MISTAKES IN SPEECH

71

V

MISTAKES IN SPEECH

ALTHOUGH the ordinary material of speech of our
mother-tongue seems to be guarded against for-
getting, its application, however, more often suc-
cumbs to another disturbance which is familiar
to us as “slips of the tongue.” What we observe
in normal persons as slips of the tongue gives the
same impression as the first step of the so-called
“paraphasias” which manifest themselves under
pathologic conditions.

I am in the exceptional position of being about
to refer to a previous work on the subject. In
the year 1895 Meringer and C. Mayer published
a study on Mistakes in Speech and Reading,
with whose view-points I do not agree. One of
the authors, who is the spokesman in the text, is
a philologist actuated by a linguistic interest to
examine the rules governing those slips. He
hoped to deduce from these rules the existence
“of a definite psychic mechanism,” “whereby the
sounds of a word, of a sentence, and even the
words themselves, would be associated and con-
 

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Psychopathology of Everyday Life

nected with one another in a quite peculiar
manner ” (p. 10).

The authors grouped the first examples of speech-
mistakes collected by them first according to
purely descriptive view-
points, such as interchang-
ings (e.g., the Milo of Venus instead of the Venus
of Milo), as anticipations (e.g., the shoes made
her sorft . . . the shoes made her feet sore), as
echoes and post positions, as contaminations
(e.g., “ I will soon him home,” instead of “ I
will soon go home and I will see him ”), and sub-
stitutions (e.g., “ he entrusted his money to a
savings crank,” instead of “ a savings bank ”).¹⁾
Besides these principal categories there are some
others of lesser importance (or of lesser signifi-
cance for our purpose). In this grouping it
makes no difference whether the transposition,
disfigurement, fusion, etc., affects single sounds
of the word or syllables, or whole words of the
concerned sentence.

To explain the various forms of mistakes in
speech, Meringer assumes a varied psychic value
of phonetics. As soon as the innervation affects
the first syllable of a word, or the first word of a
sentence, the stimulating process immediately
strikes the succeeding sounds, and the following
words, and in so far as these innervations are
synchronous they may effect some changes in one
another. The stimulus of the psychically more

¹⁾The examples are given by the editor.

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Mistakes in Speech

intensive sound “rings” before or continues
echoing, and thus disturbs the less important pro-
cess of innervation. It is necessary therefore to
determine which are the most important sounds of
a word. Meringer states: “If one wishes to
know which sound of a word possesses the
greatest intensity he should examine himself while
searching for a forgotten word, for example, a
name. That which first returns to consciousness
invariably had the greatest intensity prior to the
forgetting (p. 160). Thus the most important
sounds are the initial sound of the root-
syllable and the initial sound of the word itself, as well
as one or another of the accentuated vowels ”
(p. 162).

Here I cannot help voicing a contradiction.
Whether or not the initial sound of the name
belongs to the most important elements of the
word, it is surely not true that in the case of the
forgetting of the word it first returns to conscious-
ness; the above rule is therefore of no use.
When we observe ourselves during the search for
a forgotten name we are comparatively often
forced to express the opinion that it begins with a
certain letter. This conviction proves to be as
often unfounded as founded. Indeed, I would
even go so far as to assert that in the majority of
cases one reproduces a false initial sound. Also
in our example Signorelli the substitutive name
lacked the initial sound, and the principal syl-
lable.

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Psychopathology of Everyday Life

lables were lost; on the other hand, the less
important pair of syllables elli returned to con-
sciousness in the substitutive name Botticelli.

How little substitutive names respect the initial
sound of the lost names may be learned from the
following case. One day I found it impossible to
recall the name of the small country whose capital
is Monte Carlo. The substitutive names were as
follows: Piedmont, Albania, Montevideo, Colico.
In place of Albania Montenegro soon appeared,
and then it struck me that the syllable Mont (pro-
nounced Mon) occurred in all but the last of the
substitutive names. It thus became easy for me
to find from the name of Prince Albert the for-
gotten name Monaco. Colico practically imitates
the syllabic sequence and rhythm of the forgotten
name.

If we admit the conjecture that a mecha-
nism similar to that pointed out in the forgetting of
names may also play a part in the phenomena of
speech-
blunders, we are then led to a better
founded judgment of cases of speech-
blunders.
The speech disturbance which manifests itself as
a speech-
blunder may in the first place be caused
by the influence of another component of the
same speech, that is, through a pre-
sound or an
echo, or through another meaning within the
sentence or context which differs from that which
the speaker wishes to utter. In the second place,
however, the disturbance could be brought about

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Mistakes in Speech

analogously to the process in the case Signorelli,
through influences outside this word, sentence or
context, from elements which we did not intend
to express, and of whose incitement we became
conscious only through the disturbance. In both
modes of origin of the mistake in speech the
common element lies in the simultaneity of the
stimulus, while the differentiating elements lie in
the arrangement within or without the same
sentence or context.

The difference does not at first appear as wide
as when it is taken into consideration in certain
conclusions drawn from the symptomatology of
speech-
mistakes. It is clear, however, that only
in the first case is there a prospect of drawing
conclusions from the manifestations of speech-
blunders concerning a mechanism which connects
together sounds and words for the reciprocal
influence of their articulation; that is, conclu-
sions such as the philologist hopes to gain from
the study of speech-blunders. In the case of dis-
turbance through influence outside of the same
sentence or context, it would before all be a ques-
tion of becoming acquainted with the disturbing
elements, and then the question would arise
whether the mechanism of this disturbance
cannot also suggest the probable laws of the
formation of speech.

We cannot maintain that Meringer and Mayer
have overlooked the possibility of speech dis-

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Psychopathology of Everyday Life

turbance through “complicated psychic influ-
ences,” that is, through elements outside of the
same word or sentence or the same sequence of
words. Indeed, they must have observed that the
theory of the psychic variation of sounds applies,
strictly speaking, only to the explanation of sound
disturbances as well as to fore-sounds and after-
sounds. Where the word disturbances cannot be
reduced to sound disturbances, as, for example, in
the substitutions and contaminations of words,
they, too, have without hesitation sought the
cause of the mistake in speech outside of the
intended context, and proved this state of affairs
by means of fitting examples.¹ According to the
author’s own understanding it is some similarity
between a certain word in the intended sentence
and some other not intended, which allows the
latter to assert itself in consciousness by causing
a disfigurement, a composition, or a compromise
formation (contamination).

Now, in my work on the Interpretation of
Dreams I have shown the part played by the
process of condensation in the origin of the so-
called manifest contents of the dream from the
latent thoughts of the dream. Any similarity of
objects or of word-presentations between two
elements of the unconscious material is taken as a
cause for the formation of a third, which is a com-

¹Those who are interested are referred to pp. 62, 73, and
97 of the author’s work.

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Mistakes in Speech

posite or compromise formation. This element
represents both components in the dream content,
and in view of this origin it is frequently endowed
with numerous contradictory individual determin-
ants. The formation of substitutions and con-
taminations in speech-
mistakes is, therefore, the
beginning of that work of condensation which we
find taking a most active part in the construction
of the dream.

In a small essay destined for the general
reader,¹ Meringer advanced a theory of very prac-
tical significance for certain cases of interchang-
ing of words, especially for such cases where one
word is substituted by another of opposite mean-
ing. He says: “We may still recall the manner
in which the President of the Austrian House of
Deputies opened the session some time ago :
‘Honoured Sirs ! I announce the presence of so
and so many gentlemen, and therefore declare the
session as “closed”!’” The general merriment
first attracted his attention and he corrected his
mistake. In the present case the probable ex-
planation is that the President wished himself in
a position to close this session, from which he had
little good to expect, and the thought broke
through at least partially—a frequent manifesta-
tion—resulting in his use of “closed” in place of
“opened,” that is, the opposite of the statement

¹ Neue Freie Presse, August 23, 1900: “Wie man sich
versprechen kann.”

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Psychopathology of Everyday Life

intended. Numerous observations have taught
me, however, that we frequently interchange con-
trasting words; they are already associated in
our speech consciousness; they lie very close
together and are easily incorrectly evoked.

Still, not in all cases of contrast substitution is
it so simple as in the example of the President as
to appear plausible that the speech-
mistake occurs
merely as a contradiction which arises in the inner
thought of the speaker opposing the sentence
uttered. We have found the analogous mechan-
ism in the analysis of the example aliquis; there
the inner contradiction asserts itself in the form
of forgetting a word instead of a substitution
through its opposite. But in order to adjust the
difference we may remark that the little word
aliquis is incapable of a contrast similar to “clos-
ing” and “open-
ing,” and that the word “open-
ing” cannot be subject to forgetting on account
of its being a common component of speech.

Having been shown by the last examples of
Meringer and Mayer that speech disturbance may
be caused through the influence of fore-
sounds,
after-
sounds, words from the same sentence that
were intended for expression, as well as through
the effect of words outside the sentence intended,
the stimulus of which would otherwise not have
been suspected, we shall next wish to discover
whether we can definitely separate the two classes
of mistakes in speech, and how we can distinguish

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Mistakes in Speech

the example of the one from a case of the other
class.

But at this stage of the discussion we must also
think of the assertions of Wundt, who deals with
the manifestations of speech-
mistakes in his
recent work on the development of language.¹
Psychic influences, according to Wundt, never
lack in these as well as in other phenomena
related to them. “The uninhibited stream of
sound and word associations stimulated by spoken
sounds belongs here in the first place as a positive
determinant. This is supported as a negative
factor by the relaxation or suppression of the
influences of the will which inhibit this stream,
and by the active attention which is here a func-
tion of volition. Whether that play of associa-
tion manifests itself in the fact that a coming
sound is anticipated or a preceding sound repro-
duced, or whether a familiar practised sound
becomes intercalated between others, or finally,
whether it manifests itself in the fact that alto-
gether different sounds associatively related to the
spoken sounds act upon these—all these questions
designate only differences in the direction, and
at most in the play of the occurring associations
but not in the general nature of the same. In
some cases it may be also doubtful to which form
a certain disturbance may be attributed, or
whether it would not be more correct to refer

¹Völker psychologie, vol. i., pt. i., p. 371, etc., 1900.

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such disturbance to a concurrence of many
motives, following the principle of the complica-
tion of causes¹⁾ (cf. pp. 380–81).”

I consider these observations of Wundt as
absolutely justified and very instructive. Per-
haps we could emphasize with even greater firm-
ness than Wundt that the positive factor favour-
ing mistakes in speech (the uninhibited stream of
associations, and its negative, the relaxation of
the inhibiting attention) regularly attain syn-
chronous action, so that both factors become
only different determinants of the same process.
With the relaxation, or, more unequivocally ex-
pressed, through this relaxation, of the inhibiting
attention the uninhibited stream of associations
becomes active.

Among the examples of the mistakes in speech
collected by me I can scarcely find one in which
I would be obliged to attribute the speech dis-
turbance simply and solely to what Wundt calls
“contact effect of sound.” Almost invariably I
discover besides this a disturbing influence of
something outside of the intended speech. The
disturbing element is either a single unconscious
thought, which comes to light through the speech-
blunder, and can only be brought to conscious-
ness through a searching analysis, or it is a more
general psychic motive, which directs itself
against the entire speech.

¹⁾Italics are mine.

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Mistakes in Speech

(Example a) Seeing my daughter make an
unpleasant face while biting into an apple, I
wished to quote the following couplet :—

“The ape he is a funny sight,
When in the apple he takes a bite.”

But I began: “The apel . . .” This seems
to be a contamination of “ape” and “apple”
(compromise formation), or it may be also con-
ceived as an anticipation of the prepared “apple.”
The true state of affairs, however, was this : I
began the quotation once before, and made no
mistake the first time. I made the mistake only
during the repetition, which was necessary be-
cause my daughter, having been distracted from
another side, did not listen to me. This repeti-
tion with the added impatience to disburden
myself of the sentence I must include in
the motivation of the speech-blunder, which
represented itself as a function of condensation.

(b) My daughter said, “I wrote to Mrs.
Schresinger.” The woman’s name was Schle-
singer. This speech-blunder may depend on
the tendency to facilitate articulation. I must
state, however, that this mistake was made by my
daughter a few moments after I had said apel
instead of ape. Mistakes in speech are in a great
measure contagious ; a similar peculiarity was
noticed by Meringer and Mayer in the forgetting

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Psychopathology of Everyday Life

of names. I know of no reason for this psychic
contagiousness.

(c) “I sut up like a pocket-
knife,” said a patient in the beginning of treatment, instead of
“I shut up.” This suggests a difficulty of
articulation which may serve as an excuse for the
interchanging of sounds. When her attention
was called to the speech-blunder, she promptly
replied, “Yes, that happened because you said
‘earnesht’ instead of ‘earnest.’” As a matter
of fact I received her with the remark, “To-day
we shall be in earnest” (because it was the last
hour before her discharge from treatment), and I
jokingly changed the word into earnesht. In the
course of the hour she repeatedly made mistakes
in speech, and I finally observed that it was not
only because she imitated me but because she had
a special reason in her unconscious to linger at
the word earnest (Ernst) as a name.¹

(d) A woman, speaking about a game invented
by her children and called by them “the man in
the box,” said “the manx in the boc.” I could

¹It turned out that she was under the influence of un-
conscious thoughts concerning pregnancy and prevention
of conception. With the words “shut up like a pocket
knife,” which she uttered consciously as a complaint, she
meant to describe the position of the child in the womb.
The word “earnest” in my remark recalled to her the name
(S. Ernst) of the well-known Vienna business firm in
Kärthner Strasse, which used to advertise the sale of articles
for the prevention of conception.

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Mistakes in Speech

readily understand her mistake. It was while
analysing her dream, in which her husband is
depicted as very generous in money matters—just
the reverse of reality—that she made this speech-
blunder. The day before she had asked for a
new set of furs, which her husband denied her,
claiming that he could not afford to spend so
much money. She upbraided him for his stingi-
ness, “for putting away so much into the strong-
box,” and mentioned a friend whose husband has
not nearly his income, and yet he presented his
wife with a mink coat for her birthday. The
mistake is now comprehensible. The word manx
(manks) reduces itself to the “minks” which
she longs for, and the box refers to her husband’s
stinginess.

(e) A similar mechanism is shown in the mis-
take of another patient whose memory deserted
her in the midst of a long-forgotten childish remi-
niscence. Her memory failed to inform her on
what part of the body the prying and lustful hand
of another had touched her. Soon thereafter she
visited one of her friends, with whom she dis-
cussed summer homes. Asked where her cottage
in M. was located, she answered, “Near the
mountain loin” instead of “mountain lane.”

(f) Another patient, whom I asked at the end
of her visit how her uncle was, answered: “I
don’t know, I only see him now in flagranti.”
The following day she said, “I am really

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Psychopathology of Everyday Life

ashamed of myself for having given you yester-
day such a stupid answer. Naturally you must
have thought me a very uneducated person who
always mistakes the meaning of foreign words.
I wished to say en passant.” We did not know
at the time where she got the incorrectly used
foreign words, but during the same session she
reproduced a reminiscence as a continuation of
the theme from the previous day, in which being
caught in flagranti played the principal part.
The mistake of the previous day had therefore
anticipated the recollection, which at that time
had not yet become conscious.

(g) In discussing her summer plans, a patient
said, “I shall remain most of the summer in
Elberlon.” She noted her mistake, and asked
me to analyse it. The associations to Elberlon
elicited: seashore on the Jersey coast—summer
resort—vacation travelling. This recalled travel-
ling in Europe with her cousin, a topic which we
had discussed the day before during the analysis
of a dream. The dream dealt with her dislike for
this cousin, and she admitted that it was mainly
due to the fact that the latter was the favourite of
the man whom they met together while travelling
abroad. During the dream analysis she could
not recall the name of the city in which they met
this man, and I did not make any effort at the
time to bring it to her consciousness, as we were
engrossed in a totally different problem. When

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Mistakes in Speech

asked to focus her attention again on Elberlon
and reproduce her associations, she said, “It
brings to mind Elberlawn–lawn–field—and
Elberfield.” Elberfeld was the lost name of the
city in Germany. Here the mistake served to
bring to consciousness in a concealed manner a
memory which was connected with a painful
feeling.

(h) A woman said to me, “If you wish to buy
a carpet, go to Merchant (Kaufmann) in Matthew
Street (Mathäusgasse).” I repeated, “Then at
Matthew’s—I mean at Merchant’s—.” It would
seem that my repeating of one name in place of
the other was simply the result of distraction.
The woman’s remark really did distract me, as
she turned my attention to something else much
more vital to me than carpet. In Matthew Street
stands the house in which my wife lived as a
bride. The entrance to the house was in another
street, and now I noticed that I had forgotten its
name and could only recall it through a round-
about method. The name Matthew, which kept
my attention, is thus a substitutive name for the
forgotten name of the street. It is more suitable
than the name Merchant, for Matthew is exclu-
sively the name of a person, while Merchant is
not. The forgotten street, too, bears the name of
a person : Radetzky.

(i) A patient consulted me for the first time,
and from her history it became apparent that

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Psychopathology of Everyday Life

the cause of her nervousness was largely an un
happy married life. Without any encouragement
she went into details about her marital troubles.
She had not lived with her husband for about
six months, and she saw him last at the theatre,
when she saw the play Officer 606. I called
her attention to the mistake, and she immedi
ately corrected herself, saying that she meant
to say Officer 666 (the name of a recent
popular play). I decided to find out the reason
for the mistake, and as the patient came to me
for analytic treatment, I discovered that the
immediate cause of the rupture between herself
and husband was the disease which is treated
by “606.”¹

(k) Before calling on me a patient telephoned
for an appointment, and also wished to be in
formed about my consultation fee. He was told
that the first consultation was ten dollars;
after the examination was over he again asked
what he was to pay, and added: “I don’t like
to owe money to any one, especially to doctors;
I prefer to pay right away.” Instead of pay
he said play. His last voluntary remarks and
his mistake put me on my guard, but after a
few more uncalled-
for remarks he set me at
ease by taking money from his pocket. He
counted four paper dollars and was very

¹Similar mistakes dealing with Officer 666 were recently
reported to me by other psycho-
analysts.

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Mistakes in Speech

chagrined and surprised because he had no more
money with him, and promised to send me a
cheque for the balance. I was sure that his
mistake betrayed him, that he was only playing
with me, but there was nothing to be done.
At the end of a few weeks I sent him a bill for
the balance, and the letter was returned to me by
the post-
office authorities marked “Not found.”

(l) Miss X. spoke very warmly of Mr. Y.,
which was rather strange, as before this she
had always expressed her indifference, not to
say her contempt, for him. On being asked
about this sudden change of heart she said:
“I really never had anything against him; he
was always nice to me, but I never gave him
the chance to cultivate my acquaintance.” She
said “cuptivate.” This neologism was a con-
tamination of cultivate and captivate, and fore-
told the coming betrothal.

(m) An illustration of the mechanisms of
contamination and condensation will be found
in the following lapsus linguæ. Speaking of
Miss Z., Miss W. depicted her as a very “strait-
laced” person who was not given to levities,
etc. Miss X. thereupon remarked: “Yes, that
is a very characteristic description, she always
appealed to me as very ‘straicet-brazed.’ ” Here
the mistake resolved itself into straitlaced and
brazen-faced, which corresponded to Miss W.’s
opinion of Miss Z.

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Psychopathology of Everyday Life

(n) I shall quote a number of examples from
a paper by my colleague, Dr. W. Stekel, which
appeared in the Berlin Tageblatt of January,
1904, entitled “Unconscious Confessions.”
“An unpleasant trick of my unpleasant
thoughts was revealed by the following example:
To begin with, I may state that in my capacity
as a physician I never consider my remuneration,
but always keep in view the patient’s interest
only: this goes without saying. I was visiting
a patient who was convalescing from a serious
illness. We had passed through hard days and
nights. I was happy to find her improved, and
I portrayed to her the pleasures of a sojourn
in Abbazia, concluding with: ‘If, as I hope,
you will not soon leave your bed.’ This
obviously came from an unconscious selfish
motive, to be able to continue treating this
wealthy patient, a wish which is entirely foreign
to my waking consciousness, and which I would
reject with indignation.”

(o) Another example (Dr. W. Stekel): “My
wife engaged a French governess for the after-
noons, and later, coming to a satisfactory agree-
ment, wished to retain her testimonials. The
governess begged to be allowed to keep them,
saying, ‘Je cherche encore pour les après-midis
—pardons, pour les avant-midis.’ She apparently
intended to seek another place which would
perhaps offer more profitable arrangements—an
intention which she carried out.”

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Mistakes in Speech

(p) I was to give a lecture to a woman. Her
husband, upon whose request this was done,
stood behind the door listening. At the end of
my sermonizing, which had made a visible
impression, I said : “Good-
bye, sir !” To the
experienced person I thus betrayed the fact that
the words were directed towards the husband;
that I had spoken to oblige him.

(q) Dr. Stekel reports about himself that he
had under treatment at the same time two
patients from Triest, each of whom he always
addressed incorrectly. “Good morning, Mr.
Peloni !” he would say to Askoli, and to Peloni,
“Good morning, Mr. Askoli !” He was at first
inclined to attribute no deeper motive to this
mistake, but to explain it through a number of
similarities in both persons. However, he easily
convinced himself that here the interchange of
names bespoke a sort of boast—that is, he was
acquainting each of his Italian patients with the
fact that neither was the only resident of Triest
who came to Vienna in search of his medical
advice.

(r) Two women stopped in front of a drug
store, and one said to her companion, “If you
will wait a few moments I’ll soon be back,” but
she said movements instead. She was on her
way to buy some castoria for her child.

(s) Mr. L., who is fonder of being called
on than of calling, spoke to me through the

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Psychopathology of Everyday Life

telephone from a nearby summer resort. He
wanted to know when I would pay him a visit.
I reminded him that it was his turn to visit me,
and called his attention to the fact that, as he
was the happy possessor of an automobile, it
would be easier for him to call on me. (We
were at different summer resorts, separated by
about one half-
hour’s railway trip.) He gladly
promised to call, and asked: “How about
Labour Day (September 1st), will it be con-
venient for you?” When I answered affirma-
tively, he said, “Very well, then, put me down
for Election Day” (November). His mistake
was quite plain. He likes to visit me, but
it was inconvenient to travel so far. In
November we would both be in the city. My
analysis proved correct.

(t) A friend described to me a nervous patient,
and wished to know whether I could benefit
him. I remarked: “I believe that in time I
can remove all his symptoms by psychoanalysis,
because it is a durable case,” wishing to say
“curable”!

(u) I repeatedly addressed my patient as Mrs.
Smith, her married daughter’s name, when her
real name is Mrs. James. My attention having
been called to it, I soon discovered that I had
another patient of the same name who refused
to pay for the treatment. Mrs. Smith was also
my patient and paid her bills promptly.

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Mistakes in Speech

(v) A lapsus linguæ sometimes stands for a
particular characteristic. A young woman, who
is the domineering spirit in her home, said of
her ailing husband that he had consulted the
doctor about a wholesome diet for himself, and
then added: “The doctor said that diet has
nothing to do with his ailments, and that he can
eat and drink what I want.”

(w) I cannot omit this excellent and in-
structive example, although, according to my
authority, it is about twenty years old. A lady
once expressed herself in society—the very words
show that they were uttered with fervour and
under the pressure of a great many secret
emotions: “Yes, a woman must be pretty if
she is to please the men. A man is much better
off. As long as he has five straight limbs, he
needs no more!”

This example affords us a good insight into
the intimate mechanisms of a mistake in speech
by means of condensation and contamination
(cf. p. 72). It is quite obvious that we have
here a fusion of two similar modes of
expression :—

“As long as he has his four straight limbs.”
“As long as he has all his five senses.”
Or the term “straight” may be the common
element of the two intended expressions :—
“As long as he has his straight limbs.”
“All five should be straight.”

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Psychopathology of Everyday Life

It may also be assumed that both modes of
expression—viz., those of the five senses and
those of the straight five—have co-
operated to introduce into the sentence about the straight
limbs first a number and then the mysterious
five instead of the simple four. But this fusion
surely would not have succeeded if it had not
expressed good sense in the form resulting from
the mistake ; if it had not expressed a cynical
truth which, naturally, could not be uttered
unconcealed, coming as it did from a woman.

Finally, we shall not hesitate to call attention
to the fact that the woman’s saying, following its
wording, could just as well be an excellent
witticism as a jocose speech-blunder. It is
simply a question whether she uttered these
words with conscious or unconscious intention.
The behaviour of the speaker in this case cer-
tainly speaks against the conscious intention, and
thus excludes wit.

(x) Owing to similarity of material, I add
here another case of speech-blunder, the inter-
pretation of which requires less skill. A
professor of anatomy strove to explain the
nostril, which, as is known, is a very difficult
anatomical structure. To his question whether
his audience grasped his ideas he received an
affirmative reply. The professor, known for his
self-esteem, thereupon remarked : “I can hardly
believe this, for the number of people who

Mistakes in Speech

understand the nostril, even in a city of millions
like Vienna, can be counted on a finger–pardon
me, I meant to say on the fingers of a hand.”

(y) I am indebted to Dr. Alf. Robitsek, of
Vienna, for calling my attention to two speech-
blunders from an old French author, which I
shall reproduce in the original.

Brantôme (1527–1614), Vies des Dames
galantes, Discours second: “Si ay-je cogneu
une très belle et honneste dame de par le monde,
qui, devisant avec un honneste gentilhomme de
la cour des affaires de la guerre durant ces
civiles, elle luy dit: ‘J’ay ouy dire que le roy
a faiet rompre tous les c— de ce pays là.’
Elle vouloit dire le ponts. Pensez que, venant
de coucher d’avec son mary, ou songeant à son
amant, elle avoit encor ce nom frais en la
bouche; et le gentilhomme s’en eschauffer en
amours d’elle pour ce mot.

“Une autre dame que j’ai cogneue, entretenant
une autre grand dame plus qu’elle, et luy louant
et exaltant ses beautez, elle luy dit après: ‘Non,
madame, ce que je vous en dis, ce n’est point
pour vous adultérer; voulant dire aduler,
comme elle le rhabilla ainsi: pensez qu’elle
songeoit à adultérer.’”

In the psychotherapeutic procedure which I
employ in the solution and removal of neurotic
symptoms, I am often confronted with the task
of discovering from the accidental utterances and

93

94

Psychopathology of Everyday Life

fancies of the patient the thought contents, which,
though striving for concealment, nevertheless un-
intentionally betray themselves. In doing this
the mistakes often perform the most valuable
service, as I can show through most convincing
and still most singular examples.

For example, patients speak of an aunt and
later, without noting the mistake, call her “my
mother,” or designate a husband as a “brother.”
In this way they attract my attention to the fact
that they have “identified” these persons with
each other, that they have placed them in the
same category, which for their emotional life
signifies the recurrence of the same type. Or,
a young man of twenty years presents himself
during my office hours with these words: “I
am the father of N. N., whom you have treated
—pardon me, I mean the brother; why, he is
four years older than I.” I understand through
this mistake that he wishes to express that, like
the brother, he, too, is ill through the fault of
the father; like his brother, he wishes to be
cured, but that the father is the one most in
need of treatment. At other times an unusual
arrangement of words, or a forced expression,
is sufficient to disclose in the speech of the patient
the participation of a repressed thought having
a different motive.

Hence, in coarse as well as in finer speech
disturbances, which may, nevertheless, be sub-
 

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Mistakes in Speech

sumed as “speech-blunders,” I find that it is
not the contact effects of the sound, but the
thoughts outside the intended speech, which
determine the origin of the speech-blunder, and
also suffice to explain the newly formed mistakes
in speech. I do not doubt the laws whereby
the sounds produce changes upon one another;
but they alone do not appear to me sufficiently
forcible to mar the correct execution of speech.
In those cases which I have studied and investi-
gated more closely they merely represent the
preformed mechanism, which is conveniently
utilized by a more remote psychic motive. The
latter does not, however, form a part of the
sphere of influence of these sound relations. In
a large number of substitutions caused by mis-
takes in talking there is an entire absence of such
phonetic laws. In this respect I am in full
accord with Wundt, who likewise assumes that
the conditions underlying speech-blunders are
complex and go far beyond the contact effect
of the sounds.

If I accept as certain “these more remote
psychic influences,” following Wundt’s expres-
sion, there is still nothing to detain me from con-
ceding also that in accelerated speech, with a
certain amount of diverted attention, the causes
of speech-blunder may be easily limited to the
definite law of Meringer and Mayer. However,
in a number of examples gathered by these

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Psychopathology of Everyday Life

authors a more complicated solution is quite
apparent.

In some forms of speech-blunders we may
assume that the disturbing factor is the result
of striking against obscene words and mean-
ings. The purposive disfigurement and distor-
tion of words and phrases, which is so popular
with vulgar persons, aims at nothing else but
the employing of a harmless motive as a reminder
of the obscene, and this sport is so frequent
that it would not be at all remarkable if it
appeared unintentionally and contrary to the will.

I trust that the readers will not depreciate the
value of these interpretations, for which there is
no proof, and of these examples which I have
myself collected and explained by means of
analysis. But if secretly I still cherish the
expectation that even the apparently simple cases
of speech-blunder will be traced to a disturb-
ance caused by a half-repressed idea outside of
the intended context, I am tempted to it by a
noteworthy observation of Meringer. This
author asserts that it is remarkable that nobody
wishes to admit having made a mistake in
speaking. There are many intelligent and honest
people who are offended if we tell them that they
made a mistake in speaking. I would not risk
making this assertion as general as does
Meringer, using the term “nobody.” But the
emotional trace which clings to the demonstration

97

Mistakes in Speech

of the mistake, which manifestly belongs to the
nature of shame, has its significance. It may
be classed with the anger displayed at the in-
ability to recall a forgotten name, and with the
surprise at the tenaciousness of an apparently
indifferent memory, and it invariably points to
the participation of a motive in the formation
of the disturbance.

The distorting of names amounts to an insult
when done intentionally, and could have the
same significance in a whole series of cases
where it appears as unintentional speech-
blunders. The person who, according to
Mayer’s report, once said “Freuder” instead
of “Freud,” because shortly before he pro-
nounced the name “Breuer” (p. 38), and who
at another time spoke of the “Freuer-Breudian”
method (p. 28), was certainly not particularly
enthusiastic over this method. Later, under the
mistakes in writing, I shall report a case of name
disfigurement which certainly admits of no other
explanation.¹

¹It may be observed that aristocrats in particular very
frequently distort the names of the physicians they consult,
from which we may conclude that inwardly they slight them,
in spite of the politeness with which they are wont to greet
them. I shall cite here some excellent observations con-
cerning the forgetting of names from the works of Professor
E. Jones, of Toronto : Papers on Psycho-analysis, chap. iii.
p. 49 :—
“Few people can avoid feeling a twinge of resentment

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Psychopathology of Everyday Life

As a disturbing element in these cases there
is an intermingling of a criticism which must
be omitted, because at the time being it
does not correspond to the intention of the
speaker.

Or it may be just the reverse; the substi-
tuted name, or the adoption of the strange name,
signifies an appreciation of the same. The
identification which is brought about by the
mistake is equivalent to a recognition which for
the moment must remain in the background. An
experience of this kind from his schooldays is
related by Dr. Ferenczi :—

“While in my first year at college I was
obliged to recite a poem before the whole class.

when they find that their name has been forgotten, particularly
if it is by some one with whom they had hoped or expected
it would be remembered. They instinctively realize that
if they had made a greater impression on the person’s mind
he would certainly have remembered them again, for the
name is an integral part of the personality. Similarly, few
things are more flattering to most people than to find
themselves addressed by name by a great personage where
they could hardly have anticipated it. Napoleon, like most
leaders of men, was a master of this art. In the midst of the
disastrous campaign of France in 1814, he gave an amazing
proof of his memory in this direction. When in a town near
Craonne, he recollected that he had met the mayor, De
Bussy, over twenty years ago in the La Fère Regiment. The
delighted De Bussy at once threw himself into his service
with extraordinary zeal. Conversely, there is no surer way
of affronting some one than by pretending to forget his
name; the insinuation is thus conveyed that the person

99

Mistakes in Speech

It was the first experience of the kind in my
life, but I was well prepared. As soon as I
began my recitation I was dismayed at being
disturbed by an outburst of laughter. The
professor later explained to me this strange
reception. I started by giving the title ‘From
the Distance,’ which was correct, but instead
of giving the name of the real author, I men-
tioned—my own. The name of the poet is
Alexander Petöfi. The identity of the first name
with my own favoured the interchange of names,
but the real reason was surely the fact that I
identified myself at that time with the celebrated
poet-hero. Even consciously I entertained for
him a love and respect which verged on adora-
tion.

is so unimportant in our eyes that we cannot be bothered
to remember his name. This device is often exploited in
literature. In Turgentev’s Smoke (p. 255) the following
passage occurs: “So you still find Baden entertaining,
M’sieur—Litvinov.’ Ratmirov always uttered Litvinov’s sur-
name with hesitation, every time, as though he had forgotten
it, and could not at once recall it. In this way, as well as
by the lofty flourish of his hat in saluting him, he meant to
insult his pride.” The same author, in his Fathers and
Children (p. 107), writes: “The Governor invited Kirsanov
and Bazarov to his ball, and within a few minutes invited
them a second time, regarding them as brothers, and calling
them Kisarov.” Here the forgetting that he had spoken
to them, the mistake in the names, and the inability to
distinguish between the two young men, constitute a culmi-
nation of disparagement. Falsification of a name has the
same signification as forgetting it; it is only a step towards
complete amnesia.”

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Psychopathology of Everyday Life

tion. The whole ambition-complex hides itself
under this faulty action.”

A similar identification was reported to me
concerning a young physician who timidly and
reverently introduced himself to the celebrated
Virchow with the following words: “I am Dr.
Virchow.” The surprised professor turned to
him and asked, “Is your name also Virchow?”

I do not know how the ambitious young man
justified his speech-blunder, whether he thought
of the charming excuse that he imagined him-
self so insignificant next to this big man that
his own name slipped from him, or whether he
had the courage to admit that he hoped that he,
too, would some day be as great a man as
Virchow, and that the professor should therefore
not treat him in too disparaging a manner. One
or both of these thoughts may have put this
young man in an embarrassing position during
the introduction.

Owing to very personal motives I must leave
it undecided whether a similar interpretation
may also apply in the case to be cited. At the
International Congress in Amsterdam, in 1907,
my theories of hysteria were the subject of a
lively discussion. One of my most violent
opponents, in his diatribe against me, repeatedly
made mistakes in speech in such a manner that
he put himself in my place and spoke in my
name. He said, for example, “Breuer and I,

101

Mistakes in Speech

as is well known, have demonstrated,” etc.,
when he wished to say “Breuer and Freud.”
The name of this opponent does not show the
slightest sound similarity to my own. From this
example, as well as from other cases of inter-
changing names in speech-blunders, we are re-
minded of the fact that the speech-blunder can
fully forego the facility afforded to it through
similar sounds, and can achieve its purpose
if only supported in content by concealed
relations.

In other and more significant cases it is a
self-criticism, an internal contradiction against
one’s own utterance, which causes the speech-
blunder, and even forces a contrasting substi-
tution for the one intended. We then observe
with surprise how the wording of an assertion
removes the purpose of the same, and how the
error in speech lays bare the inner dishonesty.
Here the lapsus linguæ becomes a mimicking
form of expression, often, indeed, for the expres-
sion of what one does not wish to say. It is
thus a means of self-betrayal.

Brill relates : “I had recently been consulted
by a woman who showed many paranoid trends,
and as she had no relatives who could co-operate
with me, I urged her to enter a State hospital
as a voluntary patient. She was quite willing
to do so, but on the following day she told
me that her friends with whom she leased an

102

Psychopathology of Everyday Life

apartment objected to her going to a hospital,
as it would interfere with their plans, and so
on. I lost patience and said: ‘There is no
use listening to your friends who know nothing
about your mental condition; you are quite
incompetent to take care of your own affairs.’ I
meant to say ‘competent.’ Here the lapsus
linguæ expressed my true opinion.”

Favoured by chance the speech material often
gives origin to examples of speech-blunders
which serve to bring about an overwhelming
revelation or a full comic effect, as shown by
the following examples reported by Brill:—

“A wealthy but not very generous host invited
his friends for an evening dance. Everything
went well until about 11.30 p.m., when there
was an intermission, presumably for supper. To
the great disappointment of most of the guests
there was no supper; instead, they were regaled
with thin sandwiches and lemonade. As it was
close to Election day the conversation centred
on the different candidates; and as the discussion
grew warmer, one of the guests, an ardent
admirer of the Progressive Party candidate, re-
marked to the host: ‘You may say what you
please about Teddy, but there is one thing—he
can always be relied upon; he always gives you
a square meal,’ wishing to say square deal. The
assembled guests burst into a roar of laughter,
to the great embarrassment of the speaker

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Mistakes in Speech

and the host, who fully understood each
other.”

“While writing a prescription for a woman
who was especially weighed down by the
financial burden of the treatment, I was in-
terested to hear her say suddenly: ‘Please
do not give me big bills, because I cannot
swallow them.’ Of course she meant to
say pills.”

The following example illustrates a rather
serious case of self-betrayal through a mistake
in talking. Some accessory details justify
full reproduction as first printed by Dr.
A. A. Brill.¹

“While walking one night with Dr. Frink
we accidentally met a colleague, Dr. P., whom
I had not seen for years, and of whose private
life I knew nothing. We were naturally very
pleased to meet again, and on my invitation he
accompanied us to a café, where we spent about
two hours in pleasant conversation. To my
question as to whether he was married he gave
a negative answer, and added, ‘Why should a
man like me marry?’ ”

“On leaving the café, he suddenly turned to
me and said: ‘I should like to know what you
would do in a case like this: I know a nurse

¹ Zentralb. f. Psychoanalyse, ii., Jahrg. 1. Cf. also Brill’s
Psychanalysis : Its Theories and Practical Application, p. 202.
Saunders, Philadelphia and London.

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Psychopathology of Everyday Life

who was named as co-
respondent in a divorce
case. The wife sued the husband for divorce
and named her as co-respondent, and he got
the divorce.’ I interrupted him, saying, ‘You
mean she got the divorce.’ He immediately
corrected himself, saying, ‘Yes, she got the
divorce,’ and continued to tell how the excite-
ment of the trial had affected this nurse to such
an extent that she became nervous and took
to drink. He wanted me to advise him how to
treat her.

“As soon as I had corrected his mistake I
asked him to explain it, but, as is usually the
case, he was surprised at my question. He
wanted to know whether a person had no right
to make mistakes in talking. I explained to
him that there is a reason for every mistake,
and that if he had not told me that he was un-
married, I would say that he was the hero of
the divorce case in question, and that the mistake
showed that he wished he had obtained the
divorce instead of his wife, so as not to be
obliged to pay alimony and to be permitted to
marry again in New York State.

“He stoutly denied my interpretation, but his
emotional agitation, followed by loud laughter,
only strengthened my suspicions. To my appeal
that he should tell the truth ‘for science’ sake,’
he said, ‘Unless you wish me to lie you must
believe that I was never married, and hence your

105

Mistakes in Speech

psychoanalytic interpretation is all wrong.’ He,
however, added that it was dangerous to be with
a person who paid attention to such little things.
Then he suddenly remembered that he had
another appointment and left us.

“Both Dr. Frink and I were convinced that
my interpretation of his lapsus linguæ was
correct, and I decided to corroborate or dis-
prove it by further investigation. The next day
I found a neighbour and old friend of Dr. P.,
who confirmed my interpretation in every par-
ticular. The divorce was granted to Dr. P.’s
wife a few weeks before, and a nurse was named
as co-respondent. A few weeks later I met Dr.
P., and he told me that he was thoroughly
convinced of the Freudian mechanisms.”

The self-betrayal is just as plain in the
following case reported by Otto Rank:—

A father who was devoid of all patriotic
feeling and desirous of educating his children to
be just as free from this superfluous sentiment,
reproached his sons for participating in a
patriotic demonstration, and rejected their refer-
ence to a similar behaviour of their uncle with
these words: “You are not obliged to imitate
him ; why, he is an idiot.” The astonished
features of the children at their father’s unusual
tone aroused him to the fact that he had made
a mistake, and he remarked apologetically, “Of
course, I wished to say patriot.”

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Psychopathology of Everyday Life

When such a speech-
blunder occurs in a
serious squabble and reverses the intended
meaning of one of the disputants, at once it
puts him at a disadvantage with his adversary—
a disadvantage which the latter seldom fails to
utilize.

This clearly shows that although people are
unwilling to accept the theory of my concep-
tion and are not inclined to forego the conveni-
ence that is connected with the tolerance of a
faulty action, they nevertheless interpret speech-
blunders and other faulty acts in a manner
similar to the one presented in this book. The
merriment and derision which are sure to be
evoked at the decisive moment through such
linguistic mistakes speak conclusively against the
generally accepted convention that such a speech-
blunder is a lapsus linguæ and psychologically
of no importance. It was no less a man
than the German Chancellor, Prince Bülow,
who endeavoured to save the situation
through such a protest when the wording
of his defence of his Emperor (November,
1907) turned into the opposite through a
speech-
blunder.

“Concerning the present, the new epoch of
Emperor Wilhelm II, I can only repeat what I
said a year ago, that it would be unfair and
unjust to speak of a coterie of responsible
advisers around our Emperor (loud calls, ‘Irre-
 

107

Mistakes in Speech

sponsible !')—to speak of irresponsible advisers.
Pardon the lapsus linguæ” (hilarity).

A nice example of speech-
blunder, which aims not so much at the betrayal of the speaker as at
the enlightenment of the listener outside the
scene, is found in Wallenstein (Piccolomini,
Act I, Scene 5), and shows us that the poet who
here uses this means is well versed in the
mechanism and intent of speech-
blunders. In
the preceding scene Max Piccolomini was
passionately in favour of the ducal party,
and was enthusiastic over the blessings of the
peace which became known to him in the course
of a journey while accompanying Wallenstein’s
daughter to the encampment. He leaves his
father and the Court ambassador, Questenberg,
in great consternation. The scene proceeds as
follows :—

Questenberg. Woe unto us! Are matters thus? Friend,
should we allow him to go there with this false opinion, and
not recall him at once in order to open his eyes instantly.

Octavio (rousing himself from profound meditation). He
has already opened mine, and I see more than pleases me.

Questenberg. What is it, friend?

Octavio. A curse on that journey!

Questenberg. Why? What is it?

Octavio. Come! I must immediately follow the unlucky
trail, must see with my own eyes—come— (Wishes to lead
him away.)

Questenberg. What is the matter? Where?

Octavio (urging). To her!

Questenberg. To—?

Octavio (corrects himself). To the duke! Let us go, etc.

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Psychopathology of Everyday Life

The slight speech-blunder to her in place of
to him is meant to betray to us the fact that the
father has seen through his son’s motive for
espousing the other cause, while the courtier
complains that “he speaks to him altogether in
riddles.”

Another example wherein a poet makes use
of a speech-blunder was discovered by Otto
Rank in Shakespeare. I quote Rank’s report
from the Zentralblatt für Psychoanalyse, I. 3.

“A poetic speech-blunder, very delicately
motivated and technically remarkably well
utilized, which, like the one pointed out by
Freud in Wallenstein (Zur Psychopathologie des
Alltagslebens, 2nd Edition, p. 48), not only
shows that poets knew the mechanism and
sense of this error, but also presupposes an
understanding of it on the part of the hearer, can
be found in Shakespeare’s Merchant of Venice
(Act III, Scene 2). By the will of her father,
Portia was bound to select a husband through
a lottery. She escaped all her distasteful suitors
by lucky chance. When she finally found in
Bassanio the suitor after her own heart, she had
cause to fear lest he, too, should draw the
unlucky lottery. In the scene she would like
to tell him that even if he chose the wrong
casket, he might, nevertheless, be sure of her
love. But she is hampered by her vow. In
this mental conflict the poet puts these words

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Psychopathology of Everyday Life

“ Our great novelist, George Meredith, in his
masterpiece, The Egoist, shows an even finer
understanding of the mechanism. The plot of
the novel is, shortly, as follows : Sir Willoughby
Patterne, an aristocrat greatly admired by his
circle, becomes engaged to a Miss Constantia
Durham. She discovers in him an intense
egoism, which he skilfully conceals from the
world, and to escape the marriage she elopes
with a Captain Oxford. Some years later
Patterne becomes engaged to a Miss Clara
Middleton, and most of the book is taken up
with a detailed description of the conflict that
arises in her mind on also discovering his egoism.
External circumstances and her conception of
honour hold her to her pledge, while he becomes
more and more distasteful in her eyes. She
partly confided in his cousin and secretary,
Vernon Whitford, the man whom she ultimately
marries, but from a mixture of motives he
stands aloof.

“ In the soliloquy Clara speaks as follows :
‘ If some noble gentleman could see me as I
am and not disdain to aid me ! Oh ! to be
caught out of this prison of thorns and brambles.
I cannot tear my own way out. I am a coward.
A beckoning of a finger would change me, I
believe. I could fly bleeding and through hoot-
ings to a comrade. … Constantia met a
soldier. Perhaps she prayed and her prayer was

Mistakes in Speech

answered. She did ill. But, oh, how I love her
for it! His name was Harry Oxford. . . . She
did not waver, she cut the links, she signed
herself over. Oh, brave girl, what do you think
of me? But I have no Harry Whitford; I am
alone. . . . The sudden consciousness that she
had put another name for Oxford struck her a
buffet, drowning her in crimson.

“The fact that both men’s names end in ‘ford’
evidently renders the confounding of them more
easy, and would by many be regarded as an
adequate cause for this, but the real underlying
motive for it is plainly indicated by the author.
In another passage the same lapsus occurs, and
is followed by the hesitation and change of
subject that one is familiar with in psycho-
analysis when a half-conscious complex is
touched. Sir Willoughby patronizingly says of
Whitford: ‘False alarm. The resolution to do
anything unaccustomed is quite beyond poor old
Vernon.’ Clara replies: ‘But if Mr. Oxford–
Whitford . . . your swans, coming sailing up
the lake; how beautiful they look when they
are indignant! I was going to ask you, surely
men witnessing a marked admiration for some
one else will naturally be discouraged?’ Sir
Willoughby stiffened with sudden enlighten-
ment.

“In still another passage Clara, by another
lapsus, betrays her secret wish that she was on

III

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Psychopathology of Everyday Life

a more intimate footing with Vernon Whitford.
Speaking to a boy friend, she says, ‘Tell Mr.
Vernon–tell Mr. Whitford.’ ”

The conception of speech-
blunders here de
fended can be readily verified in the smallest
details. I have been able to demonstrate re-
peatedly that the most insignificant and most
natural cases of speech-
blunders have their good
sense, and admit of the same interpretation as
the more striking examples. A patient who,
contrary to my wishes but with firm personal
motives, decided upon a short trip to Budapest,
justified herself by saying that she was going
for only three days, but she blundered and said
for only three weeks. She betrayed her
secret feeling that, to spite me, she preferred
spending three weeks to three days in that society
which I considered unfit for her.

One evening, wishing to excuse myself for
not having called for my wife at the theatre, I
said: “I was at the theatre at ten minutes after
ten.” I was corrected: “You meant to say before
ten o’clock.” Naturally I wanted to say before
ten. After ten would certainly be no excuse.
I had been told that the theatre programme
read, “Finished before ten o’clock.” When I
arrived at the theatre I found the foyer dark and
the theatre empty. Evidently the performance
was over earlier and my wife did not wait for
me. When I looked at the clock it still wanted

113

five minutes to ten. I determined to make my
case more favourable at home, and say that it
was ten minutes to ten. Unfortunately, the
speech-blunder spoiled the intent and laid bare
my dishonesty, in which I acknowledged more
than there really was to confess.

This leads us to those speech disturbances
which can no longer be described as speech-
blunders, for they do not injure the individual
word, but affect the rhythm and execution of
the entire speech, as, for example, the stam-
mering and stuttering of embarrassment. But
here, as in the former cases, it is the inner
conflict that is betrayed to us through the dis-
turbance in speech. I really do not believe that
any one will make mistakes in talking in an
audience with His Majesty, in a serious love de-
claration, or in defending one’s name and honour
before a jury; in short, people make no mistakes
where they are all there, as the saying goes.
Even in criticizing an author’s style we are
allowed and accustomed to follow the principle
of explanation, which we cannot miss in the
origin of a single speech-blunder. A clear and
unequivocal manner of writing shows us that
here the author is in harmony with himself, but
where we find a forced and involved expression,
aiming at more than one target, as appropriately
expressed, we can thereby recognize the parti-
cipation of an unfinished and complicated

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Psychopathology of Everyday Life

thought, or we can hear through it the stifled
voice of the author’s self-criticism.¹⁾

“Ce qu’on conçoit bien
S’énonce clairement,
Et les mots pour le dire
Arrivent aisément.”
Boileau, Art Poétique.