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    I

    FORGETTING OF PROPER NAMES

    DURING the year 1898, I published a short essay, On the Psychic Mecha-
    nism of Forgetfulness.1) I shall now repeat its contents and take it as a
    starting-point for further discussion. I have there undertaken a psycho-
    logic analysis of a common case of temporary forgetfulness of proper
    names, and from a pregnant example of my own observation, I have
    reached the conclusion that this frequent and practically unimportant oc-
    currence of a failure of a psychic function—of memory—admits an ex-
    planation which goes beyond the customary utilization of this phenome-
    non.

    If an average psychologist should be asked to explain how it happens
    that we often fail to recall a name which we are sure we know, he would
    probably content himself with the answer that proper names are more apt
    to be forgotten than any other content of memory. He might give plausi-
    ble reasons for this “forgetting preference” for proper names, but he
    would not assume any deep determinant for the process.

    I was led to examine exhaustively the phenomenon of temporary for-
    getfulness through the observation of certain peculiarities, which, al-
    though not general, can, nevertheless, be seen clearly in some cases. In
    these, there is not only forgetfulness, but also false recollection; he who
    strives for the escaped name brings to consciousness others—substitutive
    names—which, although immediately recognized as false, nevertheless
    obtrude themselves with great tenacity. The process which should lead to
    the reproduction of the lost name is, as it were, displaced, and thus brings
    one to an incorrect substitute.

    Now it is my assumption that the displacement is not left to psychic ar-
    bitrariness, but that it follows lawful and rational paths. In other words,
    I assume that the substitutive name (or names) stands in direct relation
    to the lost name, and I hope, if I succeed in demonstrating this connection,
    to throw light on the origin of the forgetting of names.

    In the example which I selected for analysis in 1898, I vainly strove to

    1)Monatschrift f. Psychiatrie.

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    36

    recall the name of the master who made the imposing frescoes of the “Last
    Judgment” in the dome of Orvieto. Instead of the lost name—Signorelli—
    two other names of artists—Botticelli and Boltraffio—obtruded them-
    selves, names which my judgment immediately and definitely rejected as
    being incorrect. When the correct name was imparted to me by an out-
    sider, I recognized it at once without any hesitation. The examination of
    the influence and association paths which caused the displacement from
    Signorelli to Botticelli and Boltraffio led to the following results:

    (a) The reason for the escape of the name Signorelli is neither to be
    sought in the strangeness in itself of this name nor in the psychologic
    character of the connection in which it was inserted. The forgotten name
    was just as familiar to me as one of the substitutive names—Botticelli—
    and somewhat more familiar than the other substitute—Boltraffio—o¿
    the possessor of which I could hardly say more than that he belonged to
    the Milanese School. The connection, too, in which the forgetting of the
    name took place appeared to me harmless, and led to no further explana-
    tion. I journeyed by carriage with a stranger from Ragusa, Dalmatia, to
    a station in Herzegovina. Our conversation drifted to travelling in Italy,
    and I asked my companion whether he had been in Orvieto and had seen
    there the famous frescoes of —.

    (b) The forgetting of the name could not be explained until after I
    had recalled the theme discussed immediately before this conversation.
    This forgetting then made itself known as a disturbance of the newly
    emerging theme caused by the theme preceding it. In brief, before I asked
    my travelling companion if he had been in Orvieto, we had been discuss-
    ing the customs of the Turks living in Bosnia and Herzegovina. I had
    related what I heard from a colleague who was practising medicine among
    them, namely, that they show full confidence in the physician and com-
    plete submission to fate. When one is compelled to inform them that
    there is no help for the patient, they answer: “Sir (Herr), what can I say?
    I know that if he could be saved, you would save him.” In these sentences
    alone we can find the words and names: Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Herr
    (Sir), which may be inserted in an association series between Signorelli,
    Botticelli and Boltraffio.

    (c) I assume that the stream of thoughts concerning the customs of
    the Turks in Bosnia, etc., was able to disturb the next thought, because I
    withdrew my attention from it before it came to an end. For I recalled
    that I wished to relate a second anecdote which was next to the first in my
    memory. These Turks value sexual pleasure above all else, and at sexual
    disturbances merge into an utter despair which strangely contrasts with
    their resignation at the peril of losing their lives. One of my colleague’s
    patients once told him, “For you know, Sir (Herr), if that ceases, life no
    longer has any charm.”

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    37

    I refrained from imparting this characteristic feature because I did not
    wish to touch upon such a delicate theme in conversation with a stranger.
    But I went still further; I also deflected my attention from the continua-
    tion of the thought which might have associated itself in me with the
    theme “Death and Sexuality.” I was at that time under the after-effects
    of a message which I had received a few weeks before, during a brief so-
    journ in Trafoi. A patient on whom I had spent much effort had ended
    his life on account of an incurable sexual disturbance. I know positively
    that this sad event, and everything connected with it, did not come to my
    conscious recollection on that trip in Herzegovina. However, the agree-
    ment between Trafoi and Boltraffio forces me to assume that this remi-
    niscence was at that time brought into activity despite all the intentional
    deviation of my attention.

    (d) I can no longer conceive the forgetting of the name Signorelli as
    an accidental occurrence. I must recognize in this process the influence of
    a motive. There were motives which actuated the interruption in the com-
    munication of my thoughts (concerning the customs of the Turks, etc.),
    which later influenced me to exclude from my consciousness the thoughts
    connected with them, and which might have led to the message concern-
    ing the incident in Trafoi—that is, I wanted to forget something, I re-
    pressed something. To be sure, I wished to forget something other than
    the name of the master of Orvieto; but this other thought brought about
    an associative connection between itself and this name, so that my act of
    volition missed the aim, and I forgot the one against my will, while I in-
    tentionally wished to forget the other. The disinclina-
    tion to recall directed
    itself against the one content; the inability to remember appeared in an
    other. The case would have been obviously simpler if this disinclination
    and the inability to remember had concerned the same content. The sub-
    stitutive names no longer seem so thoroughly unjustified as they seemed
    before this explanation. They remind me (after the form of a compro-
    mise) as much of what I wished to forget as of what I wished to remem-
    be¿, and show me that my object to forget something was neither a perfe¿t
    su¿cess nor a failure.

    (e) The nature of the association formed between the lost name and
    the repressed theme (death and sexuality, etc.), containing the names of
    Bosnia, Herzegovina and Trafoi, is also very strange. In the scheme in-
    serted here, which originally appeared in 1898, an attempt is made to
    graphically represent these associations.
    The name Signorelli was thus divided into two parts. One pair of syl-
    lables (elli) returned unchanged in one of the substitutions, while the
    other had gained, through the translation of signor (Sir, Herr), many
    and diverse relations to the name contained in the repressed theme, but
    was lost through it in the reproduction. Its substitution was formed in a

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    38

    way to suggest that a displacement took place along the same associations
    —“Herzegovina and Bosnia”—regardless of the sense and acoustic de-
    marcation. The names were therefore treated in this process like the writ-
    ten pictures of a sentence which is to be transformed into a picture-puzzle
    (rebus). No information was given to consciousness concerning the whole
    process, which, instead of the name Signorelli, was thus changed to the
    substitutive names. At first sight, no relation is apparent between the
    theme that contained the name Signorelli and the repressed one which
    immediately preceded it.

    Signor elli

    Bo tticelli

    Bo l traffio

    Bo snia

    Her zegovina and

    Trafoi

    Herr Sir, What can I say, etc.

    Death and Sexuality

    Repressed Thoughts

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    39

    FORGETTING OF PROPER NAMES

    Perhaps it is not superfluous to remark that the given explanation does
    not contradict the conditions of memory reproduction and forgetting as-
    sumed by other psychologists, which they seek in certain relations and
    dispositions. Only in certain cases have we added another motive to the
    factors long recognized as causative in forgetting names, and have thus
    laid bare the mechanism of faulty memory. The assumed dispositions are
    indispensable also in our case, in order to make it possible for the re-
    pressed element to associatively gain control over the desired name and
    take it along into the repression. Perhaps this would not have occurred
    in another name having more favorable conditions of reproduction. For
    it is quite probable that a suppressed element continually strives to assert
    itself in some other way, but attains this success only where it meets with
    suitable conditions. At other times, the suppression succeeds without dis-
    turbance of function, or, as we may justly say, without symptoms.

    When we recapitulate the conditions for forgetting a name with faulty
    recollection we find: (1) a certain disposition to forget the name; (2) a
    process of suppression which has taken place shortly before; and (3) the
    possibility of establishing an outer association between the concerned
    name and the element previously suppressed. The last condition will
    probably not have to be much overrated, for the slightest claim on the
    association is apt in most cases to bring it about. But it is a different and
    far-reaching question whether such outer association can really fur-
    nish the proper condition to enable the suppressed element to disturb the
    reproduction of the desired name, or whether after all a more intimate
    connection between the two themes is not necessarily required. On super-
    ficial consideration, one may be willing to reject the latter requirement
    and consider the temporal meeting in perfectly dissimilar contents as
    sufficient. But on more thorough examination, one finds more and more
    frequently that the two elements (the repressed and the new one) con-
    nected by an outer association, possess besides a connection in content,
    and this can also be demonstrated in the example, Signorelli.

    The value of the understanding gained through the analysis of the ex-
    ample Signorelli naturally depends on whether we must explain this case
    as a typical or as an isolated process. I must now maintain that the for-
    getting of a name associated with faulty recollection not uncommonly
    follows the same process as was demonstrated in the case of Si-
    gnorelli. Almost every time that I observed this phenomenon in myself,
    I was able to explain it in the manner indicated above as being motivated
    by repression.

    I must mention still another viewpoint in favor of the typical nature
    of our analysis. I believe that one is not justified in separating the cases
    of name-forgetting with faulty recollection from those in which incorrect
    substitutive names have not obtruded themselves. These substitutive

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