whole process of wit production is therefore directed towards the
discovery of words and thought constellations which fulfill these con-
ditions. The jest makes use of almost all the technical means of wit.
What distinguishes the jest from wit is the fact that the pith of the sen-
tence withdrawn from criticism does not need to be valuable, new, or even
good; it matters only that it can be expressed, even though what it may
say is obsolete, superfluous, and useless. The most conspicuous factor of
the jest is the gratification it affords by making possible that which reason
forbids.

A mere jest is the following of Professor Kästner, who taught physics
at Göttingen in the 16th century, and who was fond of making jokes.
Wishing to enroll a student named Warr in his class, he asked him his
age, and upon receiving the reply that he was thirty years of age he ex-
claimed: “Aha, so I have the honor of seeing the thirty years’ War.”¹
When asked what vocations his sons followed, Rokitansky jestingly an-
swered: “Two are healing and two are howling,” (two physicians and two
singers). The reply was correct and therefore unimpeachable, but it
added nothing to what is contained in the parenthetic expression. There
is no doubt that the answer assumed another form only because of the
pleasure which arises from the unification and assonance of both words.

I believe that we now see our way clear. In estimating the techniques
of wit we were constantly disturbed by the fact that these are not peculiar
to wit alone, and yet the nature of wit seemed to depend upon them, since
their removal by means of reduction nullified the character as well as the
pleasure of wit. Now we become aware that what we have described as
techniques of wit—and which in a certain sense we shall have to continue
to call so—are really the sources from which wit derives pleasure; nor
does it strike us as strange that other processes draw from the same
sources with the same object in view. The technique, however, which is
¹Kleinpaul: Die Rätsel der Sprache, 1890.

721

peculiar to, and belongs to wit alone, consists in a process of safeguard-
ing the use of this pleasure-forming means against the protest of reason
which would obviate the pleasure. We can make few generalizations
about this process. The wit-work, as we have already remarked, expresses
itself in the selection of such word-material and such thought-situations
as to permit the old play with words and thoughts to stand the test of
reason; but to accomplish this end the cleverest use must be made of all
the peculiarities of the stock of words and of all constellations of mental
combinations. Later on perhaps we shall be in a position to characterize
the wit-work by a definite attribute; for the present it must remain unex-
plained how our wit makes its advantageous selections. The tendency
and capacity of wit to guard the pleasure-forming word and thought
combinations against reason, already makes itself visible as an essential
criterion in jests. From the beginning its object is to remove inner inhi-
bitions and thereby, render productive those pleasure-sources which have
become inaccessible, and we shall find that it remains true to this char-
acteristic throughout the course of its entire development.

We are now in a position to prescribe a correct place for the factor
“sense in nonsense,” to which the authors ascribe so much significance in
respect to the recognition of wit and the explanation of the pleasurable
effect. The two firmly established points in the determination of wit–its
tendency to carry through the pleasureful play, and its effort to guard it
against the criticism of reason—make it perfectly clear why the individ-
ual witticism, even though it appear nonsensical from one point of view,
must appear full of meaning or at least acceptable from another. How it
accomplishes this is the business of the wit-work; if it is not successful it
is relegated to the category of “nonsense.” Nor do we find it necessary to
deduce the resultant pleasure of wit from the conflict of feelings which
emerge either directly or by way of “confusion and clearness,” from the
simultaneous sense and nonsense of the wit. There is just as little neces-
sity for our delving deeper into the question how pleasure can come from
the succession of that part of the wit considered senseless and from that
part recognized as senseful. The psychogenesis of wit has taught us that
the pleasure of wit arises from word-play or from the liberation of non-
sense, and that the sense of wit is meant only to guard this pleasure
against suppression through reason.

JEST AND WIT

Thus, the problem of the essential character of wit could almost be ex-
plained by means of the jest. We may follow the development of the jest
until it reaches its height in the tendency-wit. The jest puts the tendency
ahead when it is a question of supplying us with pleasure, and it is con-
tent when its utterance does not appear utterly senseless or insipid. But

722

if this utterance is substantial and valuable, the jest changes into wit. A
thought, which would have been worthy of our interest even when ex-
pressed in the most unpretentious form, is now invested in a form which
must in itself excite our sense of satisfaction. Such an association we can
not help thinking has surely not come into existence unintentionally; we
must make an effort to divine the intention at the bottom of the formation
of wit. An incidental observation, made once before, will put us on the
right track. We have already remarked that a good witticism gives us,
so to speak, a general feeling of satisfaction without our being able to
decide offhand which part of the pleasure comes from the witty form and
which part from the excellent thought contained in the context. We are
deceiving ourselves constantly about this division; sometimes we over-
value the quality of the wit on account of our admiration for the thought
contained therein, and then again we overestimate the value of the
thought on account of the pleasure afforded us by the witty investment.
We know not what gives us pleasure, nor at what we are laughing. This
uncertainty of our judgment, assuming it to be a fact, may have given
the motive for the formation of wit in the literal sense. The thought seeks
the witty disguise because it thereby recommends itself to our attention
and can thus appear to us more important and valuable than it really is;
but above all because this disguise fascinates and confuses our reason.
We are apt to attribute to the thought the pleasure derived from the
witty form, and we are not inclined to consider improper what has given
us pleasure, and in this way deprive ourselves of a source of pleasure. For
if wit makes us laugh, it has also established in us a mood most unfavor-
able to reason, and then that mood is forced upon us from one point which
already suffices for play and which wit strives to displace by all means.
Although we have maintained before that such wit is harmless, and is not
yet to be designated as tendentious, we may not deny that, strictly
speaking, it is the jest alone which shows no tendency; that is, it serves to
produce pleasure only. For wit is really never purposeless even if the
thought contained therein has no tendency and merely serves a theoreti-
cal, intellectual interest. Wit carries out its purpose in advancing the
thought by magnifying it and by guarding it against reason. Here again
it reveals its original nature in that it sets itself up against an inhibiting
and restrictive power, or against the critical judgment.

The first use of wit, which goes beyond the mere production of pleasure,
points to the road ahead of us. Wit is now recognized as a powerful psychic
factor whose weight can decide the issue if it falls into this or that side of
the scale. The great tendencies and impulses of our psychic life enlist its
service for their own purposes. The original purposeless wit, which began
as play, becomes related in a secondary manner to tendencies from which
nothing that is formed in psychic life can escape for any length of time.

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We already know what it can achieve in the service of the exhibitionistic,
aggressive, cynical, and skeptical tendencies. In the case of obscene wit,
which originated in the smutty joke, it makes a confederate of the third
person who originally disturbed the sexual situation, by giving him
pleasure through the utterance which causes the woman to be ashamed
in his presence. In the case of the aggressive tendency, wit by the same
means changes the original indifferent hearers into active haters and
scorners, and in this way confronts the enemy with a host of opponents
where formerly there was but one. In the first case it overcomes the in-
hibitions of shame and decorum by the pleasure premium which it offers.
In the second case it overthrows the critical judgment which would other-
wise have examined the dispute in question. In the third and fourth cases
where wit is in the service of the cynical and skeptical tendency, it shat-
ters the respect for institutions and truths in which the hearer had be-
lieved, first by strengthening the argument, and secondly by resorting to
a new method of attack. Where the argument seeks to draw the hearer’s
reason to its side, wit strives to push aside this reason. There is no doubt
that wit has chosen the way which is psychologically more efficacious.

THE DEVELOPMENT INTO TENDENCY-WIT

What impressed us in reviewing the achievements of tendency-wit was
the effect it produced on the hearer. It is more important, however, to
understand the effect produced by wit on the psychic life of the person
who makes it, or more precisely expressed, on the psychic life of the per-
son who conceives it. Once before we have expressed the intention, which
we find occasion to repeat here, that we wish to study the psychic proc-
esses of wit in regard to its apportionment between two persons. We can
assume for the present that the psychic process aroused by wit in the
hearer is usually an imitation of the psychic processes of the wit producer.
The outer inhibitions which are to be overcome in the hearer correspond
to the inner inhibitions of the wit producer. In the latter the expectation
of the outer hindrance exists, at least as an inhibiting idea. The inner
hindrance, which is overcome in tendency-wit, is evident in some single
cases; for example, in the Cincinnatus joke we can assume that it not only
enables the hearer to enjoy the pleasure of the aggression through in-
juries, but it also makes it possible for him to produce the wit in the first
place. Of the different kinds of inner inhibitions or suppressions one is
especially worthy of our interest because it is the most far-reaching. We
designate that form by the term “repression.” It is characterized by the
fact that it excludes from consciousness certain buried emotions and their
products. We shall learn that tendency-wit itself is capable of liberating
pleasure from sources that have undergone repression. If the overcoming
of outer hindrances can be traced in the manner indicated above to inner

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inhibitions and repressions, we may say that tendency-
wit proves more clearly than any other developmental stage of wit that the main character
of wit-making is to set free pleasure by removing inhibitions. It rein-
forces the tendencies which it serves by bringing them assistance from re-
pressed emotions; or it puts itself at the disposal of the repressed ten-
dencies directly.

We may readily concede that these are the functions of tendency-wit,
but we must nevertheless admit that we do not understand in what man-
ner these functions can succeed in accomplishing their end. The power of
tendency-wit consists in the pleasure derived from the sources of word-
plays and liberated nonsense, and if one can judge from the impressions
received from purposeless jests, one cannot possibly consider the amount
of the pleasure so great as to attribute to it the power to annul deep-
rooted inhibitions and repressions. As a matter of fact, we do not deal
here with a simple propelling power, but rather with a more complicated
mechanism. Instead of covering the long circuitous route through which
I arrived at an understanding of this relationship, I shall endeavor to
demonstrate it by a short synthetic route.

G. Th. Fechner has established the principle of aesthetic assistance or
enhancement which he explains in the following words: “From the un-
opposed concurrence of pleasurable states which individually accomplish
little, there results a greater, often much greater resultant pleasure than
corresponds to the sum of the pleasure values of the separate states, or a
greater result than could be explained by the sum of the individual ef-
fects; in fact, the mere concurrence of this kind can result in a positive
pleasure product, which overflows the threshold of pleasure where the
individual factors are too weak to accomplish this. The only condition is
that in comparison to others they must produce a greater sense of satis-
faction.”¹⁾ I am of the opinion that the theme of wit does not give us the
opportunity to test the correctness of this principle which is demonstrable
in many other artistic fields. But from wit we have learned something,
which at least comes near this principle, namely that in a coöperation of
many pleasure-producing factors we are in no position to assign to each
one the resultant part which really belongs to it. But the situation as
sumed in the principle of assistance can be varied, and for these new con-
ditions we can formulate the following combination of questions which
are worthy of a reply. What usually happens if in one constellation there
is a meeting of pleasurable and painful conditions? Upon what depends
the result and the previous intimations of the result? Tendency-wit
particularly shows these possibilities. There is one feeling or impulse
which strives to liberate pleasure from a certain source and under un-
restricted conditions certainly would liberate it, but there is another im-
¹⁾ Vorschule der Aesthetik, Vol. I, V, p. 51, 2nd Ed., Leipzig, 1897.

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PLEASURE MECHANISM AND PSYCHOGENESIS

pulse which works against this development of pleasure, that is, which
inhibits or suppresses it. The suppressing stream, as the result shows,
must be somewhat stronger than the one suppressed, which however is by
no means destroyed.

THE FORE-PLEASURE PRINCIPLE

But now there appears another impulse which strives to set free pleasure
by this identical process, albeit from different sources, which acts like the
suppressed stream. What can be the result in such a case? An example
can make this clearer than this schematization. There is an impulse to
insult a certain person, but this is so strongly opposed by a feeling of
decorum and æsthetic culture that the impulse to insult must be crushed.
If, for example, by virtue of some changed emotional state the insult
should happen to break through, this insulting tendency would subse-
quently be painfully perceived. Therefore, the insult is omitted. There is
a possibility, however, of making good wit from the words or thoughts
which would have served in the insult; that is, pleasure can be set free
from other sources without being hindered by the same suppression. But
the second development of pleasure would have to be foregone if the in-
sulting quality of the wit were not allowed to come out, and as the latter
is allowed to come to the surface, it is connected with the new release of
pleasure. Experience with tendency-wit shows that under such circum-
stances the suppressed tendency can become so strengthened by the aid
of wit-pleasure as to overcome the otherwise stronger inhibition. One re-
sorts to insults because wit is thereby made possible. But the satisfaction
thus obtained is not produced by wit alone; it is incomparably greater, in
fact it is by so much greater than the pleasure of the wit, that we must
assume that the former suppressed tendency has succeeded in breaking
through, perhaps without any discharge. Under these circumstances tend-
ency-wit causes the most prolific laughter.

The investigation of the conditions of laughter will perhaps aid us in
forming a clearer picture of the process of the help which wit gets against
suppression. But we see even now that the case of tendency-wit is a spe-
cial case of the principle of help. A possibility of the development of
pleasure enters into a situation in which another pleasure possibility is so
hindered that individually it would not result in pleasure. The result is a
development of pleasure which is greater by far than the added pos-
sibility. The latter has acted, as it were, as an alluring premium; with the
aid of a small sum of pleasure a very large and almost inaccessible
amount is obtained. I have good grounds for thinking that this principle
corresponds to an arrangement which holds true in many widely separated
spheres of the psychic life, and I consider it appropriate to designate the

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WIT AND ITS RELATION TO THE UNCONSCIOUS

pleasure serving to liberate the large sum of pleasure as fore-pleasure and
the principle as the principle of fore-pleasure.

PLAY-PLEASURE AND REMOVAL-PLEASURE

The effect of tendency-wit may now be formulated as follows: It enters
the service of tendencies in order to produce new pleasure by removing
suppressions and repressions. This it does by using wit-pleasure as fore-
pleasure. When we now review its development, we may say that wit has
remained true to its nature from beginning to end. It begins as play in
order to obtain pleasure from the free use of words and thoughts. As soon
as the growing reason forbids this senseless play with words and thoughts,
it turns to the jest or joke in order to hold to these sources of pleasure and
in order to be able to gain new pleasure from the liberation of the absurd.
In the rôle of harmless wit it assists the thoughts and fortifies them against
the impugnment of the critical judgment, whereby it makes use of the
principle of intermingling the pleasure-sources. Finally, it enters into the
great struggling suppressed tendencies in order to remove inner inhibi-
tions in accordance with the principle of fore-pleasure. Reason, critical
judgment, and suppression, these are the forces which it combats in turn.
It firmly holds on to the original word-pleasure sources, and beginning
with the stage of the jest opens for itself new pleasure sources by remov-
ing inhibition. The pleasure which it produces, be it play-pleasure or re-
moval-pleasure, can at all times be traced to the economy of psychic ex-
penditure, in so far as such a conception does not contradict the nature
of pleasure, and proves itself productive also in other fields.

The nonsense-witticisms, which have been somewhat slighted in this
treatise, deserve a short supplementary comment.

In view of the significance attributed by our conception to the factor
“sense in nonsense,” one might be tempted to demand that every wit-
ticism should be a nonsense-joke. But this is not necessary, because only
the play with thoughts inevitably leads to nonsense, whereas the other
source of wit-pleasure, the play with words, makes this impression inci-
dental and does not regularly invoke the criticism connected with it. The
double root of wit-pleasure—from the play with words and thoughts,
which corresponds to the most important division into word- and thought-
witticisms—sets its face against a short formulation of general principles
about wit as a tangible aggravation of difficulties. The play with words
produces laughter, as is well known, in consequence of the factor of recog-
nition described above, and therefore suffers suppression only in a small
degree. The play with thoughts cannot be motivated through such pleas-
ure: it has suffered a very energetic suppression and the pleasure which
it can give is only the pleasure of released inhibitions. Accordingly one
may say that wit-pleasure shows a kernel of the original play-pleasure and

727

a shell of removal-pleasure. Naturally we do not grant that the pleasure
in nonsense-
wit is due to the fact that we have succeeded in making non-
sense despite the suppression, while we do notice that the play with words
gives us pleasure. Nonsense, which has remained fixed in thought-
wit, ac-
quires secondarily the function of stimulating our attention through con-
fusion; it serves as a reinforcement of the effect of wit, but only when it is
insistent, so that the confusion can anticipate the intellect by a definite
fraction of time. That nonsense in wit may also be employed to represent
a judgment contained within the thought has been demonstrated by the
joke of Ike the artilleryman. But even this is not the primal signification
of nonsense in wit.

A series of wit-like productions for which we have no appropriate name,
but which may lay claim to the designation of “witty nonsense,” may
be added to the nonsense-jokes. They are very numerous, but I shall
cite only two examples: As the fish was served to a guest at the table
he put both hands twice into the mayonnaise and then ran them through
his hair. Being looked at by his neighbor with astonishment, he seemed
to have noticed his mistake and excused himself, saying, “Pardon me, I
thought it was spinach.”

Or: “Life is like a suspension bridge,” said the one. “How is that?”
asked the other. “How should I know?” was the answer.

These extreme examples produce an effect through the fact that they
give rise to the expectation of wit, so that one makes the effort to find
the hidden sense behind the nonsense. But none is found, they are really
nonsense. Under that deception, it was possible for one moment to liber-
ate the pleasure in nonsense. These witticisms are not altogether without
tendencies, they furnish the narrator a certain pleasure in that they de-
ceive and annoy the hearer. The latter then calms his anger by resolving
that he himself should take the place of the narrator.