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    FORGETTING OF PROPER NAMES

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    3

    I

    FORGETTING OF PROPER NAMES

    DURING the year 1898 I published a short essay
    On the Psychic Mechanism of Forgetfulness.1)
    I shall now repeat its contents and take it as a
    starting-
    point for further discussion. I have
    there undertaken a psychologic analysis of a
    common case of temporary forgetfulness of
    proper names, and from a pregnant example of
    my own observation I have reached the con-
    clusion that this frequent and practically unim-
    portant occurrence of a failure of a psychic
    function–of memory–admits an explanation
    which goes beyond the customary utilization of
    this phenomenon.

    If an average psychologist should be asked
    to explain how it happens that we often fail to
    recall a name which we are sure we know, he
    would probably content himself with the answer
    that proper names are more apt to be forgotten
    than any other content of memory. He might
    give plausible reasons for this “forgetting pre-
    ”

    1)Monatschrift f. Psychiatrie.

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    4

    Psychopathology of Everyday Life

    ference ” for proper names, but he would not
    assume any deep determinant for the process.

    I was led to examine exhaustively the pheno-
    menon of temporary forgetfulness through the
    observation of certain peculiarities, which, al-
    though not general, can, nevertheless, be seen
    clearly in some cases. In these there is not only
    forgetfulness, but also false recollection : he who
    strives for the escaped name brings to conscious-
    ness others—substitutive names—which, although
    immediately recognized as false, nevertheless
    obtrude themselves with great tenacity. The
    process which should lead to the reproduction-
    of the lost name is, as it were, displaced, and
    thus brings one to an incorrect substitute.

    Now it is my assumption that the displace-
    ment is not left to psychic arbitrariness, but that it
    follows lawful and rational paths. In other-
    words, I assume that the substitutive name (or
    names) stands in direct relation to the lost name,
    and I hope, if I succeed in demonstrating this
    connection, to throw light on the origin of the
    forgetting of names.

    In the example which I selected for analysis
    in 1898 I vainly strove to recall the name of the
    master who made the imposing frescoes of the
    “Last Judgment” in the dome of Orvieto. In-
    stead of the lost name—Signorelli—two other
    names of artists—Botticelli and Boltraffio—
    obtruded themselves, names which my judg-
     

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    Forgetting of Proper Names

    ment immediately and definitely rejected as
    being incorrect. When the correct name was
    imparted to me by an outsider I recognized it at
    once without any hesitation. The examination
    of the influence and association paths which
    caused the displacement from Signorelli to
    Botticelli and Boltraffio led to the following
    results:—

    (a) The reason for the escape of the strange-
    ness in itself of this name nor in the psycho-
    logic character of the connection in which it
    was inserted. The forgotten name was just as
    familiar to me as one of the substitutive names
    —Botticelli—and somewhat more familiar than
    the other substitute—Boltraffio—of the possessor
    of which I could hardly say more than that he
    belonged to the Milanese School. The connec-
    tion, too, in which the forgetting of the name
    took place appeared to me harmless, and led
    to no further explanation. I journeyed by
    carriage with a stranger from Ragusa, Dalmatia,
    to a station in Herzegovina. Our conversation
    drifted to travelling in Italy, and I asked my
    companion whether he had been in Orvieto and
    had seen there the famous frescoes of—

    (b) The forgetting of the name could not be
    explained until after I had recalled the theme
    discussed immediately before this conversation.
    This forgetting then made itself known as a

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    Psychopathology of Everyday Life

    disturbance of the newly emerging theme caused
    by the theme preceding it. In brief, before I
    asked my travelling companion if he had been
    in Orvieto we had been discussing the customs
    of the Turks living in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
    I had related what I heard from a colleague who
    was practising medicine among them, namely,
    that they show full confidence in the physician
    and complete submission to fate. When one is
    compelled to inform them that there is no help
    for the patient, they answer: “ Sir (Herr), what
    can I say? I know that if he could be saved
    you would save him.” In these sentences alone
    we can find the words and names: Bosnia, Herze-
    govina, and Herr (sir), which may be inserted
    in an association series between Signorelli,
    Botticelli, and Boltraffio.

    (c) I assume that the stream of thoughts
    concerning the customs of the Turks in Bosnia,
    etc., was able to disturb the next thought, because
    I withdrew my attention from it before it came
    to an end. For I recalled that I wished to relate
    a second anecdote which was next to the first in
    my memory. These Turks value the sexual
    pleasure above all else, and at sexual disturbances
    merge into an utter despair which strangely
    contrasts with their resignation at the peril of
    losing their lives. One of my colleague’s patients
    once told him: “ For you know, sir (Herr), if
    that ceases, life no longer has any charm.”

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    Forgetting of Proper Names

    I refrained from imparting this characteristic
    feature because I did not wish to touch upon
    such a delicate theme in conversation with a
    stranger. But I went still further; I also de-
    flected my attention from the continuation of
    the thought which might have associated itself
    in me with the theme “Death and Sexuality.”
    I was at that time under the after-effects of a
    message which I had received a few weeks
    before, during a brief sojourn in Trafoi. A
    patient on whom I had spent much effort had
    ended his life on account of an incurable sexual
    disturbance. I know positively that this sad
    event, and everything connected with it, did not
    come to my conscious recollection on that trip
    in Herzegovina. However, the agreement be-
    tween Trafoi and Boltraffio forces me to assume
    that this reminiscence was at that time brought
    to activity despite all the intentional deviation
    of my attention.

    (d) I can no longer conceive the forgetting
    of the name Signorelli as an accidental occur-
    rence. I must recognize in this process the
    influence of a motive. There were motives which
    actuated the interruption in the communication
    of my thoughts (concerning the customs of the
    Turks, etc.), and which later influenced me to
    exclude from my consciousness the thought
    connected with them, and which might have led
    to the message concerning the incident in

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    Psychopathology of Everyday Life

    Trafoi—that is, I wanted to forget something, 
    I repressed something. To be sure, I wished 
    to forget something other than the name of the 
    master of Orvieto; but this other thought 
    brought about an associative connection between 
    itself and this name, so that my act of volition 
    missed the aim, and I forgot the one against my 
    will, while I intentionally wished to forget the 
    other. The disinclination to recall directed itself 
    against the one content; the inability to re-
    member appeared in another. The case would 
    have been obviously simpler if this disinclina-
    tion and the inability to remember had concerned 
    the same content. The substitutive names no 
    longer seem so thoroughly justified as they were 
    before this explanation. They remind me (after 
    the form of a compromise) as much of what I 
    wished to forget as of what I wished to re-
    member, and show me that my object to forget 
    something was neither a perfect success nor a 
    failure.

    (e) The nature of the association formed 
    between the lost name and the repressed theme 
    (death and sexuality, etc.), containing the names 
    of Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Trafoi, is also very 
    strange. In the scheme inserted here, which 
    originally appeared in 1898, an attempt is made 
    to graphically represent these associations.

    The name Signorelli was thus divided into 
    two parts. One pair of syllables (elli) returned

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    Signor

    alli

    Herr

    zegovina and

    Herr

    Sir, What can I say, etc.

    Botticelli

    Bosnia

    Bo

    l traffio

    Trafoi

    Death and Sexuality

    Repressed thoughts

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    unchanged in one of the substitutions, while the
    other had gained, through the translation of
    signor (sir, Herr), many and diverse relations
    to the name contained in the repressed theme,
    but was lost through it in the reproduction. Its
    substitution was formed in a way to suggest that
    a displacement took place along the same
    associations—“ Herzegovina and Bosnia ”—re-
    gardless of the sense and acoustic demarcation.
    The names were therefore treated in this process
    like the written pictures of a sentence which is
    to be transformed into a picture-puzzle (rebus).
    No information was given to consciousness con-
    cerning the whole process, which, instead of the
    name Signorelli, was thus changed to the sub-
    stitutive names. At first sight no relation is
    apparent between the theme that contained the
    name Signorelli and the repressed one which
    immediately preceded it.

    Perhaps it is not superfluous to remark that
    the given explanation does not contradict the
    conditions of memory reproduction and forgetting
    assumed by other psychologists, which they seek
    in certain relations and dispositions. Only in
    certain cases have we added another motive to
    the factors long recognized as causative in for-
    getting names, and have thus laid bare the
    mechanism of faulty memory. The assumed
    dispositions are indispensable also in our case,
    in order to make it possible for the repressed

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    Forgetting of Proper Names

    element to associatively gain control over the
    desired name and take it along into the repres-
    sion. Perhaps this would not have occurred
    in another name having more favourable
    conditions of reproduction. For it is quite
    probable that a suppressed element continually
    strives to assert itself in some other way, but
    attains this success only where it meets with
    suitable conditions. At other times the suppres-
    sion succeeds without disturbance of function,
    or, as we may justly say, without symptoms.

    When we recapitulate the conditions for for-
    getting a name with faulty recollection we find :
    (1) a certain disposition to forget the same ; (2)
    a process of suppression which has taken place
    shortly before ; and (3) the possibility of estab-
    lishing an outer association between the con-
    cerned name and the element previously
    suppressed.

    The last condition will probably
    not have to be much overrated, for the slightest
    claim on the association is apt in most cases to
    bring it about.

    But it is a different and
    farther-reaching question whether such outer
    association can really furnish the proper condi-
    tion to enable the suppressed element to disturb
    the reproduction of the desired name, or whether
    after all a more intimate connection between the
    two themes is not necessarily required.

    On
    superficial consideration one may be willing to
    reject the latter requirement and consider the

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    Psychopathology of Everyday Life

    temporal meeting in perfectly dissimilar contents
    as sufficient. But on more thorough examination
    one finds more and more frequently that the two
    elements (the repressed and the new one) con-
    nected by an outer association, possess besides
    a connection in content, and this can also be
    demonstrated in the example Signorelli.

    The value of the understanding gained through
    the analysis of the example Signorelli naturally
    depends on whether we must explain this case
    as a typical or as an isolated process. I must
    now maintain that the forgetting of a name
    associated with faulty recollection uncommonly
    often follows the same process as was demon-
    strated in the case of Signorelli. Almost every
    time that I observed this phenomenon in myself
    I was able to explain it in the manner indicated
    above as being motivated by repression.

    I must mention still another view-point in
    favour of the typical nature of our analysis. I
    believe that one is not justified in separating
    the cases of name-
    forgetting with faulty recol-
    lection from those in which incorrect substitu-
    tive names have not obtruded themselves. These
    substitutive names occur spontaneously in a
    number of cases; in other cases, where they do
    not come spontaneously, they can be brought
    to the surface by concentration of attention, and
    they then show the same relation to the repressed
    element and the lost name as those that come

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    Forgetting of Proper Names

    spontaneously. Two factors seem to play a part
    in bringing to consciousness the substitutive
    names: first, the effort of attention, and second,
    an inner determinant which adheres to the
    psychic material. I could find the latter in the
    greater or lesser facility which forms the required
    outer associations between the two elements. A
    great many of the cases of name-
    forgetting without faulty recollection therefore belong to
    the cases with substitutive name formation, the
    mechanism of which corresponds to the one in
    the example Signorelli. But I surely shall not
    venture to assert that all cases of name-
    forgetting belong to the same group. There is no doubt
    that there are cases of name-
    forgetting that
    proceed in a much simpler way. We shall
    represent this state of affairs carefully enough
    if we assert that besides the simple forgetting
    of proper names there is another forgetting
    which is motivated by repression.

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