69

V

MISTAKES IN SPEECH

ALTHOUGH the ordinary material of speech of our mother-
tongue seems to be guarded against forgetting, its application, however, more often suc-
cumbs to another disturbance which is familiar to us as “slips of the
tongue.” What we observe in normal persons as slips of the tongue gives
the same impression as the first step of the so-called “paraphasias” which
manifest themselves under pathologic conditions.

I am in the exceptional position of being about to refer to a previous
work on the subject. In the year 1895, Meringer and C. Mayer published
a study on Mistakes in Speech and Reading, with whose viewpoints I do
not agree. One of the authors, who is the spokesman in the text, is a phi-
lologist actuated by a linguistic interest to examine the rules governing
those slips. He hoped to deduce from these rules the existence “of a defi-
nite psychic mechanism,” “whereby the sounds of a word, of a sentence,
and even the words themselves, would be associated and connected with
one another in a quite peculiar manner” (p. 10).

The authors grouped the examples of speech-mistakes collected by
them first, according to purely descriptive viewpoints, such as interchang-
ings (e.g., the Milo of Venus instead of the Venus of Milo), as anticipa-
tions (e.g., the shoes made her sorft . . . the shoes made her feet sore),
as echoes and post positions, as contaminations (e.g., “I will soon him
home,” instead of “I will soon go home and I will see him”), and substi-
tutions (e.g., “he entrusted his money to a savings crank,” instead of “a
savings bank”).¹ Besides these principal categories, there are some others
of lesser importance (or of lesser significance for our purpose). In this
grouping it makes no difference whether the transposition, disfigurement,
fusion, etc., affects single sounds of the word or syllables, or whole words
of the concerned sentence.

To explain the various forms of mistakes in speech, Meringer assumes
a varied psychic value of phonetics. As soon as the innervation affects
the first syllable of a word, or the first word of a sentence, the stimulating

¹The examples are given by the editor.

70

process immediately strikes the succeeding sounds, and the following
words, and in so far as these innervations are synchronous, they may
effect some changes in one another. The stimulus of the psychically more
intensive sound “rings” before or continues echoing, and thus disturbs
the less important process of innervation. It is necessary therefore to
determine which are the most important sounds of a word. Meringer
states: “If one wishes to know which sound of a word possesses the great-
est intensity, he should examine himself while searching for a forgotten
word, for example, a name. That which first returns to consciousness in-
variably had the greatest intensity prior to the forgetting (p. 160). Thus
the most important sounds are the initial sound of the root-
syllable and
the initial sound of the word itself, as well as one or another of the accen-
tuated vowels” (p. 162).

Here, I cannot help voicing a contradiction. Whether or not the initial
sound of the name belongs to the most important elements of the word,
it is surely not true that in the case of the forgetting of the word it first
returns to consciousness; the above rule is therefore of no use. When we
observe ourselves during the search for a forgotten name, we are com-
paratively often forced to express the opinion that it begins with a certain
letter. This conviction proves to be as often unfounded as founded. In-
deed, I would even go so far as to assert that in the majority of cases, one
reproduces a false initial sound. Also, in our example Signorelli, the sub-
stitutive name lacked the initial sound, and the principal syllables were
lost; on the other hand, the less important pair of syllables elli returned
to consciousness in the substitutive name Botticelli.

How little substitutive names respect the initial sound of the lost names
may be learned from the following case. One day, I found it impossible
to recall the name of the small country whose capital is Monte Carlo. The
substitutive names were as follows: Piedmont, Albania, Montevideo,
Colico. In place of Albania, Montenegro soon appeared, and then it struck
me that the syllable Mont (pronounced Mon) occurred in all but the last
of the substitutive names. It thus became easy for me to find from the
name of Prince Albert the forgotten name Monaco. Colico practically
imitates the syllabic sequence and rhythm of the forgotten name.

If we admit the conjecture that a mechanism similar to that pointed out
in the forgetting of names may also play a part in the phenomena of
speech-
blunders, we are then led to a better-
founded judgment of cases
of speech-
blunders. The speech disturbance which manifests itself as a
speech-
blunder may, in the first place, be caused by the influence of an
other component of the same speech; that is, through a fore-
sound or an
echo, or through another meaning within the sentence or context which
differs from that which the speaker wishes to utter. In the second place,
however, the disturbance could be brought about analogously to the proc-
 

71

ess in the case Signorelli, through influences outside this word, sentence
or context, from elements which we did not intend to express, and of
whose incitement we became conscious only through the disturbance. In
both modes of origin of the mistake in speech, the common element lies
in the simultaneity of the stimulus, while the differentiating elements lie
in the arrangement within or without the same sentence or context.
The difference does not at first appear as wide as when it is taken into
consideration in certain conclusions drawn from the symptomatology of
speech-
mistakes. It is clear, however, that only in the first case, is there
a prospect of drawing conclusions from the manifestations of speech-
blunders concerning a mechanism which connects together sounds and
words for the reciprocal influence of their articulation; that is, conclu-
sions such as the philologist hopes to gain from the study of speech-
blunders. In the case of disturbance through influence outside of the same
sentence or context, it would before all be a question of becoming ac-
quainted with the disturbing elements, and then the question would arise
whether the mechanism of this disturbance cannot also suggest the prob-
able laws of the formation of speech.
We cannot maintain that Meringer and Mayer have overlooked the
possibility of speech disturbance through “complicated psychic influ-
ences,” that is, through elements outside of the same word or sentence or
the same sequence of words. Indeed, they must have observed that the
theory of the psychic variation of sound applies, strictly speaking, only
to the explanation of sound disturbances as well as to fore-sounds and
after-sounds. Where the word disturbances cannot be reduced to sound
disturbances, as, for example, in the substitutions and contaminations of
words, they, too, have without hesitation sought the cause of the mistake
in speech outside of the intended context, and proved this state of affairs
by means of fitting examples.¹ According to the authors’ own understand-
ing, it is some similarity between a certain word in the intended sentence
and some other not intended, which allows the latter to assert itself in con-
sciousness by causing a disfigurement, a composition or a compromise for-
mation (contamination).
Now, in my Interpretation of Dreams, I have shown the part played by
the process of condensation in the origin of the so-called manifest con-
tents of the dream from the latent thoughts of the dream. Any similarity
of objects or of word-presentations between two elements of the uncon-
scious material is taken as a cause for the formation of a third, which is a
composite or compromise formation. This element represents both com-
ponents in the dream content, and in view of this origin, it is frequently
endowed with numerous contradictory individual determinants. The for-
mation of substitutions and contaminations in speech-mistakes is, there
 

¹Those who are interested are referred to pp. 62, 73 and 97 of these authors’ work.

72

fore, the beginning of that work of condensation, which we find taking a
most active part in the construction of the dream.

In a small essay destined for the general reader,¹ Meringer advanced
a theory of very practical significance for certain cases of interchanging
of words, especially for such cases where one word is substituted by an
other of opposite meaning. He says: “We may still recall the manner in
which the President of the Austrian House of Deputies opened the ses-
sion some time ago: ‘Honored Sirs! I announce the presence of so and so
many gentlemen, and therefore declare the session as “closed” ’!” The
general merriment first attracted his attention and he corrected his mis-
take. In the present case, the probable explanation is that the President
wished himself in a position to close this session, from which he had little
good to expect, and the thought broke through at least partially—a
frequent manifestation—resulting in his use of “closed” in place of
“opened,” that is, the opposite of the statement intended. Numerous ob-
servations have taught me, however, that we frequently interchange con-
trasting words; they are already associated in our speech consciousness;
they lie very close together and are easily incorrectly evoked.

Still, not in all cases of contrast substitution is it so simple as in the
example of the President as to appear plausible that the speech-mistake
occurs merely as a contradiction which arises in the inner thought of the
speaker opposing the sentence uttered. We have found the analogous
mechanism in the analysis of the example aliquis; there the inner contra-
diction asserts itself in the form of forgetting a word instead of a substi-
tution through its opposite. But in order to adjust the difference, we may
remark that the little word aliquis is incapable of a contrast similar to
“closing” and “opening,” and that the word “opening” cannot be sub-
ject to forgetting on account of its being a common component of speech.

Having been shown by the last examples of Meringer and Mayer that
speech disturbance may be caused through the influence of fore-sounds,
after-sounds, words from the same sentence that were intended for expres-
sion, as well as through the effect of words outside the sentence intended,
the stimulus of which would otherwise not have been suspected, we shall
next wish to discover two classes of mistakes in speech, and how we can
distinguish the example of the one from a case of the other class.

But at this stage of the discussion, we must also think of the assertions
of Wundt, who deals with the manifestations of speech-mistakes in his
recent work on the development of language.² Psychic influences, ac-
cording to Wundt, never lack in these as well as in other phenomena re-
lated to them. “The uninhibited stream of sound and word associations
stimulated by spoken sounds belongs here, in the first place, as a positive

¹⁾Neue Freie Presse, August 23, 1900: “Wie man sich versprechen kann.”

²⁾Völker psychologie, vol. i, pt. i, p. 371, etc., 1900.

72

determinant. This is supported as a negative factor by the relaxation or
suppression of the influences of the will which inhibit this stream, and by
the active attention which is here a function of volition. Whether that
play of associations manifests itself in the fact that a coming sound is
anticipated or a preceding sound reproduced, or whether a familiar prac-
tised sound becomes intercalated between others, or finally, whether it
manifests itself in the fact that altogether different sounds associatively
related to the spoken sounds act upon these—all these questions desig-
nate only differences in the direction, and at most in the play of the oc-
curring associations but not in the general nature of the same. In some
cases, it may be also doubtful to which form a certain disturbance may be
attributed, or whether it would not be more correct to refer such disturb-
ance to a concurrence of many motives, following the principle of the
complication of causes¹ (cf. pp. 380–81).

I consider these observations of Wundt as absolutely justified and very
instructive. Perhaps we could emphasize with even greater firmness than
Wundt that the positive factor favoring mistakes in speech (the unin-
hibited stream of associations, and its negative, the relaxation of the
inhibiting attention) regularly attain synchronous action, so that both
factors become only different determinants of the same process. With
the relaxation or, more unequivocally expressed, through this relaxation,
of the inhibiting attention, the uninhibited stream of associations be-
comes active.

Among the examples of the mistakes in speech collected by me, I can
scarcely find one in which I would be obliged to attribute the speech dis-
turbance simply and solely to what Wundt calls “contact effect of sound.”
Almost invariably I discover besides this a disturbing influence of some
thing outside of the intended speech. The disturbing element is either a
single unconscious thought, which comes to light through the speech
blunder and can only be brought to consciousness through a searching
analysis, or it is a more general psychic motive, which directs itself against
the entire speech.

Example (a) Seeing my daughter make an unpleasant face while bit-
ing into an apple, I wished to quote the following couplet:

“The ape he is a funny sight,
When in the apple he takes a bite.”

But I began: “The apel . . .” This seems to be a contamination of
“ape” and “apple” (compromise formation), or it may be also conceived
as an anticipation of the prepared “apple.” The true state of affairs, how-
ever, was this: I began the quotation once before, and made no mistake

¹ Italics are mine.

74

the first time. I made the mistake only during the repetition, which was
necessary because my daughter, having been distracted from another side,
did not listen to me. This repetition with the added impatience to dis-
burden myself of the sentence I must include in the motivation of the
speech-blunder, which represented itself as a function of condensation.

(b) My daughter said, “I wrote to Mrs. Schresinger.” The woman’s
name was Schlesinger. This speech-blunder may depend on the tendency
to facilitate articulation. I must state, however, that this mistake was
made by my daughter a few moments after I had said apel instead of ape.
Mistakes in speech are in a great measure contagious; a similar peculi-
arity was noticed by Meringer and Mayer in the forgetting of names. I
know of no reason for this psychic contagiousness.

(c) “I sut up like a pocket knife,” said a patient in the beginning of
treatment, instead of “I shut up.” This suggests a difficulty of articulation
which may serve as an excuse for the interchanging of sounds. When her
attention was called to the speech-blunder, she promptly replied, “Yes,
that happened because you said ‘earnesht’ instead of ‘earnest’.” As a mat-
ter of fact, I received her with the remark, “Today we shall be in earnest”
(because it was the last hour before her discharge from treatment), and
I jokingly changed the word into earnesht. In the course of the hour, she
repeatedly made mistakes in speech, and I finally observed that it was
not only because she imitated me but because she had a special reason in
her unconscious to linger at the word earnest (Ernst) as a name.¹

(d) A woman, speaking about a game invented by her children and
called by them “the man in the box,” said “the manx in the boc.” I could
readily understand her mistake. It was while analyzing her dream, in
which her husband is depicted as very generous in money matters—just
the reverse of reality—that she made this speech-blunder. The day be-
fore she had asked for a new set of furs, which her husband denied her,
claiming that he could not afford to spend so much money. She upbraided
him for his stinginess, “for putting away so much into the strongbox,”
and mentioned a friend whose husband has not nearly his income, and yet
he presented his wife with a mink coat for her birthday. The mistake is
now comprehensible. The word manx (manks) reduces itself to the
“minks” which she longs for, and the box refers to her husband’s stingi-
ness.²

(e) A similar mechanism is shown in the mistake of another patient

1 It turned out that she was under the influence of unconscious thoughts concerning
pregnancy and prevention of conception. With the words “shut up like a pocket
knife,” which she uttered consciously as a complaint, she meant to describe the
position of the child in the womb. The word “earnest” in my remark recalled to her
the name (S. Ernst) of the well-known Vienna business firm in Kärthner Strasse,
which used to advertise the sale of articles for the prevention of conception.

2 Given by Editor.

75

whose memory deserted her in the midst of a long-
forgotten childish rem-
iniscence. Her memory failed to inform her on what part of the body the
prying and lustful hand of another had touched her. Soon thereafter she
visited one of her friends, with whom she discussed summer homes. Asked
where her cottage in M. was located, she answered, “Near the mountain
loin” instead of “mountain lane.”

(f) Another patient, whom I asked at the end of her visit how her
uncle was, answered: “I don’t know, I only see him now in flagranti.”

The following day she said: “I am really ashamed of myself for having
given you such a stupid answer yesterday. Naturally, you must have
thought me a very uneducated person who always mistakes the meaning
of foreign words. I wished to say en passant.” We did not know at the
time where she got the incorrectly used foreign words, but during the
same session she reproduced a reminiscence as a continuation of the
theme from the previous day, in which being caught in flagranti played
the principal part. The mistake of the previous day had therefore antici-
pated the recollection, which, at that time, had not yet become conscious.

(g) “In discussing her summer plans, a patient said, ‘I shall remain
most of the summer in Elberlon.’ She noted her mistake, and asked me to
analyze it. The associations to Elberlon elicited: seashore on the Jersey
coast—summer resort—vacation travelling. This recalled travelling in
Europe with her cousin, a topic which we had discussed the day before
during the analysis of a dream. The dream dealt with her dislike for this
cousin, and she admitted that it was mainly due to the fact that the latter
was the favorite of the man whom they met together while travelling
abroad. During the dream analysis, she could not recall the name of the
city in which they met this man, and I did not make any effort at the
time to bring it to her consciousness, as we were engrossed in a totally
different problem. When asked to focus her attention again on Elberlon
and reproduce her associations, she said, ‘It brings to mind Elberlawn—
lawn—field—and Elberfield.’ Elberfield was the lost name of the city
in Germany. Here the mistake served to bring to consciousness in a con-
cealed manner a memory which was connected with a painful feeling.

(h) “The following lapsus linguae was reported by the New York
Times (October 7th, 1937):

“ ‘Delegates to the convention of the Georgia division of the United
Daughters of the Confederacy listened appreciatively, while Mrs. Walter
D. Lamar eulogized Jefferson Davis last night.

“ ‘The State Historian General concluded with warm enthusiasm: “Let
the world know the wisdom, the kindness, the justice of the great and
only President of the Confederate States of America—Abraham
Lincoln!”

76

““Only after she had resumed her seat did a subdued gasp from her
listeners make her realize her lapse.¹⁾

“““It was just one of those slips that may happen at moments of en-
thusiasm,” Mrs. Lamar said.”’

“Yes! The speaker is right, but we must know that the process of en-
thusiasm is nothing but a heightened emotional state in which conscious
attention is almost completely suspended. In such a state, one unwittingly
displays his true feelings and as under the influence of alcohol, the
truth comes out.”’¹

(i) Before calling on me, a patient telephoned for an appointment and
also wished to be informed about my consultation fee. He was told that
the first consultation was ten dollars; after the examination was over, he
again asked what he was to pay and added: “I don’t like to owe money
to anyone, especially to doctors; I prefer to pay right away.” Instead of
pay he said play. His last voluntary remarks and his mistake put me on
my guard, but after a few uncalled-for remarks, he set me at ease
by taking money from his pocket. He counted four paper dollars and was
very chagrined and surprised because he had no more money with him
and promised to send me a cheque for the balance. I was sure that his
mistake betrayed him, that he was only playing with me, but there was
nothing to be done. At the end of a few weeks, I sent him a bill for the
balance, and the letter was returned to me by the post office authorities
marked “Not found.”

(j) Miss X. spoke very warmly of Mr. Y., which was rather strange,
as before this, she had always expressed her indifference, not to say her
contempt, for him. On being asked about this sudden change of heart,
she said: “I really never had anything against him; he was always nice
to me, but I never gave him the chance to cultivate my acquaintance.”
She said “cuptivate.” This neologism was a contamination of cultivate
and captivate, and foretold the coming betrothal.

(k) An illustration of the mechanisms of contamination and condensa-
tion will be found in the following lapsus linguæ. Speaking of Miss Z.,
Miss W. depicted her as a very “straitlaced” person who was not given
to levity, etc. Miss X. thereupon remarked: “Yes, that is a very char-
acteristic description, she always appealed to me as very straicet-brazed.”
Here the mistake resolved itself into straitlaced and brazenfaced, which
corresponded to Miss W.’s opinion of Miss Z.

(l) I was to give a lecture to a woman. Her husband, upon whose
request this was done, stood behind the door listening. At the end of my
sermonizing, which had made a visible impression, I said: “Goodbye,
Sir!” To the experienced person, I thus betrayed the fact that the words
were directed towards the husband, that I had spoken to oblige him.

¹Given by Editor.

77

(m) Two women stopped in front of a drugstore, and one said to her
companion, “If you will wait a few moments, I’ll soon be back,” but she
said movements instead. She was on her way to buy some castoria for
her child.

(n) Mr. L., who is fonder of being called on than of calling, spoke
to me through the telephone from a nearby summer resort. He wanted to
know when I would pay him a visit. I reminded him that it was his turn
to visit me, and called his attention to the fact that, as he was the happy
possessor of an automobile, it would be easier for him to call on me.
(We were at different summer resorts, separated by about one half-
hour’s railway trip.) He gladly promised to call and asked: “How about Labor
Day (September 1st), will it be convenient for you?” When I answered
in the affirmative, he said, “Very well, then, put me down for Election
Day” (November). His mistake was quite plain. He likes to visit me, but
it was inconvenient to travel so far. In November, we would both be in
the city. My analysis proved correct.

(o) A friend described to me a nervous patient and wished to know
whether I could benefit him. I remarked: “I believe that in time I can
remove all his symptoms by psychoanalysis, because it is a durable case,”
wishing to say “curable”!

(p) I repeatedly addressed my patient as “Mrs. Smith,” her married
daughter’s name, when her real name is “Mrs. James.” My attention hav-
ing been called to it, I soon discovered that I had another patient of the
same name who refused to pay for the treatment. Mrs. Smith was also
my patient and paid her bills promptly.

(q) A lapsus linguae sometimes stands for a particular characteristic.
A young woman, who is the dominating spirit in her home, said of her
ailing husband, that he had consulted the doctor about a wholesome diet
for himself, and then added: “The doctor said that diet has nothing to do
with his ailments, and that he can eat and drink what I want.”

(r) I cannot omit this excellent and instructive example, although,
according to my authority, it is about twenty years old. A lady once ex-
pressed herself in society—the very words show that they were uttered
with fervor and under the pressure of a great many secret emotions: “Yes,
a woman must be pretty if she is to please the men. A man is much better
off. As long as he has five straight limbs, he needs no more!”

This example affords us a good insight into the intimate mechanisms
of a mistake in speech by means of condensation and contamination.
It is quite obvious that we have here a fusion of two similar modes of ex-
pression:

“As long as he has his four straight limbs.”
“As long as he has all his five senses.”

78

Or the term “straight” may be the common element of the two intended
expressions:

“As long as he has his straight limbs.”
“All five should be straight.”

It may also be assumed that both modes of expression—viz., those of
the five senses and those of the straight five—have coöperated to intro-
duce into the sentence about the straight limbs first a number and then
the mysterious five instead of the simple four. But this fusion surely
would not have succeeded if it had not expressed good sense in the form
resulting from the mistake; if it had not expressed a cynical truth which,
naturally, could not be uttered unconcealed, coming as it did from a
woman.

Finally, we shall not hesitate to call attention to the fact that the
woman’s saying, following its wording, would just as well be an excellent
witticism as a jocose speech-blunder. It is simply a question whether she
uttered these words with conscious or unconscious intention. The be-
havior of the speaker in this case certainly speaks against the conscious
intention, and thus excludes wit.

(s) Owing to similarity of material, I add here another case of speech-
blunder, the interpretation of which requires less skill. A professor of
anatomy strove to explain the nostril, which, as is known, is a very diffi-
cult anatomical structure. To his question whether his audience grasped
his ideas, he received an affirmative reply. The professor, known for his
self-esteem, thereupon remarked: “I can hardly believe this, for the
number of people who understand the nostril, even in a city of millions
like Vienna, can be counted on a finger—pardon me, I meant to say on
the fingers of a hand.”

In the psychotherapeutic procedure which I employ in the solution and
removal of neurotic symptoms, I am often confronted with the task of
discovering from the accidental utterances and fancies of the patient the
thought contents, which, though striving for concealment, nevertheless
unintentionally betray themselves. In doing this, the mistakes often per-
form the most valuable service, as I can show through most convincing
and still most singular examples.

For example, patients speak of an aunt and later, without noting the
mistake, call her “my mother,” or designate a husband as a “brother.”
In this way, they attract my attention to the fact that they have “identi-
fied” these persons with each other, that they have placed them in the
same category, which for their emotional life signifies the recurrence of
the same type. Or, a young man of twenty years presents himself during
my office hours with these words: “I am the father of N. N., whom you
have treated—pardon me, I mean the brother; why, he is four years
older than I.” I understand through this mistake that he wishes to ex-

79

press that, like the brother, he, too, is ill through the fault of the father;
like his brother he wishes to be cured, but that the father is the one
most in need of treatment. At other times, an unusual arrangement of
words, or a forced expression, is sufficient to disclose in the speech of a
patient the participation of a repressed thought having a different motive.

Hence, in coarse as well as in finer speech disturbances, which may,
nevertheless, be subsumed as “speech-blunders,” I find that it is not
the contact effects of the sound, but the thoughts outside the intended
speech, which determine the origin of the speech-
blunder, and also suffice
to explain the newly formed mistakes in speech. I do not doubt the laws
whereby the sounds produce changes upon one another; but they alone
do not appear to me sufficiently forcible to mar the correct execution of
speech. In those cases which I have studied and investigated more closely,
they merely represent the preformed mechanism, which is conveniently
utilized by a more remote psychic motive. The latter does not, however,
form a part of the sphere of influence of these sound relations. In a large
number of substitutions caused by mistakes in talking, there is an entire
absence of such phonetic laws. In this respect, I am in full accord with
Wundt, who likewise assumes that the conditions underlying speech-
blunders are complex and go far beyond the contact effect of the sounds
influences.”

If I accept as certain “these more remote psychic influences,” follow-
ing Wundt’s expression, there is still nothing to detain me from conceding
also that in accelerated speech, with a certain amount of diverted atten-
tion, the causes of speech-blunder may be easily limited to the definite
law of Meringer and Mayer. However, in a number of examples gathered
by these authors, a more complicated solution is quite apparent.

In some forms of speech-
blunders we may assume that the disturbing
factor is the result of striking against obscene words and meanings. The
purposive disfigurement and distortion of words and phrases, which is so
popular with vulgar persons, aims at nothing else but the employing of
a harmless motive as a reminder of the obscene, and this sport is so fre-
quent that it would not be at all remarkable if it appeared unintentionally
and contrary to the will.

I trust that the readers will not depreciate the value of these interpreta-
tions, for which there is no proof, and of these examples which I have my-
self collected and explained by means of analysis. But, if secretly I still
cherish the expectation that even the apparently simple cases of speech-
blunder will be traced to a disturbance caused by a half-
repressed idea out-
side of the intended context, I am tempted to it by a noteworthy observa-
tion of Meringer. This author asserts that it is remarkable that nobody
wishes to admit having made a mistake in speaking. There are many in-
telligent and honest people who are offended if we tell them that they made
a mistake in speaking. I would not risk making this assertion as general as

30

does Meringer, using the term “nobody.” But the emotional trace which
clings to the demonstration of the mistake, which manifestly belongs to
the nature of shame, has its significance. It may be classed with the anger
displayed at the inability to recall a forgotten name, and with the surprise
at the tenaciousness of an apparently indifferent memory, and it invari-
ably points to the participation of a motive in the formation of the dis-
turbance.

The distorting of names amounts to an insult when done intention-
ally, and could have the same significance in a whole series of cases where
it appears as unintentional speech-blunders. The person who, according
to Mayer’s report, once said “Freuder” instead of “Freud,” because
shortly before he pronounced the name “Breuer,” and what at another
time, spoke of the “Freuer-Breudian” method, was certainly not partic-
ularly enthusiastic over this method. Later, under the mistakes in writing,
I shall report a case of name disfigurement which certainly admits of no
other explanation.

As a disturbing element in these cases, there is an intermingling of a
criticism which must be omitted, because at the time being, it does not
correspond to the intention of the speaker.¹⁾

¹⁾It may be observed that aristocrats in particular very frequently distort the names
of the physicians they consult, from which we may conclude that inwardly they
slight them, in spite of the politeness with which they are wont to greet them. I shall
cite here some excellent observations concerning the forgetting of names from the
works of Dr. Ernest Jones: Papers on Psychoanalysis, Chap. iii., p. 49:
“Few people can avoid having a twinge of resentment when they find that their
name has been forgotten, particularly if it is by someone with whom they had hoped
or expected it would be remembered. They instinctively realize that if they had
made a greater impression on the person’s mind, he would certainly have remembered
them again, for the name is an integral part of the personality. Similarly, few things
are more flattering to most people than to find themselves addressed by name by
a great personage where they could hardly have anticipated it. Napoleon, like most
leaders of men, was a master of this art. In the midst of the disastrous campaign of
France in 1814, he gave an amazing proof of his memory in this direction. When in
a town near Craonne, he recollected that he had met the mayor, De Bussy, over
twenty years ago in the La Fère Regiment. The delighted De Bussy at once threw
himself into his service with extraordinary zeal. Conversely, there is no surer way of
affronting someone than by pretending to forget his name; the insinuation is thus
conveyed that the person is so unimportant in our eyes that we cannot be bothered
to remember his name. This device is often exploited in literature. In Turgeniev’s
Smoke (p. 255) the following passage occurs: ‘“So you still find Baden entertaining,
M’sieur—Litvinov.”’ Ratmirov always uttered Litvinov’s surname with hesitation,
every time, as though he had forgotten it, and could not at once recall it. In this
way, as well as by the lofty flourish of his hat in saluting him, he meant to insult
his pride.’ The same author, in his Fathers and Children (p. 107), writes: ‘The
Governor invited Kirsanov and Bazarov to his ball, and within a few minutes invited
them a second time, regarding them as brothers, and calling them Kisarov.’ Here
the forgetting that he had spoken to them, the mistake in the names and the in-
ability to distinguish between the two young men, constitute a culmination of dis-
paragement. Falsification of a name has the same signification as forgetting it; it
is only a step towards complete amnesia.”

81

MISTAKES IN SPEECH

A similar identification was reported to me concerning a young physi-
cian who timidly and reverently introduced himself to the celebrated
Virchow with the following words: “I am Dr. Virchow.” The surprised
professor turned to him and asked, “Is your name also Virchow?” I do
not know how the ambitious young man justified his speech-blunder
whether he thought of the charming excuse that he imagined himself so
insignificant next to this big man that his own name slipped from him
or whether he had the courage to admit that he hoped that he, too, would
some day be as great a man as Virchow, and that the professor should
therefore not treat him in too disparaging a manner. One or both of these
thoughts may have put this young man in an embarrassing position dur-
ing the introduction.

Owing to very personal motives, I must leave it undecided whether a
similar interpretation may also apply in the case to be cited. At the In-
ternational Congress in Amsterdam, in 1907, my theories of hysteria were
the subject of a lively discussion. One of my most violent opponents, in
his diatribe against me, repeatedly made mistakes in speech in such a
manner that he put himself in my place and spoke in my name. He said,
for example, “Breuer and I, as is well known, have demonstrated,” etc.,
when he wished to say “Breuer and Freud.” The name of this opponent
does not show the slightest sound similarity to my own. From this ex-
ample, as well as from other cases of interchanging names in speech-
blunders, we are reminded of the fact that the speech-blunder can fully
forego the facility afforded to it through similar sounds, and can achieve
its purpose if only supported in content by concealed relations.

In other and more significant cases, it is a self-criticism, an internal
contradiction against one’s own utterance, which causes the speech-
blunder, and even forces a contrasting substitution for the one intended.
We then observe with surprise how the wording of an assertion removes
the purpose of the same, and how the error in speech lays bare the inner
dishonesty. Here the lapsus linguae becomes a mimicking form of ex-
pression, often, indeed, for the expression of what one does not wish to
say. It is thus a means of self-betrayal.

Brill relates: “I had recently been consulted by a woman who showed
many paranoid trends, and as she had no relatives who could coöperate
with me, I urged her to enter a State hospital as a voluntary patient. She
was quite willing to do so, but on the following day, she told me that
her friends, with whom she had leased an apartment, objected to her go-
ing to a hospital, as it would interfere with their plans, and so on. I lost
patience and said: ‘There is no use listening to your friends, who know
nothing about your mental condition; you are quite incompetent to take
care of your own affairs.’ I meant to say ‘competent.’ Here, the lapsus
linguae expressed my true opinion.”

82

Favored by chance, the speech material often gives origin to examples
of speech-blunders which serve to bring about an overwhelming revela-
tion or a full comic effect, as shown by the following examples reported
by Brill:

“A wealthy but not very generous host invited his friends for an evening
dance. Everything went well until about 11:30 p.m., when there was an
intermission, presumably for supper. To the great disappointment of most
of the guests, there was no supper; instead, they were regaled with thin
sandwiches and lemonade. As it was close to Election Day, the con-
versation centered on the different candidates; and as the discussion grew
warmer, one of the guests, an ardent admirer of the Progressive Party can-
didate, remarked to the host: ‘You may say what you please about Teddy,
but there is one thing—he can always be relied upon, he always gives you
a square meal,’ wishing to say square deal. The assembled guests burst
into a roar of laughter, to the great embarrassment of the speaker and the
host, who fully understood each other.”

“While writing a prescription for a woman who was especially weighed
down by the financial burden of the treatment, I was interested to hear
her say suddenly: ‘Please do not give me big bills, because I cannot swal-
low them.’ Of course, she meant to say pills.”

The following example illustrates a rather serious case of self-betrayal
through a mistake in talking. Some accessory details justify full repro-
duction as first printed by Dr. A. A. Brill.¹

“While walking one night with Dr. Frink, we accidentally met a col-
league, Dr. P., whom I had not seen for years, and of whose private life
I knew nothing. We were naturally very pleased to meet again, and on
my invitation, he accompanied us to a café, where we spent about two
hours in pleasant conversation. To my question as to whether he was
married, he gave a negative answer, and added, ‘Why should a man like
me marry?’

“On leaving the café, he suddenly turned to me and said: ‘I should like
to know what you would do in a case like this: I know a nurse who was
named as co-respondent in a divorce case. The wife sued the husband for
divorce and named her as co-respondent, and he got the divorce.’ I inter-
rupted him, saying, ‘You mean she got the divorce.’ He immediately cor-
rected himself, saying, ‘Yes, she got the divorce,’ and continued to tell
how the excitement of the trial had affected this nurse to such an extent
that she became nervous and took to drink. He wanted me to advise him
how to treat her.

“As soon as I had corrected his mistake, I asked him to explain it, but,
 

¹ Zentralb. f. Psychoanalyse, ii., Jahrg. 1. Cf. also Brill’s Psychoanalysis: Its Theories
and Practical Application, p. 202. Saunders, Philadelphia and London.

83

as is usually the case, he was surprised at my question. He wanted to know
whether a person had no right to make mistakes in talking. I explained to
him that there is a reason for every mistake, and that if he had not told
me that he was unmarried, I would say that he was the hero of the divorce
case in question, and that the mistake showed that he wished he had ob-
tained the divorce instead of his wife, so as not to be obliged to pay
alimony and to be permitted to marry again in New York State.

“He stoutly denied my interpretation, but his emotional agitation, fol-
lowed by loud laughter, only strengthened my suspicions. To my appeal
that he should tell the truth ‘for science’ sake,’ he said, ‘Unless you wish
me to lie, you must believe that I was never married, and hence, your
psychoanalytic interpretation is all wrong.’ He, however, added that it
was dangerous to be with a person who paid attention to such little things.
Then he suddenly remembered that he had another appointment and
left us.”

“Both Dr. Frink and I were convinced that my interpretation of his
lapsus linguae was correct, and I decided to corroborate or disprove it by
further investigation. The next day, I found a neighbor and old friend
of Dr. P., who confirmed my interpretation in every particular. The
divorce was granted to Dr. P.’s wife a few weeks before, and a nurse was
named as co-
respondent. A few weeks later, I met Dr. P., and he told me
that he was thoroughly convinced of the Freudian mechanisms.”

The self-
betrayal is just as plain in the following case reported by
Otto Rank:

A father who was devoid of all patriotic feeling and desirous of edu-
cating his children to be just as free from this superfluous sentiment, re-
proached his sons for participating in a patriotic demonstration, and re-
jected their reference to a similar behavior of their uncle with these words:
“You are not obliged to imitate him; why, he is an idiot.” The astonished
features of the children at their father’s unusual tone aroused him to the
fact that he had made a mistake, and he remarked apologetically, “Of
course, I wished to say patriot.”

When such a speech-
blunder occurs in a serious squabble and reverses
the intended meaning of one of the disputants, at once it puts him at a
disadvantage with his adversary—a disadvantage which the latter seldom
fails to utilize.

This clearly shows that although people are unwilling to accept the
theory of my conception and are not inclined to forego the convenience
that is connected with the tolerance of a faulty action, they nevertheless
interpret speech-
blunders and other faulty acts in a manner similar to the
one presented in this book. The merriment and derision which are sure to
be evoked at the decisive moment through such linguistic mistakes, speak

84

conclusively against the generally accepted convention that such a speech-
blunder is a lapsus linguae and psychologically of no importance.

A nice example of speech-blunder, which aims not so much at the be-
trayal of the speaker as at the enlightenment of the listener outside the
scene, is found in Wallenstein (Piccolomini, Act. I, Scene 5), and shows
us that the poet, who here uses this means, is well-versed in the me-
chanism and intent of speech-blunders. In the preceding scene, Max Piccolo-
mini was passionately in favor of the ducal party, and was enthusiastic
over the blessings of the peace which became known to him in the course
of a journey, while accompanying Wallenstein’s daughter to the encamp-
ment. He leaves his father and the Court ambassador, Questenberg, in
great consternation. The scene proceeds as follows:

Questenberg. Woe unto us! Are matters thus? Friend, should we allow
him to go there with this false opinion, and not recall him at once in order
to open his eyes instantly?
Octavio (rousing himself from profound meditation). He has already
opened mine, and I see more than pleases me.
Questenberg. What is it, friend?
Octavio. A curse on that journey!
Questenberg. Why? What is it?
Octavio. Come! I must immediately follow the unlucky trail, must see
with my own eyes—come . . . (Wishes to lead him away).
Questenberg. What is the matter? Where?
Octavio. (urging). To her!
Questenberg. To—?
Octavio (corrects himself). To the duke! Let us go, etc.

The slight speech-blunder to her in place of to him is meant to betray
to us the fact that the father has seen through his son’s motive for es-
pousing the other cause, while the courtier complains that “he speaks to
him altogether in riddles.”

Another example wherein a poet makes use of a speech-blunder was
discovered by Otto Rank in Shakespeare. I quote Rank’s report from the
Zentralblatt für Psychoanalyse, I. 3.

“A poetic speech-blunder, very delicately motivated and technically
remarkably well utilized, which, like the one pointed out by Freud in
Wallenstein (Zur Psychopathologie des Alltagslebens, 2nd Edition, p. 48),
not only shows that poets knew the mechanism and sense of this error,
but also presupposes an understanding of it on the part of the hearer, can
be found in Shakespeare’s Merchant of Venice (Act III, Scene 2). By the
will of her father, Portia was bound to select a husband through a lottery.
She escaped all her distasteful suitors by lucky chance. When she finally
found in Bassanio the suitor after her own heart, she had cause to fear lest

86

motives, decided upon a short trip to Budapest, justified herself by say
ing that she was going for only three days, but she blundered and said
tor only three weeks. She betrayed her secret feeling that, to spite me,
she preferred spending three weeks to three days in that society which
I considered unfit for her.

One evening, wishing to excuse myself for not having called for my
wife at the theater, I said: “I was at the theater at ten minutes after ten.”
I was corrected: “You meant to say before ten o’clock.” Naturally, I
wanted to say before ten. After ten would certainly be no excuse. I had
been told that the theater program read, “Finished before ten o’clock.”
When I arrived at the theater, I found the foyer dark and the theater
empty. Evidently the performance was over earlier and my wife did not
wait for me. When I looked at the clock, it still wanted five minutes to ten.
I determined to make my case more favorable at home, and say that it
was ten minutes to ten. Unfortunately, the speech-
blunder spoiled the in
tent and laid bare my dishonesty, in which I acknowledged more than
there really was to confess.
This leads us to those speech disturbances which can no longer be de
scribed as speech-
blunders, for they do not injure the individual word,
but affect the rhythm and execution of the entire speech, as, for example,
the stammering and stuttering of embarrassment. But here, as in the
former cases, it is the inner conflict that is betrayed to us through the dis
turbance in speech. I really do not believe that anyone will make mistakes
in talking in an audience with His Majesty, in a serious love declaration
or in defending one’s name and honor before a jury; in short, people make
no mistakes where they are all there, as the saying goes. Even in criti
cizing an author’s style, we are allowed and accustomed to follow the
principle of explanation, which we cannot miss in the origin of a single
speech-
blunder. A clear and unequivocal manner of writing shows us that
here, the author is in harmony with himself, but where we find a forced
and involved expression, aiming at more than one target, as appropriately
expressed, we can thereby recognize the participation of an unfinished
and complicated thought, or we can hear through it the stifled voice of
the author’s self-
criticism.¹⁾

¹“Ce qu’on conçoit bien
S’énonce clairement,
Et les mots pour le dire
Arrivent aisément.”
—Boileau, Art Poétique.