115

VIII
ERRONEOUSLY CARRIED-OUT ACTIONS

I SHALL give another passage from the above-mentioned
work of Meringer and Mayer (p. 98):
“Lapses in speech do not stand entirely alone. They
resemble the errors which often occur in our other activities
and are quite foolishly termed ‘forgetfulness.’”
I am therefore in no way the first to presume that there
is a sense and purpose behind the slight functional disturb-
ances of the daily life of healthy people.¹
If the lapse in speech, which is without doubt a motor
function, admits of such a conception, it is quite natural
to transfer to the lapses of our other motor functions the
same expectation. I have here formed two groups of cases;
all these cases in which the faulty effect seems to be the
essential element—that is, the deviation from the intention
—I denote as erroneously carried-out actions (Vergreifen);
the others, in which the entire action appears rather in-
expedient, I call “symptomatic and chance actions.” But
no distinct line of demarcation can be formed; indeed, we
are forced to conclude that all divisions used in this treatise
are of only descriptive significance and contradict the inner
unity of the sphere of manifestation.
The psychologic understanding of erroneous actions
apparently gains little in clearness when we place it under
the head of “ataxia,” and especially under “cortical ataxia.”
Let us rather try to trace the individual examples to their
proper determinants. To do this I shall again resort to
personal observations, the opportunities for which I could
not very frequently find in myself.

¹A second publication of Meringer has later shown me how
very unjust I was to this author when I attributed to him so much
understanding.

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PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF EVERYDAY LIFE

(a) In former years, when I made more calls at the homes
of patients than I do at present, it often happened, when
I stood before a door where I should have knocked or
rung the bell, that I would pull the key of my own house
from my pocket, only to replace it, quite abashed. When
I investigated in what patients’ homes this occurred, I had
to admit that the faulty action—taking out my key instead
of ringing the bell—signified paying a certain tribute to the
house where the error occurred. It was equivalent to the
thought “Here I feel at home,” as it happened only where
I possessed the patient’s regard. (Naturally, I never rang
my own door-
bell.)

The faulty action was therefore a symbolic representation
of a definite thought which was not accepted consciously as
serious; for in reality the neurologist is well aware that the
patient seeks him only so long as he expects to be benefited
by him, and that his own excessively warm interest for his
patient is evinced only as a means of psychic treatment.

An almost identical repetition of my experience is des-
cribed by A. Maeder (“Contrib. à la psychopathologie de
la vie quotidienne,” Arch. de Psychol., vi., 1906):

“Il est
arrivé à chacun de sortir son trousseau, en arrivant à la
porte d’un ami particulièrement cher, de se surprendre pour
ainsi dire, en train d’ouvrir avec sa clé comme chez soi.
C’est un retard, puisqu’il faut sonner malgré tout, mais c’est
une preuve qu’on se sent—ou qu’on voudrait se sentir—
comme chez soi, auprès de cet ami.”

Jones speaks as follows about the use of keys:¹ “The
use of keys is a fertile source of occurrences of this kind,
of which two examples may be given. If I am disturbed
in the midst of some engrossing work at home by having
to go to the hospital to carry out some routine work, I am
very apt to find myself trying to open the door of my
laboratory there with the key of my desk at home, although
the two keys are quite unlike each other. The mistake

¹ Jones, loc. cit., p. 79.

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ERRONEOUSLY CARRIED-
OUT ACTIONS

unconsciously demonstrates where I would rather be at the
moment.

“Some years ago I was acting in a subordinate position
at a certain institution, the front door of which was kept
locked, so that it was necessary to ring for admission. On
several occasions I found myself making serious attempts
to open the door with my house key. Each one of the
permanent visiting staff, of which I aspired to be a member,
was provided with a key to avoid the trouble of having to
wait at the door. My mistake thus expressed the desire
to be on a similar footing and to be quite ‘at home’ there.”

A similar experience is reported by Dr. Hans Sachs of
Vienna: “I always carry two keys with me, one for the
door of my office and one for my residence. They are not
by any means easily interchanged, as the office key is at
least three times as big as my house key. Besides, I carry
the first in my trouser pocket and the other in my vest
pocket. Yet it often happened that I noticed on reaching
the door that while ascending the stairs I had taken out
the wrong key. I decided to undertake a statistical examina-
tion; as I was daily in about the same emotional state when
I stood before both doors, I thought that the interchanging
of the two keys must show a regular tendency, if they were
differently determined psychically. Observation of later
occurrences showed that I regularly took out my house key
before the office door. Only on one occasion was this re-
versed: I came home tired, knowing that I would find there
a guest. I made an attempt to unlock the door with the,
naturally too big, office key.”

(b) At a certain time twice a day for six years I was
accustomed to wait for admission before a door in the
second story of the same house, and during this long period
of time it happened twice (within a short interval) that I
climbed a story higher. On the first of these occasions
I was in an ambitious day-dream, which allowed me to
“mount always higher and higher.” In fact, at that time

118

I heard the door in question open as I put my foot on the
first step of the third flight. On the other occasion I again
went too far “engrossed in thought.” As soon as I became
aware of it, I turned back and sought to snatch the dominat-
ing fantasy; I found that I was irritated over a criticism of
my works, in which the reproach was made that I “always
went too far,” which I replaced by the less respectful
expression “climbed too high.”

(c) For many years a reflex hammer and a tuning-
fork lay side by side on my desk. One day I hurried off at the
close of my office-hours, as I wished to catch a certain
train, and, despite broad daylight, put the tuning-fork in
my coat pocket in place of the reflex hammer. My atten-
tion was called to the mistake through the weight of the
object drawing down my pocket. Any one unaccustomed
to reflect on such slight occurrences would without hesita-
tion explain the faulty action by the hurry of the moment,
and excuse it. In spite of that, I preferred to ask myself
why I took the tuning-fork instead of the hammer. The
haste could just as well have been a motive for carrying
out the action properly in order not to waste time over
the correction.

“Who last grasped the tuning-fork?” was the question
which immediately flashed through my mind. It happened
that only a few days ago an idiotic child, whose attention
to sensory impressions I was testing, had been so fascinated
by the tuning-fork that I found it difficult to tear it away
from him. Could it mean, therefore, that I was an idiot?
To be sure, so it would seem, as the next thought which
associated itself with the hammer was chamer (Hebrew for
“ass”).

But what was the meaning of this abusive language?
We must here inquire into the situation. I hurried to a
consultation at a place on the Western railroad to see a
patient who, according to the anamnesis which I received
by letter, had fallen from a balcony some months before,

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ERRONEOUSLY CARRIED-OUT ACTIONS

and since then had been unable to walk. The physician
who invited me wrote that he was still unable to say whether
he was dealing with a spinal injury or traumatic neurosis—
hysteria. That was what I was to decide. This could there-
fore be a reminder to be particularly careful in this delicate
differential diagnosis. As it is, my colleagues think that
hysteria is diagnosed far too carelessly where more serious
matters are concerned. But the abuse is not yet justified.
Yes, the next association was that the small railroad station
is the same place in which, some years previous, I saw a
young man who, after a certain emotional experience, could
not walk properly. At that time I diagnosed his malady as
hysteria, and later put him under psychic treatment; but it
afterward turned out that my diagnosis was neither incorrect
nor correct. A large number of the patient’s symptoms
were hysterical, and they promptly disappeared in the
course of treatment. But back of these there was a visible
remnant that could not be reached by therapy, and could
be referred only to a multiple sclerosis. Those who saw the
patient after me had no difficulty in recognizing the organic
affection. I could scarcely have acted or judged differently,
still the impression was that of a serious mistake; the promise
of a cure which I had given him could naturally not be kept.

The mistake in grasping the tuning-
hammer could therefore be translated into the following
words: “You fool, you ass, get yourself together this time,
and be careful not to diagnose again a case of hysteria
where there is an incurable disease, as you did in this place
years ago in the case of the poor man!” And fortunately
for this little analysis, even if unfortunately for my mood,
this same man, now having a very spastic gait, had been
to my office a few days before, one day after the examination
of the idiotic child.

We observe that this time it is the voice of self-
criticism which makes itself perceptible through the mistake in grasp-
ing. The erroneously carried-out action is specially suited

120

to express self-reproach. The present mistake attempts to
represent the mistake which was committed elsewhere.

(d) It is quite obvious that grasping the wrong thing may
also serve a whole series of other obscure purposes. Here
is a first example: It is very seldom that I break anything.
I am not particularly dexterous, but by virtue of the anatomic
integrity of my nervous and muscular apparatus there are
apparently no grounds in me for such awkward movements
with undesirable results. I can recall no object in my home
the counterpart of which I have ever broken. Owing to the
narrowness of my study it has often been necessary for me
to work in the most uncomfortable position among my
numerous antique clay and stone objects, of which I have
a small collection. So much is this true that onlookers have
expressed fear lest I topple down something and shatter it.
But it never happened. Then why did I brush to the floor
the cover of my simple inkwell so that it broke into pieces?

My inkstand is made of a flat piece of marble which is
hollowed out for the reception of the glass inkwell; the
inkwell has a marble cover with a knob of the same stone.
A circle of bronze statuettes with small terra-
cotta figures
is set behind this inkstand. I seated myself at the desk to
write, I made a remarkably awkward outward movement
with the hand holding the pen-
holder, and so swept the
cover of the inkstand, which already lay on the desk, to
the floor.

It is not difficult to find the explanation. Some hours
before my sister had been in the room to look at some of
my new acquisitions. She found them very pretty, and then
remarked: “Now the desk really looks very well, only the
inkstand does not match. You must get a prettier one.”
I accompanied my sister out and did not return for several
hours. But then, as it seems, I performed the execution of
the condemned inkstand.

Did I perhaps conclude from my sister’s words that she
intended to present me with a prettier inkstand on the next

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ERRONEOUSLY CARRIED-
OUT ACTIONS

festive occasion, and did I shatter the unsightly old one in
order to force her to carry out her signified intention? If
that be so, then my swinging motion was only apparently
awkward; in reality it was most skilful and designed, as it
understood how to avoid all the valuable objects located
near it.

I actually believe that we must accept this explanation for
a whole series of seemingly accidental awkward movements.
It is true that on the surface these seem to show something
violent and irregular, similar to spastic-
ataxic movements,
but on examination they seem to be dominated by some
intention, and they accomplish their aim with a certainty
that cannot be generally credited to conscious arbitrary
motions. In both characteristics, the force as well as the
sure aim, they show besides a resemblance to the motor
manifestations of the hysterical neurosis, and in part also
to the motor accomplishments of somnambulism, which
here as well as there point to the same unfamiliar modifica-
tion of the functions of innervation.

In latter years, since I have been collecting such observa-
tions, it has happened several times that I have shattered
and broken objects of some value, but the examination of
these cases convinced me that it was never the result of
accident or of my unintentional awkwardness. Thus, one
morning while in my bath-
robe and straw slippers I followed
a sudden impulse as I passed a room, and hurled a slipper
from my foot against the wall so that it brought down a
beautiful little marble Venus from its bracket. As it fell to
pieces I recited quite unmoved the following verse from
Busch:—

“Ach! Die Venus ist perdü—¹
Klickeradoms! von Medici!”

This crazy action and my calmness at the sight of the
damage is explained in the then existing situation. We had
a very sick person in the family, of whose recovery I had

¹Alas! The Venus of Medici is lost!

122

personally despaired. That morning I had been informed
that there was a great improvement; I know that I had
said to myself, “After all she will live.” My attack of
destructive madness served therefore as the expression of a
grateful feeling toward fate, and afforded me the oppor-
tunity of performing an “act of sacrifice,” just as if I had
vowed, “If she gets well I will give this or that as a sacrifice.”
That I chose the Venus of Medici as this sacrifice was only
gallant homage to the convalescent. But even to-day it is
still incomprehensible to me that I decided so quickly,
aimed so accurately, and struck no other object in close
proximity.

Another breaking, in which I utilized a penholder falling
from my hand, also signified a sacrifice, but this time it
was a pious offering to avert some evil. I had once allowed
myself to reproach a true and worthy friend for no other
reason than certain manifestations which I interpreted from
his unconscious activity. He took it amiss and wrote me
a letter in which he bade me not to treat my friends by
psycho-analysis. I had to admit that he was right and
appeased him with my answer. While writing this letter I
had before me my latest acquisition—a small, handsome
glazed Egyptian figure. I broke it in the manner mentioned,
and then immediately knew that I had caused this mischief
to avert a greater one. Luckily, both the friendship and the
figure could be so cemented that the break would not be
noticed.

A third case of breaking had a less serious connection;
it was only a disguised “execution,” to use an expression
from Th. Vischer’s Auch Einer, of an object that no longer
suited my taste. For quite a while I had carried a cane
with a silver handle; through no fault of mine the thin
silver plate was once damaged and poorly repaired. Soon
after the cane was returned I mirthfully used the handle
to angle for the leg of one of my children. In that way it
naturally broke, and I got rid of it.

123

The indifference with which we accept the resulting damage
in all these cases may certainly be taken as evidence for the
existence of an unconscious purpose in their execution.
(e) As can sometimes be demonstrated by analysis, the
dropping of objects or the overturning and breaking of
the same are very frequently utilized as the expression of
unconscious streams of thought, but more often they serve
to represent the superstitious or odd significances connected
therewith in popular sayings. The meanings attached to the
spilling of salt, the overturning of a wineglass, the sticking
of a knife dropped to the floor, and so on, are well known.
I shall discuss later the right to investigate such superstitious
interpretations; here I shall simply observe that the individual
awkward acts do not by any means always have the same
meaning, but, depending on the circumstances, they serve
to represent now this or that purpose.

Recently we passed through a period in my house during
which an unusual number of glass and china dishes were
broken. I myself largely contributed to this damage. This
little endemic was readily explained by the fact that it pre-
ceded the public betrothal of my eldest daughter. On such
festivities it is customary to break some dishes and utter
at the same time some felicitating expression. This custom
may signify a sacrifice or express any other symbolic sense.

When servants destroy fragile objects through dropping
them, we certainly do not think in the first place of a
psychologic motive for it; still, some obscure motives are
not improbable even here. Nothing lies farther from the
uneducated than the appreciation of art and works of art.
Our servants are dominated by a foolish hostility against
these productions, especially when the objects, whose worth
they do not realize, become a source of a great deal of
work for them. On the other hand, persons of the same
education and origin employed in scientific institutions often
distinguish themselves by great dexterity and reliability in
the handling of delicate objects, as soon as they begin to

124

identify themselves with their masters and consider them-
selves an essential part of the staff.

I shall here add the report of a young mechanical engineer,
which gives some insight into the mechanism of damaging
things.

“Some time ago I worked with many others in the
laboratory of the High School on a series of complicated
experiments on the subject of elasticity. It was a work
that we undertook of our own volition, but it turned out
that it took up more of our time than we expected. One day,
while going to the laboratory with F., he complained of losing
so much time, especially on this day, when he had so many
other things to do at home. I could only agree with him, and
he added half jokingly, alluding to an incident of the previous
week: ‘Let us hope that the machine will refuse to work, so
that we can interrupt the experiment and go home earlier.’

“In arranging the work, it happened that F. was assigned
to the regulation of the pressure valve, that is, it was his
duty carefully to open the valve and let the fluid under
pressure flow from the accumulator into the cylinder of the
hydraulic press. The leader of the experiment stood at the
manometer and called a loud ‘Stop !’ when the maximum
pressure was reached. At this command F. grasped the
valve and turned it with all his force— to the left (all valves,
without any exception, are closed to the right). This caused
a sudden full pressure in the accumulator of the press, and
as there was no outlet, the connecting pipe burst. This
was quite a trifling accident to the machine, but enough
to force us to stop our work for the day and go home.

“It is characteristic, moreover, that some time later, on
discussing this occurrence, my friend F. could not recall
the remark that I positively remember his having made.”

Similarly, to fall, to make a misstep, or to slip need not
always be interpreted as an entirely accidental miscarriage
of a motor action. The linguistic double meaning of these
expressions points to diverse hidden fantasies, which may

125

ERRONEOUSLY CARRIED-OUT ACTIONS

present themselves through the giving up of bodily equi-
librium. I recall a number of lighter nervous ailments in
women and girls which made their appearance after falling
without injury, and which were conceived as traumatic
hysteria as a result of the shock of the fall. At that time I
already entertained the impression that these conditions had
a different connection, that the fall was already a prepara-
tion of the neurosis, and an expression of the same un-
conscious fantasies of sexual content which may be taken
as the moving forces behind the symptoms. Was not this
very thing meant in the proverb which says, “When a
maiden falls, she falls on her back?”

We can also add to these mistakes the case of one who
gives a beggar a gold piece in place of a copper or a silver
coin. The solution of such mishandling is simple: it is an
act of sacrifice designed to mollify fate, to avert evil, and
so on. If we hear a tender mother or aunt express concern
regarding the health of a child, directly before taking a
walk during which she displays her charity, contrary to her
usual habit, we can no longer doubt the sense of this appar-
ently undesirable accident. In this manner our faulty acts
make possible the practice of all those pious and superstitious
customs which must shun the light of consciousness, because
of the strivings against them of our unbelieving reason.

(f) That accidental actions are really intentional will find
no greater credence in any other sphere than in sexual
activity, where the border between the intention and accident
hardly seems discernible. That an apparently clumsy move-
ment may be utilized in a most refined way for sexual
purposes I can verify by a nice example from my own
experience. In a friend’s house I met a young girl visitor
who excited in me a feeling of fondness which I had long
believed extinct, thus putting me in a jovial, loquacious,
and complaisant mood. At that time I endeavoured to find
out how this came about, as a year before this same girl
made no impression on me.

126

As the girl’s uncle, a very old man, entered the room,
we both jumped to our feet to bring him a chair which stood
in the corner. She was more agile than I and also nearer
the object, so that she was the first to take possession of
the chair. She carried it with its back to her, holding both
hands on the edge of the seat. As I got there later and
did not give up the claim to carrying the chair, I suddenly
stood directly back of her, and with both my arms was
embracing her from behind, and for a moment my hands
touched her lap. I naturally solved the situation as quickly
as it came about. Nor did it occur to anybody how dexter-
ously I had taken advantage of this awkward movement.

Occasionally I have had to admit to myself that the
annoying, awkward stepping aside on the street, whereby
for some seconds one steps here and there, yet always in
the same direction as the other person, until finally both
stop facing each other, that this “barring one’s way” re-
peats an ill-mannered, provoking conduct of earlier times
and conceals erotic purposes under the mask of awkward-
ness. From my psycho-analysis of neurotics I know that
the so-called naïveté of young people and children is fre-
quently only such a mask, employed in order that the
subject may say or do the indecent without restraint.

W. Stekel has reported similar observations in regard to
himself: “I entered a house and offered my right hand
to the hostess. In a most remarkable way I thereby loosened
the bow which held together her loose morning-gown. I
was conscious of no dishonourable intent, still I executed
this awkward movement with the agility of a juggler.”

(g) The effects which result from mistakes of normal
persons are, as a rule, of a most harmless nature. Just
for this reason it would be particularly interesting to find
out whether mistakes of considerable importance, which
could be followed by serious results, as, for example, those
of physicians or druggists, fall within the range of our
point of view.

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ERRONEOUSLY CARRIED-OUT ACTIONS

As I am seldom in a position to deal with active medical
matters, I can only report one mistake from my own experi-
ence. I treated a very old woman, whom I visited twice daily
for several years. My medical activities were limited to two
acts, which I performed during my morning visits: I dropped
a few drops of an eye lotion into her eyes and gave her a
hypodermic injection of morphine. I prepared regularly
two bottles—a blue one, containing the eye lotion, and a
white one, containing the morphine solution. While per-
forming these duties my thoughts were mostly occupied
with something else, for they had been repeated so often
that the attention acted as if free. One morning I noticed
that the automaton worked wrong; I had put the dropper
into the white instead of into the blue bottle, and had
dropped into the eyes the morphine instead of the lotion.
I was greatly frightened, but then calmed myself through
the reflection that a few drops of a two per cent. solution
of morphine would not likely do any harm even if left in
the conjunctival sac. The cause of the fright manifest-
ly belonged elsewhere.

In attempting to analyse the slight mistake I first thought
of the phrase, “to seize the old woman by mistake,” which
pointed out the short way to the solution. I had been im-
pressed by a dream which a young man had told me the
previous evening, the contents of which could be ex-
plained only on the basis of sexual intercourse with his own mother.¹
The strangeness of the fact that the Œdipus legend takes
no offence at the age of Queen Jocasta seemed to me to
agree with the assumption that in being in love with one’s
mother we never deal with the present personality, but with
her youthful memory picture carried over from our child-
hood. Such incongruities always show themselves where

¹The Œdipus dream as I was wont to call it, because it con-
tains the key to the understanding of the legend of King Œdipus.
In the text of Sophocles the relation of such a dream is put in the
mouth of Jocasta (cf. The Interpretation of Dreams, pp. 222–4,
etc.).

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PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF EVERYDAY LIFE

one fantasy fluctuating between two periods is made
conscious, and is then bound to one definite period.

Deep in thoughts of this kind, I came to my patient of
over ninety; I must have been well on the way to grasp the
universal character of the Œdipus fable as the correlation
of the fate which the oracle pronounces, for I made a
blunder in reference to or on the old woman. Here, again,
the mistake was harmless; of the two possible errors, taking
the morphine solution for the eye, or the eye lotion for the
injection, I chose the one by far the least harmful. The
question still remains open whether in mistakes in handling
things which may cause serious harm we can assume an
unconscious intention as in the cases here discussed.

The following case from Brill’s experience corroborates
the assumption that even serious mistakes are determined
by unconscious intentions: “A physician received a telegram
informing him that his aged uncle was very sick. In spite
of important family affairs at home he at once repaired to
that distant town because his uncle was really his father,
who had cared for him since he was one and a half years
old, when his own father had died. On reaching there he
found his uncle suffering from pneumonia, and, as the old
man was an octogenarian, the doctors held out no hope
for his recovery. ‘It was simply a question of a day or
two,’ was the local doctor’s verdict. Although a prominent
physician in a big city, he refused to co-
operate in the treat-
ment, as he found that the case was properly managed by
the local doctor, and he could not suggest anything to
improve matters.

“Since death was daily expected, he decided to remain
to the end. He waited a few days, but the sick man strug-
gled hard, and although there was no question of any
recovery, because of the many new complications which
had arisen, death seemed to be deferred for a while. One
night before retiring he went into the sick-
room and took
his uncle’s pulse. As it was quite weak, he decided not to

129

wait for the doctor, and administered a hypodermic injec-
tion. The patient grew rapidly worse and died within a
few hours. There was something strange in the last symp-
toms, and on later attempting to replace the tube of hypoder-
mic tablets into the case, he found to his consternation that
he had taken out the wrong tube, and instead of a small
dose of digitalis he had given a large dose of hyoscine.

“This case was related to me by the doctor after he read
my paper on the Œdipus Complex.¹ We agreed that this
mistake was determined not only by his impatience to get
home to his sick child, but also by an old resentment and
unconscious hostility toward his uncle (father).”

It is known that in the more serious cases of psychoneuroses
one sometimes finds self-mutilations as symptoms of the
disease. That the psychic conflict may end in suicide can
never be excluded in these cases. Thus I know from experi-
ence, which some day I shall support with convincing
examples, that many apparently accidental injuries happen-
ing to such patients are really self-inflicted. This is brought
about by the fact that there is a constantly lurking tendency
to self-punishment, usually expressing itself in self-reproach,
or contributing to the formation of a symptom, which skil-
fully makes use of an external situation. The required
external situation may accidentally present itself or the
punishment tendency may assist it until the way is open
for the desired injurious effect.

Such occurrences are by no means rare even in cases of
moderate severity, and they betray the portion of unconscious
intention through a series of special features—for example,
through the striking presence of mind which the patients
show in the pretended accidents.²

¹ New York Medical Journal, September, 1912. Reprinted in
large form as Chapter X of Psychanalysis, etc., Saunders, Phila-
delphia.

² The self-inflicted injury which does not entirely tend toward
self-annihilation has, moreover, no other choice in our present
state of civilization than to hide itself behind the accidental, or to

130

I will report exhaustively one in place of many such
examples from my professional experience. A young woman
broke her leg below the knee in a carriage accident so that
she was bedridden for weeks. The striking part of it was
the lack of any manifestation of pain and the calmness with
which she bore her misfortune. This calamity ushered in a
long and serious neurotic illness, from which she was finally
cured by psychotherapy. During the treatment I discovered
the circumstances surrounding the accident, as well as cer-
tain impressions which preceded it. The young woman
with her jealous husband spent some time on the farm of
her married sister, in company with her numerous other
brothers and sisters with their wives and husbands. One
evening she gave an exhibition of one of her talents before
this intimate circle; she danced artistically the “cancan,”
to the great delight of her relatives, but to the great annoy-
ance of her husband, who afterward whispered to her,
“Again you have behaved like a prostitute.” The words
took effect; we will leave it undecided whether it was just
on account of the dance. That night she was restless in
her sleep, and the next forenoon she decided to go out
driving. She chose the horses herself, refusing one team
and demanding another. Her youngest sister wished to
have her baby with its nurse accompany her, but she op-
posed this vehemently. During the drive she was nervous;
she reminded the coachman that the horses were getting
skittish, and as the fidgety animals really produced a mo-
mentary difficulty she jumped from the carriage in fright
and broke her leg, while those remaining in the carriage
were uninjured. Although after the disclosure of these
details we can hardly doubt that this accident was really
contrived, we cannot fail to admire the skill which forced
the accident to mete out a punishment so suitable to the

break through in a simulation of spontaneous illness. Formerly
it was a customary sign of mourning, at other times it expressed
itself in ideas of piety and renunciation of the world.

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ERRONEOUSLY CARRIED-OUT ACTIONS

crime. For as it happened “cancan” dancing with her
became impossible for a long time.

Concerning self-inflicted injuries of my own experience,
I cannot report anything in calm times, but under extra-
ordinary conditions I do not believe myself incapable of
such acts. When a member of my family complains that
he or she has bitten his tongue, bruised her finger, and so
on, instead of the expected sympathy I put the question,
“Why did you do that?” But I have most painfully squeezed
my thumb, after a youthful patient acquainted me during
the treatment with his intention (naturally not to be taken
seriously) of marrying my eldest daughter, while I knew
that she was then in a private hospital in extreme danger
of losing her life.

One of my boys, whose vivacious temperament was wont
to put difficulties in the management of nursing him in his
illness, had a fit of anger one morning because he was ordered
to remain in bed during the forenoon, and threatened to
kill himself: a way out suggested to him by the newspapers.
In the evening he showed me a swelling on the side of his
chest which was the result of bumping against the door
knob. To my ironical question why he did it, and what he
meant by it, the eleven-year-old child explained, “That was
my attempt at suicide which I threatened this morning.”
However, I do not believe that my views on self-
inflicted wounds were accessible to my children at that time.

Whoever believes in the occurrence of semi-
intentional self-inflicted injury—if this awkward expression be permitted
—will become prepared to accept through it the fact that
aside from conscious intentional suicide there also exists
semi-intentional annihilation—with unconscious intention—
which is capable of aptly utilizing a threat against life and
masking it as a casual mishap. Such mechanism is by no
means rare. For the tendency to self-destruction exists to
a certain degree in many more persons than in those who
bring it to completion. Self-inflicted injuries are, as a rule,

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a compromise between this impulse and the forces working
against it, and even where it really comes to suicide the
inclination has existed for a long time with less strength or
as an unconscious and repressed tendency.

Even suicide consciously committed chooses its time,
means, and opportunity; it is quite natural that unconscious
suicide should wait for a motive to take upon itself one
part of the causation and thus free it from its oppression
by taking up the defensive forces of the person.¹ These are
in no way idle discussions which I here bring up; more than
one case of apparently accidental misfortune (on a horse or
out of a carriage) has become known to me whose surround-
ing circumstances justified the suspicion of suicide.

For example, during an officers’ horse-race one of the
riders fell from his horse and was so seriously injured that
a few days later he succumbed to his injuries. His behaviour
after regaining consciousness was remarkable in more than
one way, and his conduct previous to the accident was still
more remarkable. He had been greatly depressed by the
death of his beloved mother, had crying spells in the society
of his comrades, and to his trusted friend had spoken of
the tædium vitæ. He had wished to quit the service in order

¹The case is then identical with a sexual attack on a woman,
in whom the attack of the man cannot be warded off through the
full muscular strength of the woman because a portion of the
unconscious feelings of the one attacked meets it with ready accept-
ance. To be sure, it is said that such a situation paralyses the
strength of a woman; we need only add the reasons for this paralysis.
Insofar the clever sentence of Sancho Panza, which he pronounced
as governor of his island, is psychologically unjust (Don Quixote,
vol. ii. chap. xlv.) A woman hauled before the judge a man who
was supposed to have robbed her of her honour by force of violence.
Sancho indemnified her with a full purse which he took from
the accused, but after the departure of the woman he gave the
accused permission to follow her and snatch the purse from her.
Both returned wrestling, the woman priding herself that the villain
was unable to possess himself of the purse. Thereupon Sancho
spoke: “Had you shown yourself so stout and valiant to defend
your body (nay, but half so much) as you have done to defend
your purse, the strength of Hercules could not have forced you.”

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to take part in a war in Africa which had no interest for
him.¹⁾ Formerly a keen rider, he had later evaded riding
whenever possible. Finally, before the horse-
race, from which
he could not withdraw, he expressed a sad foreboding,
which most expectedly in the light of our conception came
true. It may be contended that it is quite comprehensible
without any further cause that a person in such a state of
nervous depression cannot manage a horse as well as on
normal days. I quite agree with that, only I should like to
look for the mechanism of this motor inhibition through
“nervousness” in the intention of self-
destruction here
emphasized.

Dr. Ferenczi has left to me for publication the analysis
of an apparently accidental injury by shooting which he
explained as an unconscious attempt at suicide. I can only
agree with his deduction:—
“J. Ad., 22 years old, carpenter, visited me on the 18th
of January, 1908. He wished to know whether the bullet
which pierced his left temple March 20, 1907, could or
should be removed by operation. Aside from occasional,
not very severe, headaches, he felt quite well, also the
objective examination showed nothing besides the charac-
teristic powder wound on the left temple, so that I advised
against an operation. When questioned concerning the
circumstances of the case he asserted that he injured himself
accidentally. He was playing with his brother’s revolver,
and believing that it was not loaded he pressed it with his
left hand against the left temple (he is not left-
handed),
put his finger on the trigger, and the shot went off. There
were three bullets in the six-
shooter.

“I asked him how he came to carry the revolver, and he
answered that it was at the time of his army conscription,

¹⁾It is evident that the situation of a battlefield is such as to meet
the requirement of conscious suicidal intent which, nevertheless,
shuns the direct way. Cf. in Wallenstein the words of the Swedish
captain concerning the death of Max Piccolomini: “They say he
wished to die.”

134

that he took it to the inn the evening before because he
feared fights. At the army examination he was considered
unfit for service on account of varicose veins, which caused
him much mortification. He went home and played with
the revolver. He had no intention of hurting himself, but
the accident occurred. On further questioning whether he
was otherwise satisfied with his fortune, he answered with
a sigh, and related a love affair with a girl who loved him
in return, but nevertheless left him. She emigrated to America
out of sheer avariciousness. He wanted to follow her, but
his parents prevented him. His lady-
love left on the 20th
of January, 1907, just two months before the accident.

“Despite all these suspicious elements the patient insisted
that the shot was an ‘accident.’ I was firmly convinced,
however, that the neglect to find out whether the revolver
was loaded before he began to play with it, as well as the
self-
inflicted injury, were psychically determined. He was
still under the depressing effects of the unhappy love affair,
and apparently wanted ‘to forget everything’ in the army.
When this hope, too, was taken away from him he resorted
to playing with the weapon—that is, to an unconscious
attempt at suicide. The fact that he did not hold the revolver
in the right but in the left hand speaks conclusively in favour
of the fact that he was really only ‘playing’—that is, he did
not wish consciously to commit suicide.”

Another analysis of an apparently accidental self-
inflicted
wound, detailed to me by an observer, recalls the saying,
“He who digs a pit for others falls in himself.”¹⁾

“Mrs. X., belonging to a good middle-
class family, is
married and has three children. She is somewhat nervous,
but never needed any strenuous treatment, as she could
sufficiently adapt herself to life. One day she sustained a
rather striking though transitory disfigurement of her face
in the following manner: She stumbled in a street that

¹⁾“Selbstbestrafung wegen Abortus von Dr. J. E. G. van Em-
den,” Haag (Holland), Zentralb. f. Psychoanalyse, ii. 12.

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ERRONEOUSLY CARRIED-
OUT ACTIONS

was in process of repair and struck her face against the house
wall. The whole face was bruised, the eyelids blue and
œdematous, and as she feared that something might happen
to her eyes she sent for the doctor. After she was calmed
I asked her, ‘But why did you fall in such a manner?’
She answered that just before this accident she warned her
husband, who had been suffering for some months from a
joint affection, to be very careful in the street, and she often
had the experience that in some remarkable way those
things occurred to her against which she warned others.
“I was not satisfied with this as the determination of her
accident, and asked her whether she had not something else
to tell me. ‘Yes, just before the accident she noticed a nice
picture in a shop on the other side of the street, which she
suddenly desired as an ornament for her nursery, and wished
to buy it at once. She thereupon walked across to the shop
without looking at the street, stumbled over a heap of stones,
and fell with her face against the wall without making the
slightest effort to shield herself with her hands. The intention
to buy the picture was immediately forgotten, and she
walked home in haste.’
“‘But why were you not more careful?’ I asked.
“‘Oh!’ she answered, ‘perhaps it was only a punishment
for that episode which I confided to you!’
“‘Has this episode still bothered you?’
“‘Yes, later I regretted it very much; I considered myself
wicked, criminal, and immoral, but at the time I was almost
crazy with nervousness.’
“She referred to an abortion which was started by a quack
and had to be brought to completion by a gynecologist.
This abortion was initiated with the consent of her husband,
as both wished, on account of their pecuniary circumstances,
to be spared from being additionally blessed with children.
“She said: ‘I had often reproached myself with the words,
“You really had your child killed,” and I feared that such
a crime could not remain unpunished. Now that you have

136

assured me that there is nothing seriously wrong with my
eyes I am quite assured I have already been sufficiently
punished.’

“This accident, therefore, was, on the one hand, a retribu-
tion for her sin, but, on the other hand, it may have served
as an escape from a more dire punishment which she had
feared for many months. In the moment that she ran to
the shop to buy the picture the memory of this whole history,
with its fears (already quite active in her unconscious at
the time she warned her husband), became overwhelming
and could perhaps find expression in words like these ‘But
why do you want an ornament for the nursery?—you who
had your child killed ! You are a murderer ! The great
punishment is surely approaching !’

“This thought did not become conscious, but instead of
it she made use of the situation—I might say of the psycho-
logic moment—to utilize in a commonplace manner the
heap of stones to inflict upon herself this punishment. It
was for this reason that she did not even attempt to put
out her arms while falling and was not much frightened.
The second, and probably lesser, determinant of her accident
was obviously the self-punishment for her unconscious wish
to be rid of her husband, who was an accessory to the crime
in this affair. This was betrayed by her absolutely super-
fluous warning to be very careful in the street on account
of the stones. For, just because her husband had a weak
leg, he was very careful in walking.”

If such a rage against one’s own integrity and one’s own
life can be hidden behind apparently accidental awkward-
ness and motor insufficiency, then it is not a big step forward
to grasp the possibility of transferring the same conception
to mistakes which seriously endanger the life and health
of others. What I can put forward as evidence for the validity
of this conception was taken from my experience with
neurotics, and hence does not fully meet the demands of
this situation. I will report a case in which it was not an

137

erroneously carried-out action, but what may be more aptly
termed a symbolic or chance action that gave me the clue
which later made possible the solution of the patient’s
conflict.

I once undertook to improve the marriage relations of a
very intelligent man, whose differences with his tenderly
attached young wife could surely be traced to real causes,
but as he himself admitted could not be altogether explained
through them. He continually occupied himself with the
thought of a separation, which he repeatedly rejected because
he dearly loved his two small children. In spite of this he
always returned to that resolution and sought no means to
make the situation bearable to himself. Such an unsettle-
ment of a conflict served to prove to me that there were
unconscious and repressed motives which enforced the
conflicting conscious thoughts, and in such cases I always
undertake to end the conflict by psychic analysis. One day
the man related to me a slight occurrence which had extremely
frightened him. He was sporting with the older child, by
far his favourite. He tossed it high in the air and repeated
this tossing till finally he thrust it so high that its head almost
struck the massive gas chandelier. Almost, but not quite,
or say “just about !” Nothing happened to the child except
that it became dizzy from fright. The father stood transfixed
with the child in his arms, while the mother merged into an
hysterical attack. The particular facility of this careless
movement, with the violent reaction in the parents, sug-
gested to me to look upon this accident as a symbolic action
which gave expression to an evil intention toward the beloved
child.

I could remove the contradiction of the actual tenderness
of this father for his child by referring the impulse to injure
it to the time when it was the only one, and so small that
as yet the father had no occasion for tender interest in it.
Then it was easy to assume that this man, so little pleased
with his wife at that time, might have thought: “If this

138

small being for whom I have no regard whatever should
die, I would be free and could separate from my wife.” The
wish for the death of this much loved being must therefore
have continued unconsciously. From here it was easy to
find the way to the unconscious fixation of this wish.

There was indeed a powerful determinant in a memory
from the patient’s childhood: it referred to the death of
a little brother, which the mother laid to his father’s negli-
gence, and which led to serious quarrels with threats of
separation between the parents. The continued course of
my patient’s life, as well as the therapeutic success confirmed
my analysis.