139

IX

SYMPTOMATIC AND CHANCE ACTIONS

The actions described so far, in which we recognize the
execution of an unconscious intention, appeared as distur-
bances of other unintended actions, and hid themselves
under the pretext of awkwardness. Chance actions, which
we shall now discuss, differ from erroneously carried out
actions only in that they disdain the support of a conscious
intention and really need no pretext. They appear indepen-
dently and are accepted because one does not credit them
with any aim or purpose. We execute them “without
thinking anything of them,” “by mere chance,” “just to
keep the hands busy,” and we feel confident that such
information will be quite sufficient should one inquire as
to their significance. In order to enjoy the advantage of
this exceptional position these actions which no longer
claim awkwardness as an excuse must fulfil certain condi-
tions: they must not be striking, and their effects must be
insignificant.

I have collected a large number of such “chance actions”
from myself and others, and after thoroughly investigating
the individual examples, I believe that the name “symptomatic
actions” is more suitable. They give expression to something
which the actor himself does not suspect in them, and which
as a rule he has no intention of imparting to others, but
aims to keep to himself. Like the other phenomena considered
so far, they thus play the part of the symptoms.

The richest output of such chance or symptomatic actions
is above all obtained in the psychoanalytic treatment of
neurotics. I cannot deny myself the pleasure of showing
by two examples of this nature how far and how delicately
the determination of these plain occurrences are swayed

140

by unconscious-
thoughts. The line of demarcation between
the symptomatic actions and the erroneously carried out
actions is so indefinite that I could have disposed of these
examples in the preceding chapter.

(a) During the analysis a young woman reproduced this
idea which suddenly occurred to her. Yesterday while cutting
her nails “she had cut into the flesh while engaged in trimming
the cuticle.” This is of so little interest that we ask in
astonishment why it is at all remembered and mentioned,
and therefore come to the conclusion that we deal with a
symptomatic action. It was really the finger upon which
the wedding-
ring is worn which was injured through this
slight awkwardness. It happened, moreover, on her wedding-
day, which thus gives to the injury of the delicate skin a
very definite and easily guessed meaning. At the same
time she also related a dream which alluded to the awkward-
ness of her husband and her anesthesia as a woman. But
why did she injure the ring finger of her left hand when the
wedding-
ring is worn on the right? Her husband is a jurist,
a “Doctor of Laws” (Doktor der Rechte, literally a Doctor
of Rights), and her secret affection as a girl belonged to a
physician who was jokingly called Doktor der Linke (literally
Doctor of Left). Incidentally a left-
handed marriage has
a definite meaning.

(b) A single young woman relates: “Yesterday, quite
unintentionally, I tore a hundred-
dollar note in two pieces
and gave half to a woman who was visiting me. Is that,
too, a symptomatic action?” After closer investigation the
matter of the hundred-
dollar note elicited the following
associations: She dedicated a part of her time and her
fortune to charitable work. Together with another woman
she was taking care of the rearing of an orphan. The hundred
dollars was the contribution sent her by that woman, which
she enclosed in an envelope and provisionally deposited
on her writing-
desk.

The visitor was a prominent woman with whom she was

141

associated in another act of charity. This woman wished to note
the names of a number of persons to whom she could apply
for charitable aid. There was no paper, so my patient grasped
the envelope from her desk, and without thinking of its
contents tore it in two pieces, one of which she kept, in
order to have a duplicate list of names, and gave the other
to her visitor.

Note the harmlessness of this aimless occurrence. It is
known that a hundred-
dollar note suffers no loss in value
when it is torn, provided all the pieces are produced. That
the woman would not throw away the piece of paper was
assumed by the importance of the names on it, and there
was just as little doubt that she would return the valuable
content as soon as she noticed it.

But to what unconscious thought should this chance
action, which was made possible through forgetfulness, give
expression? The visitor in this case had a very definite
relation to my patient and myself. It was she who at one
time had recommended me as physician to the suffering
girl, and if I am not mistaken my patient considered herself
indebted for this advice. Should this halved hundred-
dollar note perhaps represent a fee for her mediation? That still
remained enigmatic.

But other material was added to this beginning. Several
days before a woman mediator of a different sort had inquired
of a relative whether the gracious young lady wished to make
the acquaintance of a certain gentleman, and that morning,
some hours before the woman’s visit, the wooing letter of
the suitor arrived, giving occasion for much mirth. When
therefore the visitor opened the conversation with inquiries
regarding the health of my patient, the latter could well
have thought: “You certainly found me the right doctor,
but if you could assist me in obtaining the right husband
(and a child) I should be still more grateful.”

Both mediators became fused into one in this repressed
thought, and she handed the visitor the fee which her fantasy

142

was ready to give the other. This resolution became perfectly
convincing when I add that I had told her of such chance
of symptomatic actions only the previous evening. She
then took advantage of the next occasion to produce an
analogous action.

We can undertake a grouping of these extremely frequent
chance and symptomatic actions according to their occur-
rence as habitual, regular under certain circumstances, and
as isolated ones. The first group (such as playing with the
watchchain, fingering one’s beard, and so on), which can
almost serve as a characteristic of the person concerned,
is related to the numerous tic movements, and certainly
deserves to be dealt with in connection with the latter. In
the second group I place the playing with one’s cane, the
scribbling with one’s pencil, the jingling of coins in one’s
pocket, kneading dough and other plastic materials, all sorts
of handling of one’s clothing, and many other actions of
the same order.

These playful occupations during psychic treatment
regularly conceal sense and meaning to which other expres-
sion is denied. Generally the person in question knows
nothing about it; he is unaware whether he is doing the
same thing or whether he has imitated certain modifications
in his customary playing, and he also fails to see or hear
the effects of these actions. For example, he does not hear
the noise which is produced by the jingling of coins, and
he is astonished and incredulous when his attention is called
to it. Of equal significance to the physician, and worthy
of his observation, is everything that one does with his
clothing often without noticing it. Every change in the
customary attire, every little negligence, such as an un-
fastened button, every trace of exposure means to express
something that the wearer of the apparel does not wish to
say directly, usually he is entirely unconscious of it.

The interpretation of these trifling chance actions, as well
as the proof for their interpretation, can be demonstrated

143

every time with sufficient certainty from the surrounding
circumstances during the treatment, from the themes under
discussion, and from the ideas that come to the surface
when attention is directed to the seeming accident. Because
of this connection I will refrain from supporting my assertions
by reporting examples with their analyses; but I mention
these matters because I believe that they have the same
meaning in normal persons as in my patients.

I cannot, however, refrain from showing by at least one
example how closely an habitually accomplished symbolic
action may be connected with the most intimate and impor-
tant part of the life of a normal individual.¹⁾

“As Professor Freud has taught us, the symbolism in
the infantile life of the normal plays a greater rôle than was
expected from earlier psychoanalytic experiences. In view
of this the following brief analysis may be of general interest,
especially on account of its medical aspects.

“A doctor on rearranging his furniture in a new house
came across a straight, wooden stethoscope, and, after
pausing to decide where he should put it, was impelled to
place it on the side of his writing-
desk in such a position
that it stood exactly between his chair and the one reserved
for his patients. The act in itself was certainly odd, for in
the first place the straight stethoscope served no purpose,
as he invariably used a binaural one; and in the second place
all his medical apparatus and instruments were always kept
in drawers, with the sole exception of this one. However,
he gave no thought to the matter until one day it was
brought to his notice by a patient who had never seen a
wooden stethoscope, asking him what it was. On being
told, she asked why he kept it there. He answered in an
offhand way that that place was as good as any other.
This, however, started him thinking, and he wondered
whether there had been an unconscious motive in his action.

¹⁾“Beitrag zur Symbolik im Alltag von Ernest Jones,” Zentralb.
f. Psychoanalyse, i. 3, 1911.

144

Being interested in the psychoanalytic method, he asked
me to investigate the matter.

“The first memory that occurred to him was the fact
that when a medical student he had been struck by the
habit his hospital interne had of always carrying in his hand
a wooden stethoscope on his ward visits, although he never
used it. He greatly admired this interne, and was much
attached to him. Later on, when he himself became an
interne he contracted the same habit, and would feel very
uncomfortable if by mistake he left the room without having
the instrument to swing in his hand. The aimlessness of the
habit was shown, not only by the fact that the only stetho-
scope he ever used was a binaural one, which he carried in
his pocket, but also in that it was continued when he was a
surgical interne and never needed any stethoscope at all.

“From this it was evident that the idea of the instrument
in question had in some way or other become invested
with a greater psychic significance than normally belongs
to it—in other words, that to the subject it stood for more
than it does for other people. The idea must have got
unconsciously associated with some other one, which it
symbolized, and from which it derived its additional fulness
of meaning. I will forestall the rest of the analysis by saying
what this secondary idea was—namely, a phallic one; the
way in which this curious association had been formed will
presently be related. The discomfort he experienced in
hospital on missing the instrument, and the relief and
assurance the presence of it gave him, was related to what
is known as a ‘castration-
complex’—namely, a childhood
fear, often continued in a disguised form into adult life,
lest a private part of his body should be taken away from
him, just as playthings so often were. The fear was due
to paternal threats that it would be cut off if he were not
a good boy, particularly in a certain direction. This is a
very common complex, and accounts for a great deal of
general nervousness and lack of confidence in later years.

145

“Then came a number of childhood memories relating
to his family doctor. He had been strongly attached to this
doctor as a child, and during the analysis long-
buried memories were recovered of a double phantasy he had in
his fourth year concerning the birth of a younger sister—
namely, that she was the child (1) of himself and his mother,
the father being relegated to the background, and (2) of
the doctor and himself; in this he thus played both a masculine
and feminine part.¹ At the time, when his curiosity was
being aroused by the event, he could not help noticing the
prominent share taken by the doctor in the proceedings, and
the subordinate position occupied by the father: the signifi-
cance of this for his later life will presently be pointed out.

“The stethoscope association was formed through many
connections. In the first place, the physical appearance of
the instrument—a straight, rigid, hollow tube, having a
small bulbous summit at one extremity and a broad base
at the other—and the fact of its being the essential part
of the medical paraphernalia, the instrument with which
the doctor performed his magical and interesting feats, were
matters which attracted his boyish attention. He had had
his chest repeatedly examined by the doctor at the age of
six, and distinctly recollected the voluptuous sensation of
feeling the latter’s head near him pressing the wooden
stethoscope into his chest, and of the rhythmic to-and-fro
respiratory movement. He had been struck by the doctor’s
habit of carrying his stethoscope inside his hat; he found
it interesting that the doctor should carry his chief instrument
concealed about his person, always handy when he went
to see patients, and that he only had to take off his hat
(i.e., a part of his clothing) and ‘pull it out.’ At the age
of eight he was impressed by being told by an older boy
that it was the doctor’s custom to get into bed with his women

¹Psychoanalytic research, with the penetration of infantile
amnesia, has shown that this apparent precocity is a less abnormal
occurrence than was previously supposed.

146

patients. It is certain that the doctor, who was young and
handsome, was extremely popular among the women of
the neighbourhood, including the subject’s own mother.
The doctor and his ‘instrument’ were therefore the objects
of great interest throughout his boyhood.

“It is probable that, as in many other cases, unconscious
identification with the family doctor had been a main motive
in determining the subject’s choice of profession. It was
here doubly conditioned (1) by the superiority of the doctor
on certain interesting occasions to the father, of whom the
subject was very jealous, and (2) by the doctor’s knowledge
of forbidden topics¹⁾ and his opportunity for illicit indulgence.
The subject admitted that he had on several occasions
experienced erotic temptations in regard to his women
patients; he had twice fallen in love with one, and finally
had married one.

“The next memory was of a dream, plainly of a homo-
sexual-masochistic nature; in it a man, who proved to be
a replacement figure of the family doctor, attacked the subject
with a ‘sword.’ The idea of a sword, as is so frequently
the case in dreams, represented the same idea that was
mentioned above to be associated with that of a wooden
stethoscope. The thought of a sword reminded the subject
of the passage in the Nibelung Saga, where Sigurd sleeps
with his naked sword (Gram) between him and Brunhilda,
an incident that had always greatly struck his imagination.

“The meaning of the symptomatic act now at last became
clear. The subject had placed his wooden stethoscope
between him and his patients, just as Sigurd had placed
his sword (an equivalent symbol) between him and the
maiden he was not to touch. The act was a compromise-
formation; it served both to gratify in his imagination the
repressed wish to enter into nearer relations with an
attractive patient (interposition of phallus), and at the same

¹⁾The term “medical questions” is a common periphrasis for
“sexual questions.”

147

time to remind him that this wish was not to become a
reality (interposition of sword). It was, so to speak, a charm
against yielding to temptation.

“I might add that the following passage from Lord Lytton’s
Richelieu made a great impression on the boy:—

‘Beneath the rule of men entirely great
The pen is mightier than the sword,’¹⁾

and that he became a prolific writer and uses an unusually
large fountain-
pen. When I asked him what need he had
of this pen, he replied in a characteristic manner, ‘I have
so much to express.’

“This analysis again reminds us of the profound views
that are afforded us in the psychic life through the ‘harmless’
and ‘senseless’ actions, and how early in life the tendency
to symbolization develops.”

I can also relate an experience from my psychotherapeutic
practice in which the hand, playing with a mass of bread-
crumbs, gave evidence of an eloquent declaration. My
patient was a boy not yet thirteen years of age, who had
been very hysterical for two years. I finally took him for
psychoanalytic treatment, after a lengthy stay at a hydro-
therapeutic institution had proved futile. My supposition
was that he must have had sexual experiences, and that,
corresponding to his age, he had been troubled by sexual
questions; but I was cautious about helping him with
explanations as I wished to test further my assumption. I
was therefore curious as to the manner in which the desired
material would evince itself in him.

One day it struck me that he was rolling something
between the fingers of his right hand; he would thrust it
into his pocket and there continue playing with it, then
would draw it out again, and so on. I did not ask what
he had in his hand; but as he suddenly opened his hand
he showed it to me. It was bread-crumbs kneaded into a
mass. At the next session he again brought along a mass,

¹⁾Cf. Oldham’s “I wear my pen as others do their sword.”

148

and in the course of our conversation, although his eyes
were closed, modelled a figure with an incredible rapidity
which excited my interest. Without doubt it was a manikin
like the crudest prehistoric idols, with a head, two arms,
two legs, and an appendage between the legs which he drew
out to a long point.

This was scarcely completed when he kneaded the manikin
together again: later he allowed it to remain, but modelled
an identical appendage on the flat of the back and on other
parts in order to veil the meaning of the first. I wished to
show him that I had understood him, but at the same time
I wanted to deprive him of the evasion that he had thought
of nothing while actively forming these figures. With this
intention I suddenly asked him whether he remembered the
story of the Roman king who gave his son’s envoy a panto-
mimic answer in his garden.

The boy did not wish to recall what he must have learned
so much more recently than I. He asked if that was the
story of the slave on whose bald skull the answer was written.
I told him, “No, that belonged to Greek history,” and
related the following: “King Tarquinius Superbus had
induced his son Sextus to steal into a Latin city. The son,
who had later obtained a foothold in the city, sent a messenger
to the king asking what steps he should take next. The
king gave no answer, but went into his garden, had the
question repeated there, and silently struck off the heads
of the largest and most beautiful poppies. All that the
messenger could do was to report this to Sextus, who under-
stood his father, and caused the most distinguished citizens
of the city to be removed by assassination.”

While I was speaking the boy stopped kneading, and as
I was relating what the king did in his garden, I noticed
that at the words “silently struck” he tore off the head of
the manikin with a movement as quick as lightning. He
therefore understood me, and showed that he was also
understood by me. Now I could question him directly,

149

SYMPTOMATIC AND CHANCE ACTIONS

and gave him the information that he desired, and in a
short time the neurosis came to an end.

The symptomatic actions which we observe in inexhaustible
abundance in healthy as well as in nervous people are worthy
of our interest for more than one reason. To the physician
they often serve as valuable indications for orienting himself
in new or unfamiliar conditions; to the keen observer they
often betray everything, occasionally even more than he
cares to know. He who is familiar with its application
sometimes feels like King Solomon, who, according to the
Oriental legend, understood the language of animals.

One day I was to examine a strange young man at his
mother’s home. As he came towards me I was attracted
by a large stain on his trousers, which by its peculiar stiff
edges I recognized as one produced by albumen. After a
moment’s embarrassment the young man excused this stain
by remarking that he was hoarse and therefore drank a
raw egg, and that some of the slippery white of the egg
had probably fallen on his clothes. To confirm his state-
ments he showed the eggshell which could still be seen on
a small plate in the room. The suspicious spot was thus
explained in this harmless way; but as his mother left us
alone I thanked him for having so greatly facilitated the
diagnosis for me, and without further procedure I took
as the topic of our discussion his confession that he was
suffering from the effects of masturbation.

Another time I called on a woman as rich as she was
miserly and foolish, who was in the habit of giving the
physician the task of working his way through a heap of
her complaints before he could reach the simple cause of
her condition. As I entered she was sitting at a small table
engaged in arranging silver dollars in little piles: as she
rose she tumbled some of the pieces of money to the floor.
I helped her pick them up, but interrupted the recitation of
her misery by remarking: “Has your good son-in-law been
spending so much of your money again?” She bitterly

150

denied this, only to relate a few moments later the lamentable
story of the aggravation caused by her son-
in-
law’s extrava-
gances. And she has not sent for me since. I cannot main-
tain that one always makes friends of those to whom he
tells the meaning of their symptomatic actions.

He who observes his fellow-men while at table will be
able to verify in them the nicest and most instructive
symptomatic actions.

Dr. Hans Sachs relates the following:—

“I happened to be present when an elderly couple related
to me partook of their supper. The lady had stomach
trouble and was forced to follow a strict diet. A roast was
put before the husband, and he requested his wife, who was
not allowed to partake of this food, to give him the mustard.
The wife opened the closet and took out the small bottle
of stomach drops, and placed it on the table before her
husband. Between the barrel-shaped mustard-glass and the
small drop-bottle there was naturally no similarity through
which the mishandling could be explained; yet the wife
only noticed the mistake after her husband laughingly called
her attention to it. The sense of this symptomatic action
needs no explanation.”

For an excellent example of this kind which was very
skilfully utilized by the observer, I am indebted to Dr.
Bernh. Dattner (Vienna):—

“I dined in a restaurant with my colleague H., a doctor
of philosophy. He spoke about the injustice done to proba-
tionary students, and added that even before he finished
his studies he was placed as secretary to the ambassador,
or rather the extraordinary plenipotentiary Minister to Chili.
‘But,’ he added, ‘the minister was afterwards transferred,
and I did not make any effort to meet the newly appointed.’
While uttering the last sentence he was lifting a piece of
pie to his mouth, but he let it drop as if out of awkward-
ness. I immediately grasped the hidden sense of this sympto-
matic action, and remarked to my colleague, who was

151

unacquainted with psychoanalysis, ‘You really allowed a
very choice morsel to slip from you.’ He did not realize,
however, that my words could equally refer to his sympto-
matic action, and he repeated the same words I uttered
with a peculiarly agreeable and surprising vividness, as if
I had actually taken the words from his mouth: ‘It was
really a very choice morsel that I allowed to get away from
me.’ He then followed this remark with a detailed descrip-
tion of his clumsiness, which has cost him this very
remunerative position.

“The sense of this symbolic action becomes clearer if we
remember that my colleague had scruples about telling me,
almost a perfect stranger, concerning his precarious material
situation, and his repressed thought took on the mask of
symptomatic action which expressed symbolically what was
meant to be concealed, and the speaker thus got relief from
his unconscious.”

That the taking away or taking along things without any
apparent intention may prove to be senseful may be shown
by the following examples.

1. Dr. B. Dattner relates: “An acquaintance paid the
first after-marriage visit to a highly regarded lady friend
of his youth. He told me of this visit and expressed his
surprise at the fact that he failed in his resolution to visit
with her only a short time, and then reported to me a rather
strange faulty act which happened to him there.

“The husband of this friend, who took part in the
conversation, was looking for a box of matches which he
was sure was on the table when he came there. My acquain-
tance, too, looked through his pockets to ascertain whether
he had not put it in his pocket, but without avail. Some
time later he actually found it in his pocket, and was struck
by the fact that there was only one match in the box.

“A dream a few days later showing the box symbolism
in reference to the friend of his youth confirmed my explana-
tion. With the symptomatic action my acquaintance meant

152

to announce his priority-right and the exclusiveness of his
possession (it contained only one match).”

Dr. Hans Sachs relates the following: “Our cook is very
fond of a certain kind of pie. There is no possible doubt
about this, as it is the only kind of pastry which she always
prepares well. One Sunday she brought this pie to the
table, took it off the pie-plate, and proceeded to remove
the dishes used in the former course, but on the top of this
pile she placed the pie, and disappeared with it into the
kitchen. We first thought that she had something to improve
on the pie, but as she failed to appear my wife rang the
bell and asked, ‘Betty, what happened to the pie?’ to which
the girl answered, without comprehending the question,
‘How is that?’ We had to call her attention to the fact
that she carried the pie back to the kitchen. She had put
it on the pile of dishes, taken it out, and put it away ‘without
noticing it.’

“The next day, when we were about to consume the rest
of the pie, my wife noticed that there was as much of it
as we had left the day before—that is, the girl had disdained
to eat the portion of her favourite dish which was rightly
hers. Questioned why she did not eat the pie, she answered,
somewhat embarrassed, that she did not care for it.

“The infantile attitude is distinctly noticeable on both
occasions—first the childish insatiableness in refusing to
share with anybody the object of her wishes, then the re-
action of spite which is just as childish: ‘If you grudge
it to me, keep it for yourself, I want nothing of it.’”

Chance or symptomatic actions occurring in affairs of
married life have often a most serious significance, and
could lead those who do not concern themselves with the
psychology of the unconscious to a belief in omens. It is
not an auspicious beginning if a young woman loses her
wedding-ring on her wedding-tour, even if it were only
mislaid and soon found.

I know a woman, now divorced, who in the management

153

of her business affairs frequently signed her maiden name
many years before she actually resumed it.

Once I was the guest of a newly married couple and heard
the young woman laughingly relate her latest experience,
how, on the day succeeding her return from the wedding
tour she had sought out her single sister in order to go
shopping with her as in former times, while her husband
was attending business. Suddenly she noticed a man on
the opposite side of the street; nudging her sister she said,
“Why, that is surely Mr. L.” She forgot that for some weeks
this man had been her husband. I was chilled at this tale,
but I did not dare draw any inferences. The little story
came back to me only several years later, after this marriage
had ended most unhappily.

The following observation, which could as well have found
a place among the examples of forgetting, was taken from
a noteworthy work published in French by A. Maeder.¹

“Une dame nous racontait récemment qu’elle avait oublié
d’essayer sa robe de noce et s’en souvint la veille du mariage,
à huit heures du soir, la couturière désespérait de voir sa
cliente. Ce détail suffit à montrer que la fiancée ne se
sentait pas très heureuse de porter une robe d’épouse, elle
cherchait à oublier cette représentation pénible. Elle est
aujourd’hui . . . divorcée.”

A friend who has learned to observe signs related to me
that the great actress Eleanora Duse introduces a sympto-
matic action into one of her rôles which shows very nicely
from what depth she draws her acting. It is a drama dealing
with adultery; she has just been discussing with her husband
and now stands soliloquizing before the seducer makes his
appearance. During this short interval she plays with her
wedding-ring, she pulls it off, replaces it, and finally takes
it off again. She is now ready for the other.

I know of an elderly man who married a young girl, and

¹Maeder, “Contribution à la psychologie de la vie quoti-
dienne,” Arch. des psychologie, T. vi. 1906.

154

instead of starting at once on his wedding tour he decided
to spend the night in a hotel. Scarcely had they reached the
hotel, when he noticed with fright that he was without his
wallet, in which he had the entire sum of money for the
wedding tour; he must have mislaid or lost it. He was still
able to reach his servant by telephone; the latter found the
missing article in the coat discarded for the travelling clothes
and brought it to the hotel to the waiting bridegroom, who
had thus entered upon his marriage without means.

It is consoling to think that the “losing of objects” by
people is merely an unsuspected extension of a symptomatic
action, and is thus welcome at least to the secret intention
of the loser. Often it is only an expression of slight apprecia-
tion of the lost article, a secret dislike for the same, or
perhaps for the person from whom it came, or the desire
to lose this object was transferred to it from other and
more important objects through symbolic association. The
loss of valuable articles serves as an expression of diverse
feelings; it may either symbolically represent a repressed
thought—that is, it may bring back a memory which one
would rather not hear—or it may represent a sacrifice to
the obscure forces of fate, the worship of which is not yet
entirely extinct even with us.¹⁾

¹⁾Here is another small collection of various symptomatic
actions in normal and neurotic persons. An elderly colleague
who does not like to lose at cards had to pay one evening a large
sum of money in consequence of his losses; he did this without
complaint, but with a peculiar constrained temper. After his
departure it was discovered that he had left at this place practically
everything he had with him, spectacles, cigar-case, and handker-
chief. That would be readily translated into the words: “You
robbers, you have nicely plundered me.” A man who suffers
from occasional sexual impotence, which has its origin in the
intimacy of his infantile relations to his mother, relates that he
is in the habit of embellishing pamphlets and notes with an S, the
initial of his mother’s name. He cannot bear the idea of having
letters from home come in contact with other unsanctified corres-
pondence, and therefore finds it necessary to keep the former
separate. A young woman suddenly flings open the door of the
consulting-room while her predecessor is still present. She

155

SYMPTOMATIC AND CHANCE ACTIONS

The following examples will illustrate these statements
concerning the losing of objects:—

Dr. B. Dattner states: “A colleague related to me that
he lost his steel pencil which he had had for over two years,
and which, on account of its superior quality, was highly
prized by him. Analysis elicited the following facts: The
day before he had received a very disagreeable letter from
his brother-in-law, the concluding sentence of which read:
‘At present I have neither the desire nor the time to assist
you in your carelessness and laziness.’ The effect connected
with this letter was so powerful that the next day he promptly
sacrificed the pencil which was a present from this brother-in-
law in order not to be burdened with his favours.”

Brill reports the following example: “A doctor took
exception to the following statement in my book, ‘We
never lose what we really want’ (Psychoanalysis, its Theories
excused herself on the ground of “thoughtlessness”; it soon came
to light that she demonstrated her curiosity which caused her at
an earlier time to intrude into the bedroom of her parents. Girls
who are proud of their beautiful hair know so well how to manipu-
late combs and hairpins, that in the midst of conversation their
hair becomes loosened. During the treatment (in a reclining posi-
tion) some men scatter change from their pockets and thus pay
for the hour of treatment; the amount scattered is in porportion
to their estimation of the work. Whoever forgets articles in the
doctor’s office, such as eye-glasses, gloves, handbags, generally
indicates that he cannot tear himself away and is anxious to return
soon. Ernest Jones says: “One can almost measure the success
with which a physician is practising psychotherapy, for instance,
by the size of the collection of umbrellas, handkerchiefs, purses,
and so on, that he could make in a month. The slightest habits
and acts performed with a minimum of attention, such as the wind-
ing of a clock before retiring to sleep, the putting out of lights
before leaving the room, and similar actions, are occasionally
subject to disturbances which clearly demonstrate the influence
of the unconscious complex, and what is thought to be the strongest
“habits.”

In the journal Cœnobium, Maeder relates about a hospital
physician who, on account of an important matter, desired to get
to the city that evening, although he was on duty and had no right
to leave the hospital. On his return he noticed to his surprise
that there was a light in his room. On leaving the room he had

156

and Practical Application, p. 214). His wife, who is very
interested in psychologic subjects, read with him the chapter
on “Psychopathology of Everyday Life”; they were both
very much impressed with the novelty of the ideas, and so
on, and were very willing to accept most of the statements.
He could not, however, agree with the above-
given statement because, as he said to his wife, ‘I surely did not wish to
lose my knife.’ He referred to a valuable knife given to
him by his wife, which he highly prized, the loss of which
caused him much pain.

“It did not take his wife very long to discover the solution
for this loss in a manner to convince them both of the
accuracy of my statement. When she presented him with
this knife he was a bit loath to accept it. Although he con-
sidered himself quite emancipated, he nevertheless enter-
tained some superstition about giving or accepting a knife

forgotten to put it out, something that had never happened before.
But he soon grasped the motive of this forgetting. The hospital
superintendent who lived in the same house must have concluded
from the light in the room that he was at home. A man over-
burdened with worries and subject to occasional depressions
assured me that he regularly forgot to wind his watch on those
evenings when life seemed too hard and unfriendly. In this
omission to wind his watch he symbolically expressed that it was
a matter of indifference to him whether he lived to see the next
day. Another man who was personally unknown to me wrote:
“Having been struck by a terrible misfortune, life appeared
so harsh and unsympathetic, that I imagined that I had not
sufficient strength to live to see the next day. I then noticed that
I never omitted before I had been in the habit of doing it regularly
before retiring in an almost mechanical and unconscious manner.
It was only very seldom that I thought of it, and that happened when
I had something important for the next day which held my interest.
“Should this be considered a symptomatic action? I really
cannot explain it.” Whoever will take the trouble, like Jung
(The Psychology of Dementia Præcox, translated by Peterson and
Brill), or Maeder (“Une voie nouvelle en Psychologie—Freud et
son école,” Cœnobium, Lugano, 1906), to pay attention to melodies
which one hums to himself aimlessly and unconsciously, will regu-
larly discover the relation of the melody’s text to a theme which
occupies the person at that time.

157

as a gift, because it is said that a knife cuts friendship.
He even remarked this to his wife, who only laughed
at his superstition. He had the knife for years before it
disappeared.

“Analysis brought out the fact that the disappearance
of the knife was directly connected with a period when there
were violent quarrels between himself and his wife, which
threatened to end in separation. They lived happily together
until his step-daughter (it was his second marriage) came to
live with them. His daughter was the cause of many mis-
understandings, and it was at the height of these quarrels
that he lost the knife.

“The unconscious activity is very nicely shown in this
symptomatic action. In spite of his apparent freedom from
superstition, he still unconsciously believed that a donated
knife may cut friendship between the persons concerned.
The losing of it was simply an unconscious defence against
losing his wife, and by sacrificing the knife he made the
superstitious ban impotent.”

In a lengthy discussion and with the aid of dream analysis¹⁾
Otto Rank made clear the sacrificial tendency with its deep-
reaching motivation. It must be said that just such sympto-
matic actions often give us access to the understanding
of the intimate psychic life of the person.

Of the many isolated chance-actions, I will relate one
example which showed a deeper meaning even without
analysis. This example clearly explains the conditions under
which such symptoms may be produced most casually, and
also shows that an observation of practical importance may
be attached to it. During a summer tour it happened that
I had to wait several days at a certain place for the arrival
of my travelling companions. In the meantime I made the
acquaintance of a young man, who also seemed lonely and
was quite willing to join me. As we lived at the same hotel

¹⁾“Das Verlieren als Symptom-
handlung,” Zentralb. f. Psycho-
analyse, i. 10–11.

158

it was quite natural that we should take all our meals and
our walks together.

On the afternoon of the third day he suddenly informed
me that he expected his wife to arrive on that evening’s
express train. My psychologic interest was now aroused,
as it had already struck me that that morning that my com-
panion rejected my proposal to make a long excursion,
and in our short walk he objected to a certain path as too
steep and dangerous. During our afternoon walk he suddenly
thought that I must be hungry and insisted that I should
not delay my evening meal on his account, that he would
not sup before his wife’s arrival. I understood the hint
and seated myself at the table while he went to the station.

The next morning we met in the foyer of the hotel. He
presented me to his wife, and added, “Of course, you will
breakfast with us?” I had to attend first to a small matter
in the next street, but assured him that I would return
shortly. Later, as I entered the breakfast-
room, I noticed
that the couple were at a small table near the window, both
seated on the same side of it. On the opposite side there
was only one chair, which was covered, however, with a
man’s large and heavy coat. I understood well the meaning
of this unintentional, none the less expressive, disposition
of the coat. It meant this: “There is no room for you here,
you are superfluous now.”

The man did not notice that I remained standing before
the table, being unable to take the seat, but his wife noticed
it, and quickly nudged her husband and whispered: “Why,
you have covered the gentleman’s place with your coat.”

These as well as other similar experiences have caused
me to think that the actions executed unintentionally must
inevitably become the source of misunderstanding in human
relations. The perpetrator of the act, who is unaware of
any associated intention, takes no account of it, and does
not hold himself responsible for it. On the other hand,
the second party, having regularly utilized even such acts

159

SYMPTOMATIC AND CHANCE ACTIONS

as those of his partner to draw conclusions as to their purpose
and meaning, recognizes more of the stranger’s psychic
processes than the latter is ready either to admit or believe
that he has imparted. He becomes indignant when these
conclusions drawn from his symptomatic actions are held
up to him; he declares them baseless because he does not
see any conscious intention in their execution, and complains
of being misunderstood by the other. Close examination
shows that such misunderstandings are based on the fact
that the person is too fine an observer and understands
too much. The more “nervous” two persons are the more
readily will they give each other cause for disputes, which
are based on the fact that one as definitely denies about his
own person what he is sure to accept about the other.

And this is, indeed, the punishment for the inner dis-
honesty to which people grant expression under the guise
of “forgetting,” of erroneous actions and accidental emotions,
a feeling which they would do better to confess to themselves
and others when they can no longer control it. As a matter
of fact it can be generally affirmed that every one is con-
tinually practising psychoanalysis on his neighbours, and
consequently learns to know them better than each individual
knows himself. The road following the admonition γνῶθι
σεαυτὸν leads through the study of one’s own apparently
casual commissions and omissions.