113

VIII

ERRONEOUSLY CARRIED-OUT ACTIONS

I SHALL give another passage from the above-mentioned work of Merin-
ger and Mayer (p. 98):

“Lapses in speech do not stand entirely alone. They resemble the errors
which often occur in our other activities and are quite foolishly termed
‘forgetfulness.’ ”

I am therefore in no way the first to presume that there is a sense and
purpose behind the slight functional disturbances of the daily life of
healthy people.¹⁾

If the lapse in speech, which is without doubt a motor function, admits
of such a conception, it is quite natural to transfer to the lapses of our
other motor functions the same expectation. I have here formed two
groups of cases; all these cases in which the faulty effect seems to be the
essential element—that is, the deviation from the intention—I denote as
erroneously carried-out actions or defaults; the others, in which the
entire action appears rather inexpedient, I call “symptomatic and chance
actions.” Again, no distinct line of demarcation can be formed; indeed,
we are forced to conclude that all divisions used in this treatise are of
only descriptive significance and contradict the inner unity of the sphere
of manifestation.

The psychologic understanding of erroneous actions apparently gains
little in clearness when we place it under the head of “ataxia,” and espe-
cially under “cortical ataxia.” Let us rather try to trace the individual
examples to their proper determinants. To do this, I shall again resort to
personal observations, the opportunities for which I could not very fre-
quently find in myself.

(a) In former years, when I made more calls at the homes of patients
than I do at present, it often happened, when I stood before a door where
I should have knocked or rung the bell, that I would pull the key of my
own house from my pocket, only to replace it, quite abashed. When I in-

¹A second publication of Meringer has later shown me how very unjust I was to thi
author when I attributed to him such understanding.

114

vestigated in what patients’ homes this occurred, I had to admit that the
faulty action—taking out my key instead of ringing the bell—signified
paying a certain tribute to the house where the error occurred. It was
equivalent to the thought “Here I feel at home,” as it happened only where
I possessed the patient’s regard. (Naturally, I never rang my own door-
bell.)

The default was therefore a symbolic representation of a definite
thought which was not accepted consciously as serious; for in reality, the
psychiatrist is well aware that the patient seeks him only so long as he
expects to be benefited by him, and that his own excessively warm interest
for his patient is evinced only as a means of psychic treatment.

That the senseful faulty handling of the keys is by no means peculiar to
myself is readily shown by self-observation of others.

An almost identical repetition of my experience is described by A.
Maeder (“Contrib. à la psychopathologie de la vie quotidienne,” Arch. de
Psychol., vi, 1906): “Il est arrivé à chacun de sortir son trousseau, en
arrivant à la porte d’un ami particulièrement cher, de se surprendre pour
ainsi dire, en train d’ouvrir avec sa clef comme chez soi. C’est un retard,
puisqu’il faut sonner malgré tout, mais c’est une preuve qu’on se sent—
ou qu’on voudrait se sentir—comme chez soi, auprès de cet ami.”

Jones speaks as follows about the use of keys: ¹ “The use of keys is a
fertile source of occurrences of this kind, of which two examples may be
given. If I am disturbed in the midst of some engrossing work at home by
having to go to the hospital to carry out some routine work, I am very apt
to find myself trying to open the door of my laboratory there with the
key of my desk at home, although the two keys are quite unlike each
other. The mistake unconsciously demonstrates where I would rather be
at the moment.

“Some years ago, I was acting in a subordinate position at a certain
institution, the front door of which was kept locked, so that it was neces-
sary to ring for admission. On several occasions, I found myself making
serious attempts to open the door with my house key. Each one of the
permanent visiting staff, of which I aspired to be a member, was provided
with a key to avoid the trouble of having to wait at the door. My mistake
thus expressed the desire to be on a similar footing and to be quite ‘at
home’ there.”

A similar experience is reported by Dr. Hans Sachs of Vienna: “I al-
ways carry two keys with me, one for the door of my office and one for my
residence. They are not by any means easily interchanged, as the office
key is at least three times as big as my house key. Besides, I carry the
first in my trouser pocket and the other in my vest pocket. Yet it often
happened that I noticed, on reaching the door, that while ascending the

¹Jones, loc. cit., p. 79.

115

stairs, I had taken out the wrong key. I decided to undertake a statistical
examination; as I was daily in about the same emotional state when I
stood before both doors, I thought that the interchanging of the two
keys must show a regular tendency, if they were differently determined
psychically. Observation of later occurrences showed that I regularly took
out my house key before the office door. Only on one occasion was this
reversed: I came home tired, knowing that I would find a guest there. I
made an attempt to unlock the door, with the, naturally too big, office
key.”

(b) At a certain time twice a day for six years, I was accustomed to
wait for admission before a door in the second story of the same house,
and during this long period of time, it happened twice (within a short
interval) that I climbed a story higher. On the first of these occasions, I
was in an ambitious day-
dream, which allowed me to “mount always
higher and higher.” In fact, at that time, I heard the door in question open
as I put my foot on the first step of the third flight. On the other occasion,
I again went too far, “engrossed in thought.” As soon as I became aware
of it, I turned back and sought to snatch the dominating phantasy;
found that I was irritated over a criticism of my works, in which the re-
proach was made that I “always went too far,” which I replaced by the
less respectful expression, “climbed too high.”

(c) For many years, a reflex hammer and a tuning-
fork lay side by
side on my desk. One day, I hurried off at the close of my office hours, as
I wished to catch a certain train, and, despite broad daylight, put the
tuning-
fork in my coat pocket in place of the reflex hammer. My attention
was called to the mistake through the weight of the object drawing down
my pocket. Anyone accustomed to reflect on such slight occurrences
would, without hesitation, explain the faulty action by the hurry of the
moment, and excuse it. In spite of that, I preferred to ask myself why I
took the tuning-
fork instead of the hammer. The haste could just as well
have been a motive for carrying out the action properly in order not to
waste time over the correct action.

“Who last grasped the tuning-
fork?” was the question which imme-
diately flashed through my mind. It happened that only a few days ago,
an idiotic child, whose attention to sensory impressions I was testing, had
been so fascinated by the tuning-
fork that I found it difficult to tear it
away from him. Could it mean, therefore, that I was an idiot? To be
sure, so it would seem, as the next thought which associated itself with
the hammer was chamer (Hebrew for “ass”).

But what was the meaning of this abusive language? We must here in-
quire into the situation. I hurried to a consultation to see a patient who,
according to the anamnesis which I received by letter, had fallen from a

216

balcony some months before, and since then, had been unable to walk.
The physician who invited me wrote that he was still unable to say
whether he was dealing with a spinal injury or traumatic neurosis—hys-
teria. That was what I was to decide. This could therefore be a reminder
to be particularly careful in this delicate differential diagnosis. As it is,
my colleagues think that hysteria is diagnosed far too carelessly where
more serious matters are concerned. But the abuse is not yet justified.
Yes, the next association was that the small railroad station is the same
place in which, some years previous, I saw a young man who, after a cer-
tain emotional experience, could not walk properly. At that time, I diag-
nosed his malady as hysteria, and later put him under psychic treatment;
but it afterward turned out that my diagnosis was neither incorrect nor
correct. A large number of the patient’s symptoms were hysterical, and
they promptly disappeared in the course of treatment. But back of these,
there was a visible remnant that could not be reached by therapy, and
could be referred only to a multiple sclerosis. Those who saw the patient
after me had no difficulty in recognizing the organic affection. I could
scarcely have acted or judged differently; still, the impression was that
of a serious mistake; the promise of a cure which I had given him could
naturally not be kept.

The mistake in grasping the tuning-fork instead of the hammer could
therefore be translated into the following words: “You fool, you ass, get
yourself together this time, and be careful not to diagnose again a case
of hysteria where there is an incurable disease, as you did in this place
years ago in the case of that poor man!” And fortunately for this little
analysis, even if unfortunately for my mood, this same man, now showing
a very spastic gait, had been to my office a few days before, one day
after the examination of the idiotic child.

We observe that this time it is the voice of self-criticism which makes
itself perceptible through the mistake in grasping. The erroneously car-
ried-out action is specially suited to express self-reproach. The present
mistake attempts to represent the mistake which was committed else-
where.

(d) It is quite obvious that grasping the wrong thing may also serve
a whole series of other obscure purposes. Here is a first example: It is
very seldom that I break anything. I am not particularly dexterous, but
by virtue of the anatomic integrity of my nervous and muscular appara-
tus, there are apparently no grounds in me for such awkward movements
with undesirable results. I can recall no object in my home which I have
ever broken. Owing to the narrowness of my study, it has often been
necessary for me to work in the most uncomfortable position among my
numerous antique clay and stone objects, of which I have a small collec-

117

tion. So much is this true that onlookers have expressed fear lest I topple
down something and shatter it. But it never happened. Then, why did I
brush to the floor the cover of my simple inkwell so that it broke into
pieces?

My inkstand is made of a flat piece of marble which is hollowed out for
the reception of the glass inkwell; the inkwell has a marble cover with a
knob of the same stone. A circle of bronze statuettes with small terra-
cotta figures is set behind this inkstand. I seated myself at the desk to
write; I made a remarkably awkward outward movement with the hand
holding the pen-
holder, and so swept the cover of the inkstand, which
already lay on the desk, to the floor.

It is not difficult to find the explanation. Some hours before, my sister
had been in the room to look at some of my new acquisitions. She found
them very pretty, and then remarked: “Now the desk really looks very
well, only the inkstand doesn’t match. You must get a prettier one.” I
accompanied my sister out and did not return for several hours. But then,
as it seems, I performed the execution of the condemned inkstand.

Did I perhaps conclude from my sister’s words that she intended to
present me with a prettier inkstand on the next festive occasion, and did
I shatter the unsightly old one in order to force her to carry out her
signified intention? If that be so, then my swinging motion was only ap-
parently awkward; in reality, it was most skillful and designed, as it
seemingly understood how to avoid all the valuable objects located near it.

I actually believe that we must accept this explanation for a whole se-
ries of seemingly accidental awkward movements. It is true that on the
surface, these seem to show something violent and irregular, similar to
spastic-
ataxic movements, but on examination, they seem to be dom-
inated by some intention, and they accomplish their aim with a cer-
tainty that cannot be generally credited to conscious arbitrary motions.
In both characteristics, the force as well as the sure aim, they show be-
sides a resemblance to the motor manifestations of the hysterical neurosis,
and in part also to the motor accomplishments of somnambulism, which
here as well as there, point to the same unfamiliar modification of the
functions of innervation.

In latter years, since I have been collecting such observations, it has
happened several times that I have shattered and broken objects of some
value, but the examination of these cases convinced me that it was never
the result of accident or of my unintentional awkwardness. Thus, one
morning while in my bath-
robe and straw slippers, I followed a sudden
impulse as I passed a room, and hurled a slipper from my foot against
the wall so that it brought down a beautiful little marble Venus from its
bracket. As it fell to pieces, I recited quite unmoved the following verse
from Busch:

118

“Ach! Die Venus ist perdü—¹
Klickeradoms!—von Medici!”

This crazy action and my calmness at the sight of the damage are ex-
plained in the then existing situation. We had a very sick person in the
family, of whose recovery I had personally despaired. That morning, I
had been informed that there was a great improvement; I know that I
had said to myself, “After all she will live.” My attack of destructive
madness served therefore as the expression of a grateful feeling toward
fate, and afforded me the opportunity of performing an “act of sacrifice,”
just as if I had vowed, “If she gets well, I will give this or that as a sac-
rifice.” That I chose the Venus of Medici as this sacrifice was only gallant
homage to the convalescent. But even today, it is still incomprehensible
to me that I decided so quickly, aimed so accurately and struck no other
object in close proximity.

Another breaking, in which I utilized a penholder falling from my
hand, also signified a sacrifice, but this time, it was a pious offering to
avert some evil. I had once allowed myself to reproach a true and worthy
friend for no other reason than certain manifestations which I interpreted
from his unconscious activity. He took it amiss and wrote me a letter in
which he bade me not to treat my friends by psychoanalysis. I had to
admit that he was right and appeased him with my answer. While writing
this letter, I had before me my latest acquisition—a small, handsome,
glazed Egyptian figure. I broke it in the manner mentioned, and then
immediately knew that I had caused this mischief to avert a greater one.
Luckily, both the friendship and the figure could be so cemented that the
break would not be noticed.

A third case of breaking had a less serious connection; it was only a
disguised “execution,” to use an expression from Th. Vischer’s Auch
Einer, of an object that no longer suited my taste. For quite a while, I had
carried a cane with a silver handle; through no fault of mine, the thin
silver plate was once damaged and poorly repaired. Soon after the cane
was returned, I mirthfully used the handle to angle for the leg of one of
my children. In that way, it naturally broke and I got rid of it.

The indifference with which we accept the resulting damage in all these
cases may certainly be taken as evidence for the existence of an uncon-
scious purpose in their execution.

(e) As can sometimes be demonstrated by analysis, the dropping of
objects or the overturning and breaking of the same, are very frequently
utilized as the expression of unconscious streams of thought, but more
often, they serve to represent the superstitious or odd significances con-
nected therewith in popular sayings. The meanings attached to the spill-
 

¹Alas! The Venus of Medici is lost!

119

ing of salt, the overturning of a wineglass, the sticking of a knife dropped
to the floor, and so on, are well known. I shall discuss later the right to
investigate such superstitious interpretations; here I shall simply observe
that the individual awkward acts do not by any means always have the
same meaning, but, depending on the circumstances, they serve to repre-
sent now this or that purpose.

Recently, we passed through a period in my house, during which an
unusual number of glass and china dishes were broken. I myself largely
contributed to the damage. This little endemic was readily explained by
the fact that it preceded the public betrothal of my eldest daughter. At
such festivities, it is customary to break some dishes and utter at the same
time some felicitating expression. This custom may signify a sacrifice or
express any other symbolic sense.

When servants destroy fragile objects by letting them fall, we certainly
do not think in the first place of a psychic motive for it; still, some obscure
motives are not improbable even here. Nothing lies farther from the un-
educated than the appreciation of art and works of art. Our servants are
dominated by a foolish hostility against these productions, especially
when the objects, whose worth they do not realize, become a source of
a great deal of work for them. On the other hand, persons of the same edu-
cation and origin employed in scientific institutions often distinguish
themselves by great dexterity and reliability in the handling of delicate
objects, as soon as they begin to identify themselves with their masters
and consider themselves an essential part of the staff.

I shall here add the report of a young mechanical engineer, which gives
some insight into the mechanism of damaging things.

“Some time ago, I worked with many others in the laboratory of the
High School on a series of complicated experiments on the subject of
elasticity. It was a work that we undertook of our own volition, but it
turned out that it took up more of our time than we expected. One day,
while going to the laboratory with F., he complained of losing so much
time, especially on this day, when he had so many other things to do at
home. I could only agree with him, and he added half jokingly, alluding
to an incident of the previous week: ‘Let us hope that the machine will
refuse to work, so that we can interrupt the experiment and go home
earlier.’

“In arranging the work, it happened that F. was assigned to the regu-
lation of the pressure valve; that is, it was his duty to carefully open the
valve and let the fluid under pressure flow from the accumulator into the
cylinder of the hydraulic press. The leader of the experiment stood at the
manometer and called a loud ‘Stop!’ when the maximum pressure was
reached. At this command, F. grasped the valve and turned it with all
his force—to the left (all valves, without any exception, are closed to the

120

right). This caused a sudden full pressure in the accumulator of the press,
and as there was no outlet, the connecting pipe burst. This was quite a
trifling accident to the machine, but enough to force us to stop our work
for the day and go home.

“It is characteristic, moreover, that some time later on discussing this
occurrence, my friend F. could not recall the remark that I positively re-
member he had made.”

Similarly, to fall, to make a misstep, or to slip need not always be in-
terpreted as an entirely accidental miscarriage of a motor action. The
linguistic double meaning of these expressions points to diverse hidden
phantasies, which may present themselves through the giving up of bodily
equilibrium. I recall a number of lighter nervous ailments in women and
girls which made their appearance after falling without injury, and which
were conceived as traumatic hysteria as a result of the shock of the fall.
At that time, I already entertained the impression that these conditions
had a different connection, that the fall was already a preparation of the
neurosis, and an expression of the same unconscious phantasies of sexual
content which may be taken as the moving forces behind the symptoms.
Was not this very thing meant in the proverb which says, “When a maiden
falls, she falls on her back”?

We can also add to these mistakes the case of one who gives a beggar a
gold piece in place of a copper or a silver coin. The solution of such mis-
handling is simple: it is an act of sacrifice designed to mollify fate, to
avert evil, and so on. If we hear a tender mother or an aunt express con-
cern regarding the health of a child, immediately before taking a walk
during which she displays her charity, contrary to her usual habit, we
can hardly doubt the sense of this apparently undesirable accident. In
this manner, our faulty acts make possible the practice of all those pious
and superstitious customs which must shun the light of consciousness,
because of the strivings against them of our unbelieving reason.

(f) That accidental actions are really intentional will find no greater
credence in any other sphere than in sexual activity, where the border be-
tween the intention and accident hardly seems discernible. That an ap-
parently clumsy movement may be utilized in a most refined way for
sexual purposes, I can verify by a nice example from my own experience.
In a friend’s house, I met a young girl visitor who excited in me a feeling
of fondness which I had long believed extinct, thus putting me in a jovial,
loquacious and complaisant mood. At that time, I endeavored to find out
how this came about, as a year before this same girl made no impression
on me.

As the girl’s uncle, a very old man, entered the room, we both jumped
to our feet to bring him a chair which stood in the corner. She was more
agile than I and also nearer the object, so that she was the first to take

121

ERRONEOUSLY CARRIED-OUT ACTIONS

possession of the chair. She carried it with its back to her, holding both
hands on the edge of the seat. As I got there later and did not give up the
claim to carrying the chair, I suddenly stood directly back of her, and
with both my arms was embracing her from behind, and for a moment, my
hands touched her lap. I naturally solved the situation as quickly as it
came about. Nor did it occur to anybody how dexterously I had taken
advantage of this awkward movement.

Occasionally, I have had to admit to myself that the annoying, awkward
stepping aside on the street, whereby for some seconds one steps here and
there, yet always in the same direction as the other person, until finally
both stop facing each other, that this “barring one’s way” repeats an ill-
mannered, provoking conduct of earlier times and conceals erotic pur-
poses under the mask of awkwardness. From my psychoanalysis of neu-
rotics, I know that the so-called naiveté of young people and children is
frequently only such a mask employed in order that the subject may say
or do the indecent without restraint.

(g) The effects which result from mistakes of normal persons are, as a
rule, of a most harmless nature. Just for this reason, it would be particu-
larly interesting to find out whether mistakes of considerable importance,
which could be followed by serious results, as, for example, those of phy-
sicians or druggists, fall within the range of our point of view.

As I am seldom in a position to deal with active medical matters, I can
only report one mistake from my own experience. I treated a very old
woman, whom I visited twice daily for several years. My medical activi-
ties were limited to two acts, which I performed during my morning visits:
I dropped a few drops of an eye lotion into her eyes and gave her a hypo-
dermic injection of morphine. I prepared regularly two bottles—a blue
one, containing the eye lotion, and a white one, containing the morphine
solution. While performing these duties, my thoughts were mostly occu-
pied with something else, for they had been repeated so often that the
attention acted as if free. One morning, I noticed that the automaton
worked wrong; I had put the dropper into the white instead of into the
blue bottle, and had dropped into the eyes the morphine instead of the
lotion. I was greatly frightened, but then calmed myself through the re-
flection that a few drops of a two per cent solution of morphine would not
likely do any harm even if left in the conjunctival sac. The cause of the
fright manifestly belonged elsewhere.

In attempting to analyze the slight mistake, I first thought of the
phrase, “to seize the old woman by mistake,” which pointed out the short
way to the solution. I had been impressed by a dream which a young mar-
had told me the previous evening, the contents of which could be explained

122

only on the basis of sexual intercourse with his own mother.¹ The strange-
ness of the fact that the Oedipus legend takes no offense at the age of
Queen Jocasta seemed to me to agree with the assumption that in being in
love with one’s mother, we never deal with the present personality, but
with her youthful memory picture carried over from our childhood. Such
incongruities always show themselves where one phantasy fluctuating
between two periods is made conscious, and is then bound to one definite
period.

Deep in thoughts of this kind, I came to my patient of over ninety; I
must have been well on the way to grasp the universal character of the
Oedipus fable as the correlation of the fate which the oracle pronounces,
for I made a blunder in reference to or on the old woman. Here, again, the
mistake was harmless; of the two possible errors, taking the morphine
solution for the eye, or the eye lotion for the injection, I chose the one by
far the least harmful. The question still remains open whether in mis-
takes in handling things which may cause serious harm, we can assume an
unconscious intention as in the cases here discussed.

The following case from Brill’s experience corroborates the assumption
that even serious mistakes are determined by unconscious intentions: “A
physician received a telegram informing him that his aged uncle was very
sick. In spite of important family affairs at home, he at once repaired to
that distant town because his uncle was really his father, who had cared
for him since he was one and a half years old, when his own father had
died. On reaching there, he found his uncle suffering from pneumonia,
and, as the old man was an octogenarian, the doctors held out no hope for
his recovery. ‘It was simply a question of a day or two,’ was the local doc-
tor’s verdict. Although a prominent physician in a big city, he refused to
coöperate in the treatment, as he found that the case was properly man-
aged by the local doctor, and he could not suggest anything to improve
matters.

“Since death was daily expected, he decided to remain to the end. He
waited a few days, but the sick man struggled hard, and although there
was no question of any recovery, because of the many new complications
which had arisen, death seemed to be deferred for a while. One night, be-
fore retiring, he went into the sickroom and took his uncle’s pulse. As it
was quite weak, he decided not to wait for the doctor, and administered a
hypodermic injection. The patient grew rapidly worse and died within a
few hours. There was something strange in the last symptoms, and on
later attempting to replace the tube of hypodermic tablets into the case,

¹ The Oedipus dream, as I was wont to call it, because it contains the key to the
understanding of the legend of King Oedipus. In the text of Sophocles, the relation
of such a dream is put in the mouth of Jocasta. (Cf. The Interpretation of Dreams
pp. 307–9, etc.)

123

he found, to his consternation, that he had taken out the wrong tube, and
instead of a small dose of digitalis, he had given a large dose of hyoscine.
“This case was related to me by the doctor after he read my paper on
the Oedipus Complex. We agreed that this mistake was determined not
only by his impatience to get home to his sick child, but also by an old
resentment and unconscious hostility toward his uncle (father).”

It is known that in the more serious cases of psychoneuroses one some-
times finds self-mutilations as symptoms of the disease. That the psychic
conflict may end in suicide can never be excluded in these cases. Thus, I
know from experience, which some day I shall support with convincing
examples, that many apparently accidental injuries happening to such
patients are really self-inflicted. This is brought about by the fact that
there is a constantly lurking tendency to self-punishment—usually express-
ing itself in self-reproach, or contributing to the formation of a symptom,
which skillfully makes use of an external situation. The required external
situation may accidentally present itself or the punishment tendency may
assist it until the way is open for the desired injurious effect.

Such occurrences are by no means rare even in cases of moderate sever-
ity, and they betray the portions of unconscious intention through a series
of special features—for example, through the striking presence of mind
which the patients show in the pretended accidents.¹

I will report exhaustively one in place of many such examples from
my professional experience. A young woman broke her leg below the
knee in a carriage accident so that she was bedridden for weeks. The
striking part of it was the lack of any manifestation of pain and the calm-
ness with which she bore her misfortune. This calamity ushered in a long
and serious neurotic illness, from which she was finally cured by psycho-
therapy. During the treatment I discovered the circumstances surround-
ing the accident, as well as certain impressions which preceded it. The
young woman with her jealous husband spent some time on the farm
of her married sister, in company with her numerous brothers and sisters
with their wives and husbands. One evening, she gave an exhibition
of one of her talents before this intimate circle; she danced artistically the
“cancan,” to the great delight of her relatives, but to the great annoyance
of her husband, who afterward whispered to her, “Again you have be-
haved like a whore.” The words took effect; we will leave it undecided
whether it was just on account of the dance. That night she was restless
in her sleep, and the next forenoon, she decided to go out driving. She

¹The self-inflicted injury which does not entirely tend toward self-annihilation has,
moreover, no other choice in our present state of civilization than to hide itself be-
hind the accidental, or to break through in a simulation of spontaneous illness. For-
merly, it was a customary sign of mourning; at other times, it expressed itself in
ideas of piety and renunciation of the world.

124

chose the horses herself, refusing one team and demanding another. Her
youngest sister wished to have her baby with its nurse accompany her,
but she opposed this vehemently. During the drive, she was nervous; she
reminded the coachman that the horses were getting skittish, and as the
fidgety animals really produced a momentary difficulty, she jumped from
the carriage in fright and broke her leg, while those remaining in the car-
riage were uninjured. Although after the disclosure of these details we
can hardly doubt that this accident was really contrived, we cannot fail to
admire the skill which forced the accident to mete out a punishment so
suitable to the crime. For, as it happened, “cancan” dancing with her be-
came impossible for a long time.

Concerning self-inflicted injuries of my own experience, I cannot report
anything in calm times, but under extraordinary conditions, I do not be-
lieve myself incapable of such acts. When a member of my family com-
plains that he or she has bitten his tongue, bruised her finger, and so on,
instead of the expected sympathy, I put the question, “Why did you do
that?” But I have most painfully squeezed my thumb, after a youthful
patient acquainted me during the treatment with his intention (naturally
not to be taken seriously) of marrying my eldest daughter, while I knew
that she was then in a private hospital in extreme danger of losing her life.

One of my boys, whose vivacious temperament was wont to put diffi-
culties in the management of nursing him in his illness, had a fit of anger
one morning because he was ordered to remain in bed during the forenoon,
and threatened to kill himself: a way out suggested to him by the news-
papers. In the evening, he showed me a swelling on the side of his chest
which was the result of bumping against the door knob. To my ironical
question why he did it, and what he meant by it, the eleven-year-old
child explained, “That was my attempt at suicide which I threatened
this morning.” However, I do not believe that my views on self-inflicted
wounds were accessible to my children at that time.

Whoever believes in the occurrence of semi-intentional self-inflicted
injury—if this awkward expression be permitted—will become prepared
to accept through it the fact that aside from conscious intentional suicide,
there also exists semi-intentional annihilation—with unconscious inten-
tion—which is capable of aptly utilizing a threat against life and masking
it as a casual mishap. Such mechanisms are by no means rare. For the
tendency to self-destruction exists to a certain degree in many more
persons than in those who bring it to completion. Self-inflicted injuries
are, as a rule, a compromise between this impulse and the forces working
against it, and even where it really comes to suicide, the inclination has
existed for a long time with less strength or as an unconscious and re-
pressed tendency.

Even suicide consciously committed chooses its time, means and op-
portunity

125

ERRONEOUSLY CARRIED-OUT ACTIONS

portunity; it is quite natural that unconscious suicide should wait for a
motive to take upon itself one part of the causation and thus free it from
its oppression by taking up the defensive forces of the person.¹ These are
in no way idle discussions which I here bring up; more than one case of
apparently accidental misfortune has become known to me whose sur-
rounding circumstances justified the suspicion of suicide.

For example, during an officers’ horse-race one of the riders fell from
his horse and was so seriously injured that a few days later he succumbed
to his injuries. His behavior after regaining consciousness was remarkable
in more than one way, and his conduct previous to the accident was still
more remarkable. He had been greatly depressed by the death of his be-
loved mother, had crying spells in the society of his comrades, and to his
trusted friend had spoken of the taedium vitae. He had wished to quit
the service in order to take part in a war in Africa which had no interest
for him.² Formerly a keen rider, he had later evaded riding whenever
possible. Finally, before the horse-race, from which he could not with-
draw, he expressed a sad foreboding; in the light of our conception, it is
not surprising that his premonition came true. It may be contended that
it is quite comprehensible without any further cause that a person in such
a state of nervous depression cannot manage a horse as well as on normal
days. I quite agree with that, only I should like to look for the mechanism
of this motor inhibition through “nervousness” in the intention of self-
destruction here emphasized.

Another analysis of an apparently accidental self-inflicted wound, de-
tailed to me by an observer, recalls the saying, “He who digs a pit for
others falls in himself.”³

¹ The case is then identical with a sexual attack on a woman, in whom the attack of
the man cannot be warded off through the full muscular strength of the woman be-
cause a portion of the unconscious feelings of the one attacked meets it with ready
acceptance. To be sure, it is said that such a situation paralyzes the strength of a
woman; we need only add the reasons for this paralysis. Insofar, the clever sentence
of Sancho Panza, which he pronounced as governor of his island, is psychologically
unjust (Don Quixote, vol. ii., chap. xlv.). A woman haled before the judge a man
who was supposed to have robbed her of her honor by force of violence. Sancho
indemnified her with a full purse which he took from the accused, but after the
departure of the woman, he gave the accused permission to follow her and snatch the
purse from her. Both returned wrestling, the woman priding herself that the villain
was unable to possess himself of the purse. Thereupon Sancho spoke: “Had you
shown yourself so stout and valiant to defend your body (nay, but half so much) as
you have done to defend your purse, the strength of Hercules could not have forced
you.”

² It is evident that the situation of a battlefield is such as to meet the requirement of
conscious suicidal intent which, nevertheless, shuns the direct way. Cf. in Wallenstein
the words of the Swedish captain concerning the death of Max Piccolomini: “They
say he wished to die.”

³ “Selbstbestrafung wegen Abortus” by Dr. J. E. G. van Emden, Haag (Holland)
Zentralb. f. Psychoanalyse, ii., 12.

126

“Mrs. X., belonging to a good middle-
class family, is married and has
three children. She is somewhat nervous, but never needed any strenuous
treatment, as she could sufficiently adapt herself to life. One day, she
sustained a rather striking though transitory disfigurement of her face in
the following manner: She stumbled in a street that was in process of
repair and struck her face against the house wall. The whole face was
bruised, the eyelids blue and oedematous, and as she feared that some
thing might happen to her eyes, she sent for the doctor. After she was
calmed, I asked her, ‘But why did you fall in such a manner?’ She an-
swered that just before this accident she warned her husband, who had
been suffering for some months from a joint affection, to be very careful
in the street, and she often had the experience that in some remarkable
way those things occurred to her against which she warned others.
“I was not satisfied with this as the determination of her accident, and
asked her whether she had not something else to tell me. ‘Yes, just before
the accident, she noticed a nice picture in a shop on the other side of the
street, which she suddenly desired as an ornament for her nursery, and
wished to buy it at once. She thereupon walked across to the shop without
looking at the street, stumbled over a heap of stones, and fell with her face
against the wall without making the slightest effort to shield herself with
her hands. The intention to buy the picture was immediately forgotten,
and she walked home in haste.’
“ ‘But why were you not more careful?’ I asked.
“ ‘Oh!’ she answered, ‘perhaps it was only a punishment for that epi-
sode which I confided to you!’
“ ‘Has this episode still bothered you?’
“ ‘Yes, later I regretted it very much; I considered myself wicked,
criminal and immoral, but at the time, I was almost crazy with nerv-
ousness.’
“She referred to an abortion which was started by a quack and had to
be brought to completion by a gynecologist. This abortion was initiated
with the consent of her husband, as both wished on account of their
pecuniary circumstances to be spared from being additionally blessed
with children.
“She said: ‘I had often reproached myself with the words, “You really
had your child killed,” and I feared that such a crime could not remain
unpunished. Now that you have assured me that there is nothing seriously
wrong with my eyes, I am quite assured I have already been sufficiently
punished.’
“This accident, therefore, was on the one hand a retribution for her
sin, but on the other hand it may have served as an escape from a more
dire punishment which she had feared for many months. In the moment
that she ran to the shop to buy the picture, the memory of this whole

127

history, with its fears (already quite active in her unconscious at the time
she warned her husband), became overwhelming and could perhaps find
expression in words like these: ‘But why do you want an ornament for
the nursery?—you who had your child killed! You are a murderer! The
great punishment is surely approaching!’
“This thought did not become conscious, but instead of it she made use
of the situation—I might say of the psychologic moment—to utilize in a
commonplace manner the heap of stones to inflict upon herself this
punishment. It was for this reason that she did not even attempt to put
out her arms while falling and was not much frightened. The second, and
probably lesser, determinant of her accident was obviously the self-pun-
ishment for her unconscious wish to be rid of her husband, who was an
accessory to the crime in this affair. This was betrayed by her absolutely
superfluous warning to be very careful in the street on account of the
stones. For, just because her husband had a weak leg, he was very careful
in walking.”

If such a rage against one’s own integrity and one’s own life can be
hidden behind apparently accidental awkwardness and motor insuffi-
ciency, then it is not a big step forward to grasp the possibility of trans-
ferring the same conception to mistakes which seriously endanger the life
and health of others. What I can put forward as evidence for the validity
of this conception was taken from my experience with neurotics, and
hence, does not fully meet the demands of this situation. I will report a
case in which it was not an erroneously carried-out action, but what may
be more aptly termed a symbolic or chance action that gave me the clue
which later made possible the solution of the patient’s conflict.

I once undertook to improve the marriage relations of a very intelligent
man, whose differences with his tenderly attached young wife could surely
be traced to real causes, but as he himself admitted, could not be alto-
gether explained through them. He continually occupied himself with the
thought of a separation, which he repeatedly rejected because he dearly
loved his two small children. In spite of this, he always returned to that
resolution and sought no means to make the situation bearable to himself.
Such an unsettlement of a conflict served to prove to me that there were
unconscious and repressed motives which enforced the conflicting con-
scious thoughts, and in such cases, I always undertake to end the conflict
by psychic analysis. One day, the man related to me a slight occurrence
which had extremely frightened him. He was sporting with the older child,
by far his favorite. He tossed it high in the air and repeated this tossing
till finally he thrust it so high that its head almost struck the massive gas
chandelier. Almost, but not quite, or say “just about!” Nothing happened
to the child except that it became dizzy from fright. The father stood
transfixed with the child in his arms, while the mother merged into an

128

hystericaI attack. The particular facility of this careless movement, with
the violent reaction in the parents, suggested to me to look upon this
accident as a symbolic action which gave expression to an evil intention
toward the beloved child.

I could remove the contradiction to the actual tenderness of this father
for his child by referring the impulse to injure it to the time when it was
the only one, and so small, that as yet, the father had no occasion for
tender interest in it. Then it was easy to assume that this man, so little
pleased with his wife at that time, might have thought: “If this small
being for whom I have no regard whatever should die, I would be free and
could separate from my wife.” The wish for the death of this much loved
being must therefore have continued unconsciously. From here, it was
easy to find the way to the unconscious fixation of this wish.

There was indeed a powerful determinant in a memory from the pa-
tient’s childhood: it referred to the death of a little brother, which the
mother laid to his father’s negligence, and which led to serious quarrels
with threats of separation between the parents. The continued course of
my patient’s life, as well as the therapeutic success, confirmed my analysis.